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Abstract 
Ens B.J., N.M.J.A. Dankers, M.F. Leopold, H.J. Lindeboom, C.J. Smit, S. van Breukelen, J.W. van der Schans, 2007. 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation. Wageningen, Statutory Research 
Tasks Unit for Nature and the Environment. WOt-rapport 42. 116 p. 9 Fig.; 5 Tab.; 142 ref.; 1 annex 
 
In this report we explore some examples of fisheries that are regulated in such a way that they cause no significant harm to 
the ecosystem. In fact, our leading question is whether such fisheries exist Policy options how fisheries can be managed to 
decrease the negative impact on the ecosystem and the role and state of eco-labelling of fisheries such as the Marine 
Stewardship Council are described. We address the general question whether there are cases where fisheries self-regulation 
contributed to maritime ecosystem conservation. For the North Sea we describe the possible implications of EU directives 
such as the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive and international treaties for fisheries.  
 
Key words: sustainable fisheries, fisheries management, co-management, nature conservation, eco labelling, Marine 
Stewardship Council, EU Habitats Directive, EU Wild Birds Directive 
 
 
Referaat 
Ens B.J., N.M.J.A. Dankers, M.F. Leopold, H.J. Lindeboom, C.J. Smit, S. van Breukelen, J.W. van der Schans, 2007. 
Een internationale vergelijking van visserijbeheer in het kader van natuurbehoud. Wageningen, Wettelijke Onderzoekstaken 
Natuur & Milieu, WOt-rapport 42. 116 blz. 9 fig.; 5 tab.; .142 ref.; .1 bijl.  
 
In dit rapport worden enkele voorbeelden besproken van visserijen die zodanig zijn gereguleerd dat geen significante schade 
wordt aangericht aan het ecosysteem. De leidende vraag is in feite of dergelijke visserijen wel bestaan. Het rapport bespreekt 
beleidsopties voor een zodanig beheer van visserijen dat de negatieve gevolgen voor het ecosysteem worden beperkt, en 
beschrijft de rol en de huidige status van systemen voor eco-keurmerken voor visserij, zoals die van de Marine Stewardship 
Council. Tevens wordt de algemene vraag besproken of er voorbeelden zijn aan te wijzen waarin zelfregulatie door 
visserijbedrijven heeft bijgedragen aan de bescherming van mariene ecosystemen. Voor de Noordzee worden de mogelijke 
implicaties van EU-richtlijnen zoals de Vogel- en Habitat-richtlijn en van internationale visserijverdragen besproken.  
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 Summary 
Throughout the world, fisheries are not only harming themselves through over-fishing (leading 
to collapsing stocks, rent dissipation and, eventually, declining income for the fishermen), but 
also harming the ecosystems where the fisheries take place. This happens through direct 
negative impact on the fished stock and direct negative impacts on non-targeted species via 
bycatches, up to large-scale long-term changes of the ecosystem. Cases where the fishery 
harvests the fished stock in a sustainable manner are few. Cases where the fishery not only 
harvests the fished stock in a sustainable manner, but also does not damage the ecosystem 
are even fewer. In Chapter 1 we define the problem and give a short description of the 
approach that we adopted in this study. 
 
The aim of the current project was to identify examples of viable and sustainable fisheries that 
are regulated in such a way that they cause no significant harm to the ecosystem. The 
objective was to learn lessons on fishery management in the context of nature conservation 
that might be applicable to the Netherlands. Our first step was to describe the legal context 
for nature conservation as it applies to Dutch fisheries. This includes the EU Birds Directive, 
the EU Habitats Directive, the EU Water Framework Directive and the OSPAR convention. 
Chapter 2 provides a glimpse of the challenges that must be overcome by Dutch fisheries 
together with the Dutch government in the coming decades with respect to nature 
conservation in the marine environment. We then set out to assemble international case 
studies of fisheries conducted in such a way that the fishery could be considered sustainable 
for both the fish and the fishermen, and that nature was sufficiently protected. Those cases 
that seemed to meet our criteria and for which we subsequently succeeded in acquiring 
sufficient information on the sustainability of the fishery, the impact on the ecosystem and the 
management system are described in Chapter 3. To these should be added the fisheries 
certified with the ecolabel of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which are described in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Our next step was to organize a workshop (see Annex 1) around these case studies with the 
aim of deciding which of these case studies should be studied in more detail. To this end, a 
draft version of this report was circulated before the workshop to all participants. The many 
comments during the workshop on this draft led us to extensively rewrite and completely 
reorganize the report. Thus, instead of studying one or more of the cases in more detail, we 
focused our efforts on rewriting the report. 
 
Initiatives to improve the sustainability of a particular fishery can derive from the private sector 
or from the public sector. We devote two chapters to initiatives from the private sector. In 
Chapter 4 we focus on one example of self-organisation of the private sector: the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC). In Chapter 5 we address the general issue to what extent 
fishermen self-organisation can contribute to maritime nature conservation. 
 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is an independent, global, non-profit organisation that 
seeks to enhance responsible management of seafood resources and to ensure sustainability 
of global fish stocks and the health of marine ecosystems. It has developed an environmental 
standard for sustainable and well-managed fisheries. It uses a product label (the MSC 
certificate) to reward environmentally responsible fishery management and practises. Principle 
1 states that the stock should not be overfished. Principle 2 states that the fishery should not 
damage the ecosystem. Principle 3 demands an effective management system such that the 
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 first two principles are actually adhered to. On paper, the MSC certified fisheries are viable 
and sustainable fisheries that are regulated in such a way that they cause no significant harm 
to the ecosystem, i.e. exactly the type of well-managed fisheries that this project set out to 
identify. When we studied the fisheries awarded the MSC certificate in some more detail, it 
appeared that the MSC certificate had been awarded to several fisheries where there was still 
considerable uncertainty with regard to the impact on the ecosystem. In some cases, a 
negative impact seemed quite likely. From this it can be concluded that obtaining the MSC 
certificate does not provide an absolute guarantee against damage to the ecosystem. 
However, in these cases MSC requires corrective actions to remedy the potentially negative 
impacts on the ecosystem. Given the many scientific uncertainties with regard to ecosystem 
functioning and fishery impact, the MSC certificate may be a good way of starting a process 
towards reducing the scientific uncertainties and reducing the ecosystem impact. Inside 
nature reserves (marine protected areas, special areas of conservation and special protection 
areas), the added value with respect to nature conservation of the MSC certificate may be 
small. However, outside nature reserves, the MSC certificate has great benefits for both 
nature and the fishery.  
 
There are many cases in the literature where fishermen self-organisation contributes to stock 
preservation. The leading question in Chapter 5 is whether there are also cases where 
fisheries self-organisation contributed to maritime ecosystem conservation? In order to answer 
this question, the first step was to review the literature on fishermen self-organisation or co-
management. It is concluded that co-management is not so much an alternative management 
instrument, but rather it indicates an alternative approach to management decision making, 
whether it includes state-initiated rules, market-based instruments, voluntary agreed 
constraints, or any combination of these. This alternative approach embodies the notion that 
the quality of decision making should not only be judged in terms of performance criteria 
(effects on stocks or fishing communities), but also in terms of process criteria (to what extent 
are basic principles of good governance observed?). The next step was to introduce the 
ecosystem approach to fisheries management, which entails an explicit recognition of the 
complexity and dynamics of marine ecosystems and of the interconnections among its 
component parts. There seems to be an intimate – although as yet not fully understood -- 
connection between over-all ecosystem health and fisheries productivity. Apart from that, 
ecosystem conservation as part of wildlife management has become a legitimate 
management goal in its own right, not just in the terrestrial but increasingly also in the aquatic 
environment. There are several ways in which public as well as private parties, including 
fishermen themselves, can contribute to maritime nature conservation. The institution of 
marine protected areas is one such way, the certification of ecosystem-friendly fisheries 
practices is another one. It is concluded that private sector self-organisation can indeed 
contribute to maritime nature conservation, and it should be pursued more systematically in 
order to bring about a transition towards more sustainable fisheries. 
 
In chapter 5 it is concluded that co-management can only thrive if it is properly embedded in 
the overall governance system in place to manage a fishery. Time did not permit to study this 
interaction between market-based and government-initiated measures in any detail. One 
problem is that parts of the international legislation are still in the process of implementation.  
 
Although this report contains many pages, we feel that we have only just begun to scratch the 
surface of this important topic. We explored different aspects of the problem, but are unable 
to come up with a grand and all-encompassing synthesis. Instead, we end the report with a 
short epilogue (Chapter 6). 
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 Samenvatting 
Over de gehele wereld zien we momenteel een patroon waarbij visserijen niet alleen zichzelf 
benadelen door overbevissing (met als gevolg instortende populaties, teruglopende 
productiviteit en uiteindelijk dalende inkomens voor de vissers), maar ook de ecosystemen 
schaden waarin wordt gevist. Deze schadelijke invloed vindt plaats via rechtstreekse negatieve 
impact op de beviste populatie, via rechtstreekse negatieve impact op niet beviste soorten 
(bijvangst) en via grootschalige veranderingen op langere termijn in het ecosysteem. Er zijn 
maar weinig voorbeelden bekend waarin vispopulaties op een duurzame manier worden 
geoogst, en nog minder voorbeelden waarin niet alleen de beviste populatie duurzaam wordt 
geoogst maar ook geen schade wordt aangericht aan het ecosysteem. In hoofdstuk 1 van dit 
rapport wordt het probleem in kaart gebracht en wordt een korte beschrijving gegeven van de 
voor dit onderzoek gekozen benadering. 
 
Doel van het onderhavige project was het vinden van voorbeelden van levensvatbare en 
duurzame visserijpraktijken, waarbij een zodanig beheer wordt gevoerd dat geen significante 
schade wordt aangericht aan het ecosysteem. Het was onze bedoeling aan dergelijke 
voorbeelden ideeën te ontlenen voor visserijbeheer in het kader van natuurbehoud die zouden 
kunnen worden toegepast in de Nederlandse situatie. De eerste stap in het onderzoek was het 
beschrijven van het wettelijke kader voor natuurbehoud, voor zover van toepassing op de 
Nederlandse visserij. Tot dit kader behoren de Vogel- en Habitatrichtlijnen van de EU, de 
Kaderrichtlijn Water van de EU en de OSPAR-conventie. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt iets getoond van 
de uitdagingen waarvoor de Nederlandse visserij en de Nederlandse overheid zich in de 
komende decennia gesteld zullen zien wat betreft het natuurbehoud in de mariene omgeving. 
Vervolgens zijn een aantal internationale voorbeelden bijeengezocht van visserijen die zodanig 
worden beheerd dat sprake was van duurzame visserijpraktijken voor zowel vis als vissers, 
terwijl het ecosysteem afdoende wordt beschermd. Die voorbeelden die aan onze criteria 
leken te voldoen en waarover we vervolgens voldoende gegevens konden verzamelen 
aangaande de duurzaamheid van de visserij, de gevolgen voor het ecosysteem en de wijze 
van beheer, staan beschreven in Hoofdstuk 3. Hieraan kunnen worden toegevoegd de 
visserijen die het eco-keurmerk van de Marine Stewardship Council hebben gekregen; dit 
wordt beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4. 
 
De volgende stap in het onderzoek was het op basis van de gevonden casestudies 
organiseren van een workshop (zie Bijlage 1), met als doel te beslissen welke van de 
casestudies interessant genoeg waren om nader te worden bestudeerd. Daartoe werd een 
conceptversie van dit rapport vooraf toegezonden aan alle workshopdeelnemers. Naar 
aanleiding van de vele commentaren op dit concept gedurende de workshop hebben we het 
concept grondig herschreven en geherstructureerd. In plaats van het nader bestuderen van 
één of meer cases hebben we daarom onze energie besteed aan het herschrijven van het 
rapport. 
 
Initiatieven om de duurzaamheid van een bepaalde visserij te verbeteren, kunnen komen vanuit 
de particuliere sector of van de overheid. In het rapport worden twee hoofdstukken gewijd aan 
initiatieven vanuit de particuliere sector. In Hoofdstuk 4 ligt de nadruk op één specifiek 
voorbeeld van zelfregulering door de particuliere sector, namelijk de Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC). In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt de algemene vraag besproken in hoeverre zelfregulering 
door de vissers een bijdrage kan leveren aan natuurbehoud in de mariene omgeving.  
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 De MSC is een onafhankelijke, wereldwijde non-profit organisatie die streeft naar een 
verantwoorde wijze van beheren van (zee)visserijproducten, naar een duurzame status voor de 
visvoorraden op de wereld en naar gezonde mariene ecosystemen. De MSC heeft een 
internationale milieunorm opgesteld voor duurzame en zorgvuldig beheerde visserij. De raad 
kent een eco-keurmerk toe (het MSC-certificaat) aan milieuvriendelijk visserijbeheer en 
visserijpraktijken. Dit is gebaseerd op een aantal principes. Principe 1 zegt dat de populatie 
niet mag worden overbevist. Principe 2 stelt dat de visserij het ecosysteem niet mag 
aantasten. Principe 3 vraagt om een effectief beheerssysteem dat ervoor moet zorgen dat 
ook werkelijk aan de eerste twee principes wordt voldaan. Op papier zijn de door de MSC 
gecertificeerde visserijen levensvatbare en duurzame visserijen die zodanig zijn gereguleerd 
dat ze geen schade toebrengen aan het ecosysteem, dus precies de soort zorgvuldige 
beheerde visserij dat we met ons onderzoek trachtten op te sporen. Toen wij echter de MSC-
gecertificeerde visserijen nader gingen bestuderen, leek het erop dat het certificaat in 
verschillende gevallen was toegekend aan visserijen waarbij nog aanzienlijke onzekerheid 
bestond over de mogelijke impact op het ecosysteem, en in sommige gevallen leek een 
negatieve impact zelfs tamelijk waarschijnlijk. Hieruit kan de conclusie worden getrokken dat 
MSC-certificering geen absolute garantie vormt dat er geen schade aan het ecosysteem wordt 
aangericht. In dergelijke gevallen eist de MSC echter wel maatregelen om de eventuele 
negatieve gevolgen voor het ecosysteem te corrigeren. Aangezien uit wetenschappelijk 
onderzoek nog lang niet volledig bekend is hoe ecosystemen functioneren en wat de impact 
van visserij is, is het MSC-certificaat wellicht toch een goed uitgangspunt voor een proces 
waarbij de wetenschappelijke onzekerheden kunnen worden verkleind en de schade aan 
ecosystemen kan worden beperkt. Binnen natuurreservaten (Marine Protected Areas, Special 
Areas of Conservation en Special Protection Areas) zal de toegevoegde waarde van het MSC-
certificaat voor het natuurbehoud waarschijnlijk gering zijn. Maar buiten dergelijke gebieden 
biedt het certificaat grote voordelen voor zowel natuur als visserij. 
 
In de literatuur zijn vele voorbeelden beschreven waarin zelfregulering door vissers heeft 
bijgedragen aan het behoud van visvoorraden. De belangrijkste vraag die in Hoofdstuk 5 aan 
de orde komt is of er ook voorbeelden zijn waarin een dergelijke zelfregulering bijdraagt aan 
het behoud van het mariene ecosysteem. Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, hebben we 
allereerst de literatuur op het gebied van zelfregulering of co-management door vissers 
bestudeerd. Hieruit bleek dat co-management niet zozeer een alternatief beheersinstrument is, 
maar meer een alternatieve benadering aangeeft voor besluitvorming voor het beheer, of het 
nu gaat om door de overheid opgelegde regels, marktinstrumenten, vrijwillig aangegane 
beperkingen of combinaties hiervan. Deze alternatieve benadering is gebaseerd op het idee 
dat de kwaliteit van de besluitvorming niet alleen moet worden beoordeeld met behulp van 
prestatiecriteria (zoals het effect op visvoorraden of vissersgemeenschappen) maar ook met 
procescriteria (bv. in hoeverre worden de basisprincipes van ‘good governance’ in acht 
genomen?). De volgende stap was het toepassen van de ecosysteembenadering op het 
visserijbeheer, wat een expliciete erkenning inhoudt van de complexiteit en dynamiek van 
mariene ecosystemen en van de vele onderlinge verbanden tussen de samenstellende 
componenten. Er lijkt een nauw – zij het nog onvoldoende begrepen – verband te bestaan 
tussen de algehele gezondheidstoestand van ecosystemen en de productiviteit van de visserij. 
Daarnaast is ecosysteembehoud als onderdeel van natuurbehoud zelf een legitiem 
beheersdoel geworden, niet alleen in de terrestrische maar in toenemende mate ook in de 
mariene omgeving. Zowel overheden als particuliere betrokkenen, met inbegrip van de vissers 
zelf, kunnen op verschillende manieren een bijdrage leveren aan het natuurbehoud in zee. Een 
van die manieren is het instellen van beschermde gebieden (Marine Protected Areas), een 
andere is certificering van ecosysteemvriendelijke visserijpraktijken. Geconcludeerd wordt dat 
zelfregulering door de particuliere sector wel degelijk kan bijdragen aan marien natuurbehoud, 
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 en dat een dergelijke zelfregulering meer systematisch zou moeten worden nagestreefd om 
een overgang te bewerkstelligen naar meer duurzame visserij. 
 
De conclusie in Hoofdstuk 5 luidt dat co-management alleen succes kan hebben als het op de 
juiste wijze wordt ingebed in het bestaande governance-systeem dat verantwoordelijk is voor 
het visserijbeheer. De tijd heeft ons ontbroken om deze interactie tussen op de markt 
gebaseerde en door de overheid geïnitieerde maatregelen in detail te bestuderen. Een van de 
problemen hierbij is dat de internationale wetgeving op dit gebied nog niet volledig ten uitvoer 
is gelegd. 
 
Hoewel dit een dik rapport is geworden, hebben wij desondanks het idee dat we nog maar een 
eerste aanzet hebben gegeven tot de bestudering van dit belangrijke onderwerp. We hebben 
diverse aspecten van het probleem bestudeerd, maar kunnen hieruit nog geen grote 
alomvattende synthese destilleren. In plaats daarvan eindigen we ons rapport met een korte 
Epiloog (Hoofdstuk 6). 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Defining the problem 
Fisheries is causing extensive problems 
Fisheries have caused problems world-wide, that are far from trivial and that gravely affect the 
fished populations, a large suite of associated wildlife, the very habitats in which fishery takes 
place, and ultimately also the people involved, i.e. the fishermen themselves, the associated 
industries and in their wake the fisheries scientists, policy makers, and the general public. 
Clear examples are the outstanding environmental issues of European fisheries described by 
Daan & van der Mheen (2005). Fisheries advice, originally aimed at determining take-levels 
that would result in maximum sustainable yields, today often focuses on preserving dwindling 
stocks and struggling fisheries, or attempting to keep or return the stocks to a minimum 
biologically viable size. Depleted stocks have only in few cases returned to former population 
sizes, and most prized fish (or anything else that has been intensively fished, such as whales 
or shellfish) have been greatly reduced in numbers, in some cases possibly to a point of no 
return. With increasing numbers of fish stocks becoming depleted, and fisheries turning to 
previously neglected stocks (because of low market values or high costs for obtaining them) 
the world’s fisheries have moved into a process that has become known as “fishing down the 
food chain” (Pauly et al. 1998). Usually, the fish that act as toppredators grow to a large size 
and hence are the most valuable. As a result, the toppredators are fished first, but as soon as 
these are overfished, the next species to become the target of the fishery are the former food 
species of the toppredators. This process may be repeated, hence the phrase “fishing down 
the food chain”. 
 
Future perspectives 
An optimistic view may be that there is still plenty of fish in the sea (be it different fish than in 
former times), but this line of thinking has been dismissed as “the shifting baseline syndrome” 
(Pauly & Maclean 2003). Our memory appears to be alarmingly short when it comes to 
considering the state of the oceans and we have very little recollection of what a sea once 
looked like in an unfished state. Yet, “long-term” reviews of the state of the oceans reveal that 
the global ocean has lost more than 90% of large predatory fishes, and that new fisheries 
usually follow a “boom and bust” pattern that quickly leads to overexploitation with an 80% 
decline typically occurring within 15 years of industrialized exploitation (Dietz et al. 2003, 
Myers & Worm 2003, Pauly & Maclean 2003, Berkes et al. 2006). Although this pattern, of 
initial increasing stock exploitation by increasing effort, followed by the ultimate crash has 
been observed in many fisheries (Pauly et al. 2002; Pauly & Maclean 2003), the fishing 
industry habitually blames external factors for the downhill slide, rather than the fishing 
industry itself. Often, natural predators (that have “exploded in numbers”), such as whales, 
seals or birds are blamed for the decline in the stock, or climatic influence (“global warming”)1 
or extreme weather events such as “abnormal” storms or “extreme” winters. In fact, it seems 
likely that, compared to unexploited populations, heavily exploited populations are more 
vulnerable to environmental fluctuations (Pauly et al. 2002; Worm et al. 2006). By blaming 
others, it is of course conveniently overlooked that climate and weather variations are of all 
                                                   
1 We do not want to imply that climate change does not influence fish stocks. On the contrary, climate 
change will almost certainly profoundly affect the fish stocks. However, our point is that climate change 
should not be invoked as the sole cause of declining stocks, when these stocks are clearly 
overexploited. 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 13
 ages (and overfishing is not) and that the consumption by piscivorous top-predators is usually 
smaller than that of the fish community itself or the catches of the fishery (Trites et al. 1997; 
Barrett et al. 2001; Kaschner & Pauly 2004; Reilly et al. 2004). Moreover, we have forgotten 
what it was that once drew the fishermen, whalers and sealers to areas such as the Grand 
Banks: its “unlimited” wealth of marine top predators such as large cod, whales, seals and 
seabirds that, in the pristine situation, must have existed there in numbers now no longer 
imaginable despite their consumption rates and despite climatic anomalies that undoubtedly 
also occurred before man arrived at the scene (Jackson et al. 2001; Jackson 2001).  
 
Another factor that usually comes with over-exploitation of certain target fish stocks is that 
numbers of other wildlife may decrease, through unintended bycatches, depletion of prey-
organisms for predators at higher trophic levels, and habitat degradation. In a world that has 
only limited space and biotic resources, but growing human populations and demands for 
protein, modern fishing practice is a road to disaster and many today consider our fisheries a 
sunset industry, unless we can drastically change our way of thinking and fisheries 
management (Daan & van der Mheen 2004, Royal Commission on Environment and pollution 
2004, Board of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment of the United Nations 2005). 
 
Management / how to deal with it 
The underlying problem of over-fishing is that of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968), 
which was recently rephrased as the tragedy of the unmanaged commons (Hardin 1998). In 
situations where the resource (a fish stock) is exploited by many, each individual fisherman, 
company or country will strive to optimise his short-term take at the expense of others, and 
ultimately, of the fish stock. There are ways of dealing with this inherent problem of free 
competition, either through a very strict top-down management of the fisheries, by making one 
fisherman (or company or country) the sole owner of the stock, or by making all resource 
users better herdsmen of the commons by giving them a greater responsibility for their 
actions and allowing rules to evolve over time. Fisheries that are governed by top-down rules 
based on models that are not credible among users often have low compliance and are 
frustrated by a strong resistance from the fishermen. A solution might thus be to make the 
fishermen fully aware of the problem and the need for good “stewardship” and this can only be 
achieved by having a good scientific understanding of the problem and an equally good 
communication with the fishermen who should then govern “their” stock by rules that serve 
their long term interests best (Dietz et al. 2003). An important key to the solution is that all 
fishermen that use the stock should be involved in managing, and that no outsiders should be 
allowed to fish in the common pond (Ostrom 1990; Dietz et al. 2003). Such “adaptive 
governance” probably works best in relatively simple situations, i.e. in fisheries that are small 
in scale or in number of fishermen involved, without the complication of stocks crossing 
international borders and fishermen from more than one community (or country) pursuing 
them. In more complex situations, i.e. internationally managed common fish stocks or 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that can only cover part of the stock’s range, the commons 
problem will probably be a much harder problem to solve. However, in situations where an 
EEZ can cover the whole (fishery on a) stock, such as in geographically isolated areas, its 
declaration and subsequent implementation can be helpful (see e.g. Verbeek & Christiansen 
2003). 
 
Mixed fisheries, or one fishery inadvertently impacting the stocks fished by others, pose 
specific and hard-to-solve problems. Unidirectional or multi-purpose fisheries, such as 
groundfish fisheries, impact many different species at the same time. Protecting one or a few 
of these that are at risk can only be achieved, at the “expense” of the whole fishery. Worse 
even, in terms of attaining the necessary compliance from the fishermen, is when one stock 
needs protection from a bycatch problem stemming from a fishery targeting another stock. 
WOt-rapport 42 14 
 For instance, dangerously low stocks of gadoids in the North Sea would probably benefit from 
a reduction of the bycatch in the flatfish fishery. However, fishermen targeting flatfish might 
not be interested in saving undersized gadoids if this negatively affects their own flatfish 
returns. The incentive to reduce fishing effort or change fishing practices to minimize damage 
to the ecosystem may be even less. Yet, this is precisely what is needed when the area where 
the fishery takes place is declared a nature reserve, or more generally, when a sustainable 
way of fishing is to be achieved. 
 
Project aim 
This then brings us to the aim of the current project (instigated by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency), which is: 
 
to identify examples of viable and sustainable fisheries that are regulated in such a 
way that they cause no significant harm to the ecosystem.  
 
The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP in Dutch) functions as the interface 
between science, policy and politics, producing independent assessments on the quality of the 
environment for people, plants and animals to advise national and international policy-makers2. 
So far, the MNP has dealt mostly with the terrestrial environment, doing no justice to the fact 
that a substantial part of the Dutch territory is part of the aquatic marine environment and the 
fact that this marine environment is increasingly affected by all kinds of human activities. 
Fisheries are among the activities that have a big impact on the marine ecosystem. For these 
reasons, the MNP felt the need to support an investigation comparing different types of 
fisheries management in the context of nature conservation. 
 
 
1.2 The approach 
Research design 
Given the limitations with regard to time and finances and the sheer magnitude of the problem, 
this study could only be of an exploratory nature.  
 
Our first step was to study the international legislation that seeks to protect the marine 
environment and investigate how it might affect current Dutch fisheries. 
 
Our second step was to try to assemble international case studies of fisheries conducted in 
such a way that the fishery could be considered sustainable for both the fish and the 
fishermen, and that nature is sufficiently protected. For this, we relied on the expertise in the 
group and our scientific contacts. When we questioned our international colleagues for 
examples of sustainable fisheries that did not harm nature, some replied that they were not 
aware of fisheries meeting these criteria. Others replied that the only cases they were aware 
of were the fisheries that were certified by the Marine Stewardship Council. However, we also 
succeeded in accumulating a series of non-certified fisheries, potentially meeting our criteria. 
  
Our third step involved the organisation of a workshop. Initially, we aimed to organize a 
workshop around the various case studies and then decide which of these case studies would 
be worth studying in more detail. In preparing the workshop it became clear that such an 
                                                   
2 On the website of the MNP http://www.mnp.nl/en/index.html one finds the following mission statement: 
“The Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) supports national and international policy 
makers by analysing the environmental impact of policies and of trends in society.” 
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 approach would have been too restrictive. The case studies helped us to define the important 
questions, but during the workshop new cases were discussed. Also, much discussion 
focused on the problems of current fisheries in the Netherlands with regard to nature 
conservation and how these could be solved. The workshop was organised together with 
“Stichting de Noordzee”, because it turned out that this conservation organization had very 
similar interests. A draft version of this report was circulated before the workshop to all 
participants and the many comments during the workshop on this draft led us to extensively 
rewrite and completely reorganize the report. Thus, instead of studying one or more of the 
cases in more detail, we focused our efforts on rewriting the report. 
 
During our investigations, it became clear early on that the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
was highly relevant to our research question. The MSC is an independent, global, non-profit 
organisation that seeks to enhance responsible management of seafood resources and to 
ensure sustainability of global fish stocks and the health of marine ecosystems. It has 
developed an environmental standard for sustainable and well-managed fisheries. It uses a 
product label (the MSC certificate) to reward environmentally responsible fishery management 
and practices. We provide some summary data on the fisheries that have succeeded in 
obtaining the MSC certificate. We also describe the MSC principles and the criteria derived 
from these principles that need to be met by the fishery to obtain the MSC certificate. 
Principle 1 states that the stock should not be overfished. Principle 2 states that the fishery 
should not damage the ecosystem. Principle 3 demands an effective management system 
such that the first two principles are actually adhered to. On paper, the MSC certified fisheries 
are viable and sustainable fisheries that are regulated in such a way that they cause no 
significant harm to the ecosystem, i.e. exactly the type of well-managed fisheries that this 
project set out to identify. However, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. We therefore set 
out to assess to what extent the MSC-certificate is a real guarantee against damage to the 
ecosystem from the fishery. 
 
The MSC-certificate is an example of self-organisation of the private sector and should 
therefore be distinguished from state-ordained rules which are the domain of the public sector. 
Instead of focusing on one particular example of private initiative, like the MSC certificate, we 
subsequently decided to address the question to what extent fishermen self-organisation can 
contribute to maritime nature conservation in general. Are there cases where fisheries self-
organisation contributes to maritime ecosystem conservation? Any private initiative must 
always operate within the legal bounds set by the government and international treaties. 
Because most of the national jurisdiction is not effective outside the territorial waters, 
international organisations and the European Union are better equipped to develop jurisdiction 
or a common policy. It is concluded that co-management can only thrive if it is properly 
embedded in the overall governance system in place to manage a fishery. Time did not permit 
to study this interaction between market-based and government-initiated measures in any 
detail. One problem is that parts of the international legislation are still in the process of 
implementation.  
 
 
1.3 Contents of the report 
In Chapter 2 we describe the current state of international nature legislation in relation to 
current Dutch fisheries. This chapter lists the challenges that must be overcome by Dutch 
fisheries together with the Dutch government in the coming decades with respect to nature 
conservation in the marine environment. 
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 In Chapter 3 we describe fisheries that seemed to be conducted in such a way that the fishery 
could be considered sustainable for both the fish and the fishermen, and that nature was 
sufficiently protected. We selected those cases for which we succeeded in acquiring sufficient 
information on the sustainability of the fishery, the impact on the ecosystem and the 
management system. 
 
In Chapter 4 we focus on the Marine Stewardship Council. Our leading question is to what 
extent the MSC-certificate is a real guarantee against damage to the ecosystem from the 
fishery. At the end of the chapter we focus on the relationship between the MSC certificate 
and Dutch fisheries. 
 
In Chapter 5 we address the question to what extent fishermen self-organisation can 
contribute to maritime nature conservation in general. The chapter does not provide 
exhaustive empirical evidence to answer this question, but rather its purpose is to review the 
fisheries management literature. The chapter consists of three parts: a conceptual part in 
which the literature on co-management is reviewed, an empirical part in which the relation 
between co-management and nature conservation is explored, and an analytical part in which 
the points raised in the conceptual part are used to discuss the cases introduced in the 
empirical part. 
 
In Chapter 6 we reflect on the lessons to be learnt from our exploratory investigations. 
 
In Annex 1 we provide a program of the workshop that we jointly organised with the “Stichting 
de Noordzee”, the list of participants and a summary of the conclusions. 
 
 
1.4 Glossary, Acronyms and species names 
The nature of our subject made it unavoidable that the report came to contain many 
abbreviations, technical concepts and names of animal species. These may not be familiar to 
the general reader. We have therefore included a glossary, a list of acronyms and a list of 
species at the end of this report. The list of species gives the English name, the Latin name 
and the Dutch name for all species, not only fish, but also crustaceans, bivalves, birds etc., 
which are mentioned in the text. The species list is ordered alphabetically for the English 
names. 
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 2 The implication of European Directives and the 
OSPAR convention for fisheries in the Netherlands 
Because most of the national jurisdiction (including legislation on nature conservation) is not 
effective outside the territorial waters, international organisations and the European Union are 
better equipped to develop jurisdiction or a common policy. Within the OSPAR framework 
criteria have been developed on the basis of which sites can be designated as Marine 
Protected Areas. So far, designations have not been made. The EU-legislation is still further 
developed and new proposals for marine habitats are in the pipeline. Both the OSPAR 
convention and the EU-Directives strongly focus on habitats (within specific areas) and/or 
species. In this respect they are quite different from the market-based approach of 
management and protection. One problem is that parts of the international legislation are still 
in the process of implementation. In this chapter we describe the current state of international 
nature legislation in relation to current Dutch fisheries. 
 
 
2.1 Legislation of the North Sea  
The North Sea territorial waters at more than 1 km from the coast are not part of the 
jurisdiction from communities or provinces. The national government is the only authority 
responsible for legislation, policy making and management for that area. For these territorial 
waters the EU Birds and Habitats directives are applicable. National authorities have struggled 
for years with the question whether the EU Birds and Habitats Directives are also applicable to 
non-territorial waters, outside the 12 miles zone. Following questions in the European 
Parliament (E-3529/96, OJ C138, 5.5.97) the EU stated in 1997 that the EU Directives also 
apply for non-territorial waters3. A seminar on this subject, held in Morecambe Bay (UK) in 
1997 (Coffey 1998), only partly answered the question how these directives can be 
implemented in non-territorial waters. Because the Interpretation Manual of European Union 
Habitats (European Commission 2003) also deals with typical marine habitats it can be 
concluded that it has always been the intention from the EU Commission that marine habitats 
should become part of the Natura2000 network. This implies that also in non-territorial waters 
Special Areas of Conservation can be designated. This philosophy has been confirmed by the 
English Supreme Court, due to which the UK has designated sites outside its territorial waters 
(McLeod et al. 2002). Following the publication of clear statements by the European 
Commission4 (European Commission 2002) other countries have done the same. 
 
 
                                                   
3 “As far as Member States have competence, it applies to the exclusive economic zones. However, the 
marine species and habitats concerned generally have their main range inside territorial waters”.  
4 Action 2: The Commission will pursue its efforts to fully implement the EU Habitat and Birds Directives 
in the marine environment including Exclusive Economic Zones. The Commission will develop by 2005, 
together with the regional conventions, a programme aimed at enhancing the protection of species and 
habitats in European waters. Consequently, the Commission will develop proposals to adapt the annexes 
to the Habitats Directive containing marine habitats and species to be protected under the Natura 2000 
Network to scientific and technical progress.  
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 2.2 Developments in the Netherlands 
The Nota Ruimte (Ministries VROM, LNV, V&W and EZ 2004), a policy document outlining 
spatial planning strategies for the Netherlands, describes the future protection strategy for the 
Dutch part of the North Sea. The whole coastal zone along the Wadden Sea islands, the 
mainland coast and along the Delta area up to a depth of 20 m, the Frisian Front, the Oyster 
Grounds, Klaver Bank and Dogger Bank have been highlighted as areas with special ecological 
values, deserving protection through the designation of a coherent network of protected areas 
in the North Sea. A recent Alterra/RIKZ report (Lindeboom et al. 2005) confirmed this. The 
highest densities of birds, marine mammals, fish and macrobenthic species are present in 
these areas. This report also made suggestions for the designation of areas as either Special 
Protection Areas under the Birds Directive, as Special Areas of Conservation under the 
Habitats Directive or as Marine Protected Areas under the OSPAR convention. The proposals 
made in these two documents have recently been implemented in the Integraal Beheersplan 
Noordzee (IBN) 2015 (IDON 2005) which presents the governmental policy for the coming 10 
years. The proposals from the Nota Ruimte and the Alterra/RIKZ report have largely been 
accepted in IBN2015 but the areas will not be designated before 2008 (IDON 2005). Possible 
restrictions on future human activities in these areas have not yet been worked out. 
 
 
2.3 Habitats Directive 
According to the Habitats Directive the following habitats occurring in the Dutch part of the 
North Sea can be designated as Special Areas of Conservation (SAC):  
o 1110, Sandbanks which are slightly covered by sea water all the time 
o 1140, Mudflats and sand flats not covered by seawater at low tide. This habitat type 
includes sands and muds of the coasts of the oceans, their connected seas and 
associated lagoons, not covered by sea water at low tide 
o 1170, Reefs. This habitat type includes submarine, or exposed at low tide, rocky 
substrates and biogenic concretions, which arise from the sea floor in the sub littoral zone 
but may extend into the littoral zone 
o 1180 Submarine structures made by leaking gases. This habitat type includes submarine 
complex structures, consisting of rocks, pavements and pillars up to 4 m high. These 
formations are due to the aggregation of sandstone by carbonate cement resulting from 
microbial oxidation of gas emissions, mainly methane. 
 
In designated areas these habitats have to be managed so that the Conservation Status 
remains stable or is improved. For marine areas this implies, among others, that physical 
processes (sedimentation, erosion, currents) can act in an undisturbed and natural way, 
leading to mosaics of naturally occurring habitat types each featuring a corresponding fauna 
and flora. The presence of a naturally occurring fauna and flora is an essential criterion in the 
assessment of the Conservation Status of a particular habitat type. At the same time the 
population developments of typical species for that particular habitat are included in such an 
assessment, as well as the distribution of species within the site, and whether the site fulfils 
the ecological needs of typical species. Assessments on the Conservation Status of Special 
Conservation Areas have to be carried out at 6 years intervals. Management changes can be 
enforced by verdicts and statements from the European Court. The implementation of the 
Directive in marine habitats is still in the process of being developed. It will certainly take 
several years before each country has designated sites and set out criteria by which the 
Conservation Status can be determined and evaluated.  
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 2.4 Birds Directive 
Based on the presence of species mentioned in Annex 1 of the Birds Directive, areas can be 
designated as Special Protection Areas (SPA). These species include: Gavia stellata, Gavia 
arctica, Gavia immer, Podiceps auritus, Hydrobates pelagicus, Oceanodroma leucorhoa, 
Sterna sandvicensis, Sterna hirundo, Sterna paradisaea, Sterna albifrons and Chlidonias niger. 
Additionally areas can be designated when over 1% of the biogeographical population of a 
waterbird species is present or when regularly over 20,000 waterbirds occur in a certain 
area. Assessments of the Conservation Status are carried out for the species for which the 
area has been designated. In such an assessment population developments are included, as 
well as the distribution of species within the site, whether the site fulfils the ecological needs 
of the species and, in some areas, their breeding success. Also in areas designated as 
Special Protection Areas assessments on the Conservation Status have to be made every 6 
years. Management changes can be enforced by verdicts and statements from the European 
Court. 
 
 
2.5 OSPAR 
Annexes A and B of the OSPAR convention describe the criteria through which an area can be 
designated as a Marine Protected Area (MPA). Annex A describes the ecological criteria; 
Annex B describes how to deal with priorities when choices have to be made between areas. 
These are different from priorities in the Birds and Habitats Directives. For instance: an MPA in 
the OSPAR framework can have a higher priority when there is a stronger basis for it under 
stakeholders. MPA’s under the OSPAR convention can be selected using criteria like:  
1. The occurrence of threatened or declining species and habitats 
2. The occurrence of globally or regionally important species or habitats 
3. The ecological importance of habitats (whether an area is especially important as a 
feeding area, breeding area, moulting area, wintering area, nursery area, spawning area 
or whether the area is characterized by a high production or the presence of high 
proportions of biogeographical populations) 
4. A high biodiversity 
5. Whether the area is characterized by a high sensitivity, representativity or whether the 
area is characterized by pristine nature 
 
Areas to be designated have to fulfil a number of these criteria, but not all. The designation of 
Marine Protected Areas under the OSPAR convention is carried out by the member states. 
Member states have research and monitoring obligations on the status of habitats and/or 
species but there is no jurisdiction to enforce these obligations. Member states do not have 
possibilities to enforce changes in the management or protection of MPA’s in other countries. 
OSPAR’s intensions are to harmonize the international conventions on the protection of marine 
habitats. When the Habitats and Bird Directives become more fully implemented in marine 
waters it is likely that OSPAR criteria will become integrated in the toolbox of the other 
Directives.  
 
MPA’s can also be designated for other reasons than those formulated by OSPAR. Several 
examples and a comprehensive summary of the implications of the designation as an MPA 
have been presented in Chapters 5.7 and 5.8 of this report.  
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 2.6 Water Framework Directive 
The Water Framework Directive may have large consequences for the water quality in inland 
water systems and coastal waters but the Directive has no obligations towards waters more 
than 1 km from the coast. The water quality in nearby coastal waters, however, has to fulfil 
criteria regarding hydromorphological components, tidal regime, phytoplankton biomass, 
abundance of benthic fauna, salinity and oxygen and nutrient contents. The water quality in 
areas off the coast can only indirectly improve by benefiting from improvements in the coastal 
zone. There are no criteria on fishes. The Water Framework Directive is currently in the 
process of being implemented. When effective a process of water quality improvement will 
come into force according to guidelines set out by the EC.  
 
 
2.7 Effects of fisheries in the North Sea and adjacent 
coastal waters 
In a recent study on the effects of human activities in the Dutch part of the North Sea the 
effects of fishery activities at the Klaver Bank and Dogger Bank were classified as 
“considerable negative effects”. The effects of fisheries at the Oyster Grounds, the Frisian 
Front and in the whole North Sea coastal zone were classified as “strong” (Lindeboom et al. 
2005). In order to consider the effects of fishing in the proposed SPA’s (Birds Directive), 
SAC’s (Habitats Directive) and MPA’s (OSPAR) an attempt has been made to describe the 
fishing methods applied in the North Sea and their effects. This has been done because there 
is a large difference in the effects of fishing methods. Some methods cause considerable 
collateral damage to the habitat or to non-target species. Other methods may be highly 
selective. Beam trawl fishery in the North Sea affects both the demersal fish stocks and the 
seafloor (and the macrobenthic community living there) whereas pelagic fishery (with some 
precautions) does not affect the sea floor but only the fish stocks in the water column (and 
potentially the higher trophic levels that are dependant on these fish stocks). When 
considering the measures that have to be taken to safeguard the habitats mentioned in the 
Habitats Directive and the fish stocks, birds and mammals depending on these, the existing 
differences between fishing techniques and their side-effects also have to be taken into 
account. Table 1 presents an inventory of which fishery techniques play a role in those areas 
of the North Sea and adjacent coastal waters where conservation measures are to be 
expected. Table 2 presents an overview of the ecosystem effects of different fisheries 
techniques. 
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 Table 1 Overview of current knowledge on commercial fishery techniques in the proposed Dutch 
SAC’s, SPA’s and MPA’s. When effects in specific sites are expected this has been marked with √. 
For each proposed site a tentative prediction on its future protection regime has been made, based 
upon the ecological values of the sites that have been described in Lindeboom et al. (2005). 
Abbreviations stand for: BD=Birds Directive; HD=Habitats Directive, OSPAR=OSPAR Convention. 
Bold characters indicate areas that have already been designated under one of the Directives. 
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Wadden Sea 
(intertidal) BD, HD  
  √     √  
Wadden Sea 
(subtidal) BD, HD √ 
  √    √ √  
Ooster- +  
Westerschelde 
(intertidal) 
BD, HD  
  √ 
    √  
Ooster- +  
Westerschelde 
(subtidal) 
BD, HD √ 
  √ 
   √ √  
Voordelta BD, HD √ √ √ √   √ √   
part of coastal 
zone 
BD, HD 
OSPAR? √ 
√ √ √ √  √ √   
Klaver Bank HD OSPAR? √ 
√ √  √ √ √    
Dogger bank HD OSPAR? √ 
√ √  √ √ √   √ 
Frisian Front BD OSPAR? √ 
√ √  √ √ √    
Oyster Grounds OSPAR √ √ √  √ √ √    
 
 
Table 2 Overview of the effects of commercial fishery techniques on the fauna (macrobenthos, 
fishes, birds, seals, cetaceans) of the North Sea. When effects are certain or likely this has been 
marked with √. Probable or possible effects are marked by +?. 
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Demersal fish √ √ √ √ √  √ +? √ √ 
Pelagic fish  √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Macrobenthos √ +? +? √   +?   √ 
Birds +?   √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Seals +?    √ +? √ +? √ √ 
Cetaceans +?    √ +? √ +?  √ 
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 Beam trawl fishery is carried out all over the North Sea, although the intensity of this type of 
fishing is smaller in the northernmost part of the North Sea (Lindeboom et al. 2005). This 
technique is primarily used for demersal fish species and Brown shrimps Crangon crangon. 
The gear used for this type of fishery slightly digs into the sediment, leaving tracks and 
disturbing the upper sediment layer (10-60 mm, Gubbay & Knapman 1999). The extent to 
which the seafloor is affected depends on the sediment type (Lindeboom & de Groot 1998). 
Main effect of beam trawl fishery is the extraction of demersal fishes from the ecosystem. 
Additionally, there is a considerable bycatch of non-target species, including damage to 
echinoderms, worms, crustaceans, bivalves and non-target fish species. These effects differ 
between substrates and currents and depend also on the penetration of the fishing gear in the 
sediment. Even the thick-shelled Arctica islandica may be severely affected (Gubbay & 
Knapman 1999). There is evidence that beam trawling affects the structure and composition 
of the benthic communities in the North Sea, favouring short-lived, opportunistic and rapidly 
resettling species and damaging epifauna and shallow infauna. In areas with little current 
movement the physical effects may be visible for weeks or months (Gubbay & Knapman 
1999). Slow growing, fragile reef species (like Sabellaria) are vulnerable as well, their 
resettlement may take years. In areas which are fished on a regular basis beam trawl fishery 
may prevent the re-settlement of Reefs (Habitat type 1170) altogether. Scavenging species, 
like Whelks Buccinum undatum, Sea urchin Strongylocentrotus pallidus and several worm and 
fish species, may benefit from these activities. 
 
Twinrigging has been developed in the 1950’s in Mexico. The technique has been imported 
in a slightly modified way in Europe by Danish fishermen around 1983, firstly mainly for 
catching small crustaceans (Nephros norvegicus and Pandalus borealis). Since then the 
technique, by which 2 trawl nets are being pulled by 1 fishing vessel at low speed has been 
further developed. Currently twinrigging is also used for catching pelagic roundfish and 
demersal fish, since 1999 also by Dutch fishermen. The technique, which is considered to be 
highly efficient, is especially suitable for low powered ships. New developments include the 
use of 3 nets (multirig). Because of the low speed at which twinrigging is practised the 
technique is expected to have small or no direct effects on birds, marine mammals or other 
bycatch species (den Heijer & Keus 2001).  
 
Snurrevaad-fishery. This originally Danish method is currently only applied at a small scale 
by Dutch fishermen. The technique dates from the mid-1800’s and has been applied in the 
Netherlands since the 1920’s. is relatively old. The technique consists of fencing off an area 
of seafloor and the water column above it by a net, which is then pulled in towards the ship. 
The technique can only be applied during daylight and can therefore only in summer. It has 
gradually become less popular over time but since the 1980’s attempts have been made to 
revitalize the snurrevaad-fishery again, mainly because it yields good quality large fish and 
because fuel costs are relatively very low. Although no proper research has been carried out 
on unwanted bycatch of this type of fishery the side-effects are considered to be low. This is 
mainly due to the low speed at which the net is pulled in (den Heijer & Keus 2001). 
 
Shellfish and mussel seed dredging (on Mussels Mytilus edulis and Cockles Cerastoderma 
edule) in shallow coastal areas like the Wadden Sea and the Delta area has been subject of 
extensive debate and research over the 1990s and in the past few years. Because of negative 
effects on shellfish stocks, sediment structure and consequently on the numbers of shellfish 
consuming birds (Eider Somateria mollissima, Oystercatcher Haematopus ostralegus and Knot 
Calidris canutus) mechanical harvesting of Cockles has recently been completely banned from 
the Wadden Sea and regulated in the Oosterschelde and Westerschelde. In the Wadden Sea 
2000 ha of stable intertidal mussel beds are now being safeguarded from mussel dredging. 
Whether mussel seed fishery can continue on “wild” subtidal and the remaining intertidal 
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 mussel beds is currently under investigation. The Birds and Habitats Directives played an 
important role in these decisions. Shellfish fishery on other species (Spisula, Ensis) 
concentrates on the coastal zone, although there are intentions to start up fishery activities in 
the Frisian Front and Oyster Grounds on species like Arctica islandica. Fishing for shellfish 
often requires the use of powerful suction dredging techniques. Since Spisula is a species 
living on top of the sediment surface, fishing for Spisula only affects the upper sediment layer. 
Ensis lives up to 50 cm deep in the sediment. This type of fishing requires more powerful 
machinery and will affect the seafloor severely, probably destroying all macrobenthic life in the 
fished areas and locally affecting the sediment composition. Ensis fishery may leave trenches 
of 0.5-3.5 m wide and 0.25-0.6 m deep in the sediment (Hall et al. 1990). Recovery of the 
sediment may take weeks or months, even in mobile sediments (Gubbay & Knapman 1999). 
Recovery of the infauna may take months and for some species even years.  
 
Gill nets are fine structured nets that float vertically in the water column. They are used to 
catch demersal as well as pelagic fish species which become entangled in the nets. Although 
gill netting is a relatively selective technique in theory, it can accidentally lead to bycatch of 
birds and sea mammals (Jefferson & Currey 1994). In the UK accidental entanglement of 
Harbour porpoises is considered to be the most frequent cause of death of stranded 
porpoises. Considering their slow reproductive rate this could be a serious threat to the 
sustainability of discrete populations (Gubbay & Knapman 1999). When close to the seafloor 
surface many species of scavenging invertebrates may attack captured fishes. Such 
invertebrate species may turn into unwanted bycatch when the nets are lifted. An accidental 
risk is the loss of this type of nets. When lost such nets can behave like “ghost nets” in which 
many different species of invertebrates, fish, birds and sea mammals may get entangled and 
die. Under calm weather conditions such “ghost nets” may be active for up to 6 months 
(Dawson 1991; Kaiser & Spencer 1996). Gill netting may lead to bycatch of species listed in 
Annex 2 of the Habitat Directive (Allis shad Alosa alosa, Twaite shad Alosa fallax, Lampern 
Lampetra fluviatilis, Sea lamprey Petromyzon marinus and Sturgeon Acipenser sturio). In the 
Netherlands, gill netting is mainly used for sport fishing near wrecks. At the same time gill 
netiing is used at a large scale by Danish fishermen (den Heijer & Keus 2001. 
 
Long-lining is carried out at a small scale over the most of the North Sea. Theoretically long-
lining is a selective way of fishing but side effects are that seabirds may get attracted to the 
catch and become victim of the hooks when scavenging on captured fishes (Gubbay & 
Knapman 1999). Long-lines may get lost resulting in the entanglement of non-target species, 
including birds and sea mammals. 
 
Pair trawling is carried out at a rather small scale over most of the North Sea. Main target 
species are shoal fishes like Herring but pair fishing may also be applied for catching 
demersal species. In the latter case the side-effects may be comparable to those of beam 
trawl fishery. When used for shoal fishing this type of fishery may incidentally result in the 
bycatch of sea mammals.  
 
Angling from small ships (both professional and as sport angling) concentrates very much on 
the coastal zone. Angling is a selective way of fishing with few side effects. However, fishing 
gear may get lost easily when angling is carried out in the neighbourhood of ship wracks, 
preferred locations for angling because many species concentrate in the vicinity of wracks. 
Lost fishing gear may result in the entanglement of non-target species, including birds and sea 
mammals. 
 
Fyke nets are operated by professional fishermen and recreational fishermen, mainly in 
intertidal waters. Apart from fishes sometimes seals and diving waterbirds are captured (and 
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 locally sea otters). Drowning of seals (and otters) in fykes can be prevented through the use of 
square guards in the fyke entrance, which can be passed by fishes but not by seals (Vincent 
Wildlife Trust 1988; Reijnders et al. 2005). Fykes may lead to bycatch of species listed in 
Annex 2 of the Habitat Directive, especially of Sea lamprey Petromyzon marinus (pers. comm. 
from fishermen from Wieringen, the Netherlands). 
 
Bulk fishery using fine mesh nets is probably only carried out at the Dogger Bank. It is mainly 
used for catching large quantities of sandeel which are removed from the nets by using 
powerful pumps. Probably this type of fishery is selective in the species which are captured. 
Because very high quantities of fish are captured this type of fishery may have side effects on 
the food availability of many species of birds and sea mammals depending on sand eel, which 
constitutes a staple food source for many marine species.  
 
 
2.8 Discussion 
2.8.1 Impact of protective measures on Dutch fisheries 
In areas which already have been designated under the Birds and/or the Habitats Directives 
like the Dutch part of the Wadden Sea, the Oosterschelde and the Westerschelde mechanical 
cockle fishery has been banned altogether (Wadden Sea) or has been regulated 
(Oosterschelde, Westerschelde). The effects of mussel seed dredging are currently being 
evaluated by means of an appropriate assessment within the framework of the European 
Directives and national jurisdiction in which these Directives have been implemented. Shrimp 
fishery in coastal waters will have to be evaluated in the same way.  
 
As mentioned earlier in the Dutch EEZ five marine areas have been highlighted which qualify on 
the basis of either the presence of habitat type 1110 (Habitats Directive), the presence of bird 
concentrations (Birds Directive) or the occurrence of a diverse fauna (OSPAR). The Dutch 
government now is in the process of considering whether the proposed areas should be 
suggested to the European Commission, to become future SAC’s of SPA’s. The EU, after 
consulting the European Topic Centre in Paris will report back to the Dutch government 
whether they agree with the proposed sites and whether the EU considers the proposed areas 
as large enough and appropriate. Hence, the final designation will only be made after an 
agreement between the national government and the EU.  
 
According to the Nota Ruimte (2004) existing use (such as fishery) can continue in these 
areas. New developments (plans, projects) that can have a significant effect on habitat 
characteristics or the natural values in these areas are not accepted if no appropriate 
assessment has been made. Due to a ruling of the European Court of Justice on Cockle 
fishery in the Dutch part of the Wadden Sea (case C-127/02 from September 2004 this policy 
may have to be changed. In many cases also existing use will have to be taken into account. 
Hence, appropriate assessments on existing use (such as fishery activities) in proposed SPA’s 
and SAC’s in the North Sea may be necessary in the future. As long as these areas have not 
been designated under the Birds or Habitat Directive or the OSPAR Convention no protective 
measures are in force yet.  
 
Whether restrictions will have to be applied to fishery in designated areas will depend on the 
values to be protected. These are different under the Birds and Habitats Directives: 
o The protection regime deriving from the Birds Directive focuses on species living within 
specific areas (SPA’s). In areas which will be designated under the Birds Directive the 
Conservation Status of the birds for which the site has been designated should be 
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 favourable. Obviously fishery removes potential food from the ecosystem which cannot be 
used by birds using that particular site. However, as long as the food stocks in the SPA 
fulfil the requirements of the birds living in that site its Conservation Status for a particular 
bird species can still be favourable. The restrictions upon fishery in such areas will have to 
be studied in advance in order to determine what restrictions are necessary. 
Developments, both in terms of fish stocks as well as in terms of bird use (numbers, 
distribution) will have to be monitored properly in order to adapt the management regime, 
when necessary. This implies that for each site a profound analysis on the natural values 
will have to be carried out prior to its designation, combined with an analysis how fishery 
could negatively affect the Conservation Status of those bird species for which it has been 
designated under the Birds Directive.  
o The protection regime deriving from the Habitats Directive focuses on habitats and on 
species living within specific areas (SAC’s). In such areas specific habitats should be 
protected. Activities affecting the seafloor (like beam trawl fishery and shellfish dredging) 
may have to be restricted or maybe even banned because they may severely conflict with 
the Conservation Status of the habitat. This implies that pelagic fishery may still be 
possible in SAC’s as long as the Conservation Status for marine mammals remains 
favourable. Also in this case a profound analysis on the natural values of a site has to be 
carried out prior to its designation, combined with an analysis how fishery could negatively 
affect the habitats for which that site has been designated under the Habitat Directive. 
Such an analysis should include the Conservation Status of seals and Cetaceans for which 
it is designated under the Habitats Directive. 
 
2.8.2 Government-based versus market-based protection 
In chapter 4 it is concluded that from the point of view of nature protection, the added value of 
the market-based MSC-certificate was not very high for fisheries inside nature reserves 
protected under the EU Birds and/or Habitats Directive, but that outside such SPA’s and/or 
SAC’s, the contribution of the MSC-certificate to nature conservation seemed substantial. This 
chapter demonstrates that there is also an added value to the MSC-certificate in areas 
declared SPA and/or SAC. The MSC certification focuses on wise use of species and limited 
(acceptable) influence on habitat features. MSC certification is not restricted to a specific 
area. It focuses on a sound exploitation of seafood stocks and the protection of the 
ecosystem whereas the Birds Directive on the protection of birds in SPAs and the 
conservation of the ecosystem these birds live in. The Habitats Directive focuses primarily on 
the conservation of specific habitat types, the protection of a limited number of species using 
these habitats and an even more limited number of species that require protection in general. 
OSPAR focuses mainly on the protection of declining species and deteriorating habitats and 
biodiversity. MSC certification can contribute to a protection regime from the Birds Directive in 
areas designated for sensitive bird species because in such areas a wise exploitation of 
seafood stocks can still be possible. The same applies for areas where the conservation of 
seafloor habitats is the primary goal. MSC certification can also be applied for the protection 
of species in Marine Protected Areas designated under the OSPAR convention. MSC can be 
combined with restrictions emerging from the European Directives and OSPAR and play an 
additional role in a wise exploitation in such areas. Whether the MSC certificate actually 
improves nature protection in areas that are already legally protected one way or another, 
remains to be seen. 
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 2.9 Conclusions 
The Birds and Habitats Directives offer a suitable framework for an objective assessment of 
the effects of human activities on the Conservation Status of species and ecosystems. This is 
especially so because national jurisdiction on most topics (like nature conservation) in the 
Netherlands stops at the 12-mile border line. Hence, the directives can play a valuable and 
partly complementary role in the management of species and habitats, next to measures and 
policies described in the following chapters.  
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 3 Promising cases 
In this chapter a number of fisheries are described that are regulated in such a way that 
fishing does not significantly harm the ecosystem. At least, that was our impression of these 
cases when we started our study and assembled the information pertaining to these cases. 
The cases were selected on the basis of experience of the members of the project team, or 
were suggested to us by international contacts. Thus, the cases do not represent an 
exhaustive review of all instances of sustainable fisheries that do not damage the ecosystem. 
Additional cases which have acquired certification of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
are described in Chapter 45. For each of the cases, we tried to collect information on: (a) the 
fishery and the impact of the fishery on the status of the ecosystem and fished stock, (b) the 
economic value of the fishery for the fisherman, so as to be able to compare different 
fisheries and give insight in the scale and importance of the fishery, (c) the (institutional) 
regulation of the fishery and the role of fishermen in regulation. We did not always succeed in 
acquiring all the information within the time available. In some instances we did not proceed 
beyond a very superficial description of the fishery and we decided to exclude such cases 
from our report. 
 
 
3.1 Fishery and aquaculture in Ria Formosa, Portugal 
Introduction 
The Ria Formosa is situated in the Algarve in the south of Portugal to the east of Faro, and a 
small part west of Faro, with a total area of 17.000 ha (Figure 1). The Ria Formosa is a 
shallow lagoon. Towards the sea, it is limited by a non-continuous belt of sandy dunes formed 
by two peninsulas and five barrier islands that separate the lagoon from the Atlantic Ocean. 
Six inlets allow good exchange of the water with the sea. 50-75% of the water mass is 
exchanged each tidal cycle. The entire water body is sheltered with an average depth of 3 m. 
The Ria includes habitats such as salt marshes, mud flats, sand banks and dunes interspersed 
by a branched system of channels, some of which are navigable. More than 50% of the area 
consists of intertidal flats. The intertidal flats are largely covered by Seagrass and Spartina. 
90% of the Ria Formosa area is listed as a Natural Park (1987), Ramsar Site, Special 
Protection Area (EU Wild Birds directive) and Special Area of Conservation (EU Habitats 
Directive) (Michler, 2003). 
 
 
                                                   
5 During completion of this report the Halibut fishery described in this chapter actually acquired the MSC 
certificate. 
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Figure 1  Map of Ria Formosa (source: Asmus, 2000). 
 
 
Type of fishery or culture 
A variety of species is exploited in different manners: bivalve culture, finfish culture, fishing by 
gear and gathering/colleting of invertebrates. The Ria Formosa has a long history of bivalve 
harvesting, especially of clams (Ruditapes decussates). 80% of Portugal’s mollusc fishery is 
harvested in the Ria Formosa (Coelho et al 2002, Michler, 2003). Around 20% of the total 
area of Ria Formosa is occupied by on-growing banks of R. decussates, that are cultured 
throughout the entire lagoon and are the most important commercial species in the area 
(Coelho et al 2002). Other species of significance include the clam Ruditapes romboides, 
Spisula solida, cockle, razor shells (Ensis) and oysters (Crassostrea angulata and Ostrea 
edulis) (Coelho et al 2002, Michler, 2003). Bivalves are cultured in lots but also manually 
collected on the intertidal flats. 
 
There are 1319 licenses for bivalve culture lots with an area of around 450 ha (Michler, 
2003). Many lots are not larger than 50 x 50 m. The lots are well maintained and weeds are 
removed. The lots are used by single persons organised in cooperatives using manual 
methods for seeding and harvesting. Seed is collected from natural banks and “planted” in the 
lots (stock husbandry). The annual harvest of this bivalve is about 3000 tons per year. 
Average bivalve production is 0.5 kg/m-2 (Michler, 2003).  
 
Much of the finfish farming is carried out in converted saltpans or salinas where fish 
production depends on the benthic organisms present. Total area for finfish culture is around 
100 ha and there are 9 license holders (Michler, 2003). Main species are seabass and 
seabream. The main water reservoir of the salinas and the extensive aquaculture ponds 
behave like small lagoons where there are one or more openings to a tidal channel. The yield 
of fish (in culture ponds which have water exchange with the estuary) is in excess of 22-25 
g/m2 (Gamito, 1997). Gamito (1997) warns for problems with anoxia if attempts are made to 
increase production by fertilisation or food addition which may provoke rapid deterioration and 
endanger all production.  
 
Parallel tot the cultivation of bivalve molluscs and other fishing activities, there is a large 
activity related to the commercial gathering of bivalves on natural banks and the collection of 
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 different invertebrates on the flats and in the intertidal zone, undertaken by hand or adequate 
individual tools (Michler, 2003). There are around 3000 licenses for commercial collection of 
bivalves, these include licenses for harvesting seed to grow in the culture lots. In public areas 
it is also allowed to collect invertebrates for own use. 
 
Artisan fishing is also an important activity in the Ria with many people involved (Michler, 
2003). Fishing gear has remained artisanal and is mainly limited to small gear. Nonetheless an 
increase in effort and in the efficiency of the gear has led to an increase in catches of juvenile 
fish which use the area as nursery site. 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
There is not much evidence of serious impact of marine aquaculture on the environment, 
although some farmed stocks of clams have suffered from overcrowding (ICES, 2003). In the 
public area it is busy with people collecting shellfish. There is much disturbance of foraging 
birds.  
 
Status of the fished stock 
The annual harvest of bivalves is stable around 3000 tons per year over the last 10 years 
(ICES, 2003; Michler, 2003). There is, however, concern that the intensification of fishing 
activities has led to a high pressure on natural banks and juveniles of shellfish. Particularly the 
group of razor shells is exposed to high pressure and the stock is expected to decline within a 
few years.  
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
A large number of people in the Ria Formosa area are involved in fishing. It is estimated that 
20% of the active population is directly or indirectly dependent on the fishery sector (Michler, 
2003). The importance of the fishery, particularly of the bivalve culturing and gathering 
activities, is attributed to the high productivity of the lagoon and the high commercial value of 
bivalves. Prices on the local market are for Ruditapes decusstaus €13-14 /kg, €2-3 for 
cockle and up to €20 /kg for razor shells (Ensis). The sector of bivalve culturing is not a 
professionalized sector and quite a lot of people are performing this business for their own 
subsidence and for increasing the family’s income without officially declaring their profits 
(Michler, 2003).  
 
According to the official data the value of cultured clams in Portugal is € 20–30 million. Value 
of the finfish production in Portugal is € 10-15 million. Most of this production comes from the 
Ria Formosa (ICES, 2003).  
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
Unknown 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
Bivalve culture, fish culture and fisheries are regulated by licenses. Fishing gear that can be 
used is regulated by legislation. However, a lot of illegal fishing with beam trawls, beach 
seines and other unpermitted gear still takes place. In public areas it is allowed to collect for 
own consumption to a maximium of 2 kg/species (Michler, 2003). However, a lot of people 
without having licenses sell products to the local market. 
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 3.2 Fishery and aquaculture in the Galician Ria’s, Spain  
Introduction 
Galician Ria’s are located on the Spanish north-west coast. They are under influence of the 
Atlantic Ocean. The Galician coastline is more than 1200 km long. There are numerous 
coastal embayments or ria’s and shallow oceanic areas with intertidal flats.  
 
 
Figure 2 Map of the Galician Ria’s (Freire 2002). 
 
 
Type of fishery or culture 
In the Galician Ria’s a great variety of fishing/aquaculture activities are carried out: bivalve 
culture, finfish culture, gathering/collecting of invertebrates on the intertidal flats on foot and 
fishing by boat using a variety of gear. 
 
Mussel culture (Mytilus galloprovincialis) on rafts anchored in the Ria’s is the region’s most 
important aquaculture activity. Mussel culture takes place in designated areas. Traditionally, 
mussel farming is a family business although there are a few big companies. Most firms have 
1-3 rafts for mussel culture. A raft consists of 6 large floats (4x2 m) and heavy beams making 
a raft of 25x16 m. From each raft there are around 400 – 500 ropes (10 m) hanging 
vertically. Seed is collected from the ropes and from the rocky shore. It is thinned several 
times and attached to the rope in netting which breaks down after several weeks when the 
mussels are attached. The estimated number of rafts is 3537. Total estimated production of 
mussels is 250.000 tons with a value of € 132 million (website Xunta de Galicia: 
http://www.xunta.es/). 
 
Shellfish culture (stock husbandry) in small lots marked with stones and sticks is carried out in 
the intertidal zone by family businesses. Seed or juveniles of bivalves are collected from 
natural banks. Important species are cockles, oyster and clams. On foot shellfish fishing on 
the intertidal flats is also carried out by groups of mainly women. They collect a large number 
of species of bivalves, gastropods, scallops, razor shells and clams. It is estimated that 5600 
people collect shellfish. The Xunta de Galicia tries to promote the professionalisation of the on 
foot shell fishing to a form of semi intensive culture of shell fish (website Xunta de Galicia: 
http://www.xunta.es/).  
 
Turbot is the main species in the finfish culture. Turbot is cultured in 17 farms. In 2002 
production of turbot was 3.237 tons with a value of € 26.6 million (website Xunta de Galicia: 
http://www.xunta.es/). 
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 Artisanal fishing by boat is carried out form vessels usually less than 9 m long. The artisanal 
fishery is multispecific and multi-gear exploiting more than 50 species, mainly sedentary 
benthic invertebrates. Among the most important species area crustaceans (crabs and 
prawns), bivalves (clams, razor clams, scallops and cockles), cephalopods (cuttlefish, squid 
and octopus). Finfish catches are low. According to the official data there are 8811 vesels 
with 28.000 fishers. In practice the number of vessels is much higher (Freire et al., 2001). 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
Production from mussel rafts seems sustainable. Possibly there are problems with bottom 
sediment underneath rafts (low oxygen in deposited pseudofaeces). The small scale 
production of shellfish has a large impact on natural development of the intertidal flats, 
including large disturbance of feeding birds. 
 
Status of the fished stock 
Half of the necessary seed for the mussel raft culture is collected from ropes which have no 
impact on the fished stock. The other half comes from rocks along the ocean coast and has 
an impact on the natural development of the rocky shore. The small scale collection and 
culture probably has a large impact on the intertidal flats 
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
The mussel raft and finfish culture is profitable and well regulated Small-scale business 
collectors and growers provide necessary additional income for households. 
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
Fishermen are organised in local fishery associations. Local fishermen participate on village 
level. Participation seems to be very well organised. 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
The Galician administration annually regulates inter-tidal fishing activities by means of 
exploitation plans, which specify dates, places, species, number of authorised workers and 
maximum catches. The Fishing Inspection and Surveillance agents of the Xunta have an 
extensive network along the entire coastline and make sure that the fishing sector respects 
minimum sizes of species, off seasons or areas where fishing is prohibited (website Xunta de 
Galicia: http://www.xunta.es/). 
 
 
3.3 Otter Trawl Fishery in the Great Barrier Reef, Australia 
Introduction 
The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is situated in the South Pacific Ocean east of Queensland in 
Australia (Figure 3). The GBR is a World Heritage Area of 347,800 km2. Approximately 99.3% 
of the Heritage Area is also protected as a Marine National Park. 
 
The Marine National Park is managed by the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority. The 
GBR Authority with its aim to protect the natural qualities providing reasonable use of the GBR 
Marine Park, has control over fisheries by virtue of the use of zones which restrict certain 
fishing activities in specific areas. In July 2004, the zoning system of the GBR Marine Park 
was revised (GBRMPA, 2003) because in the old zoning system less than 5% of the area was 
protected as a marine sanctuary and this was inadequate for effective protection of the range  
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Figure 3. Location of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMPA, 2003). 
 
of biodiversity in the GBR. In the new zoning system areas are closed for all fishing. In some 
zones only certain fisheries with low impact on the ecosystem are allowed. 
 
The GBR Authority also becomes involved in fisheries management when there is concern that 
levels and type of fishing have an unacceptable negative impact on the ecosystem. The 
Queensland Fisheries Service has responsibility for the day-to-day management of all fish 
stocks in waters adjacent to Queensland coast including the GBR. 
 
Type of fishery or culture 
Fishing in the GBR includes major commercial fisheries of prawn trawling, reef line fishing, 
inshore netting and crabbing. There is also smaller dive based fishing for lobster aquarium 
fishes, coral, sea cucumber, trochus and shells. Recreational fishing is an important activity 
with 56,000 privately registered boats. Until recently commercial fishing effort has been very 
high. Over the last decade regulations have been made to decrease the fishing effort. 
  
All fisheries are managed in more or less the same structure which is determined by the 
national and regional laws (see institutional context of the fishery). In this case study we focus 
on the otter trawl fishery which with the reef hook and line fishery is one of the major fishing 
activities. There is also river and inshore beam trawl fishery and Moreton Bay trawl fishery 
which has an overlap in species caught. The catches of these fisheries are much smaller than 
the otter trawl fishery and are not further described here. The otter trawl fishery and the 
management of this fishery is described in the Fisheries (East Coast Trawl) Management Plan 
1999. Assessment of the Queensland East Coast Otter Trawl fishery (DEH, 2004) and the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority website (GBR, 2004) were used as main source of 
information. 
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 The otter trawl fishery takes place in all tidal waters (excluding estuaries) of Eastern 
Queensland, east to the outer edge of the Exclusive Economical Zone, south to the New South 
Wales border and north to Cape York. About 70% of effort in the otter trawl fishery is within 
the GBR. It occurs predominantly within the GBR lagoon, the area between the Queensland 
coastline and the western margin of the mid-shelf reef complex. Otter trawling on the 
Queensland east coats began in 1950 and new areas were progressively opened to trawling. 
The fleet grew to a peak of 1413 vessels in 1981.  
 
The fishery is composed of several sectors, based on target species and geographical 
location. The five main fisheries include eastern king prawn, tiger/endeavour prawn, scallop, 
red spot/western king prawn and bay/banana prawn. Other principal species include Moreton 
bay bugs and squid. The total catch fluctuated in the last 20 years between 7834 tonnes in 
2001 and 11572 tonnes in 1998.  
 
Trawling is permanently excluded from 66.2% of the GBR Marine Park and approximately 42% 
of the total fishing area. Gear restrictions vary between different sectors and area of the 
fishery. There are several seasonal closures specific to areas and fishers. Target species are 
controlled by limited entry fishery, effort allocation, boat and gear restrictions (size and 
number of nets, mesh size and size of the ground chain), spatial and seasonal closures. 
Spatial closures are intended to protect habitats (such as sea grass beds or reserve areas 
free from extractive use. Seasonal closures are designed to minimize capture of juvenile 
prawns recruiting to the fishery. Byproduct species are controlled through possession limits 
and restrictions on size, sex and reproductive condition. Take is restricted to principal and 
permitted species as defined in the Fisheries (East Coast Trawl) Management Plan. Bycatch 
reduction devices and turtle excluder devices are now compulsory in all nets in the fishery. 
 
Management responses reduced the number of licenses and a more recent reconstructing in 
2001 has further reduced vessel numbers to 485 in May 2004. There is an effort cap in the 
fishery with effort units allocated to individual vessels. Surrender provisions apply if boats are 
replaced or licenses and/or effort units are transferred. Compliance and enforcement tools 
implemented in the otter trawl fisheries include a vessel monitoring system and random at sea 
and port inspections and a 24 hour hotline to enable general public to report suspected illegal 
fishing activities. In 2003, in the trawl fisheries (including the inshore beam trawl and 
Morecombe bay trawl fisheries there were 51 convictions recorded, 31 of these being Serious 
Fishing Offences as defined under the Trawl plan, such as closed water offences, satellite 
monitoring system incursions, bycatch reduction device offences, etc. Fines are high and 
offences may lead tot suspension of the fishing license. 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
As in any trawl fishery, bycatch to target ratios are high with a large variety of species caught 
incidentally. Some bycatch species in the fishery are listed as protected species under the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. Protected species 
interactions in the fisheries include capture of syngnathods (seahorses and pipefish), sea 
snakes and marine turtles and the provisioning and possible habituation of dolphins and 
seabirds.  
 
Through the zoning of activities of the Great Barrier Reef a large area is not impacted by trawl 
fisheries. Within the areas open for trawl fisheries, the management arrangements described 
in the fisheries management plan are so that the impact of the fisheries on the ecosystem are 
on a level that is accepted by the Australian government. 
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 Status of the fished stock 
The status of the fished stocks varies between sectors from fully exploited (maximum 
sustainable yield) to under exploited. Stock assessments are available for several target 
species. A preliminary risk assessment has been conducted on byproduct species. 
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
The catch fishing effort and value of the catch is summarized in Table 3 (DPI, 2005). 
 
Table 3 Otter trawl catch and effort in Queensland. 
Year Number of boats 
Number of nights 
fished 
Catch (in 
tonnes) 
Approximate gross value of 
production (AUD $million) 
2001 590 68 526 8086 102 
2002 532 67 611 8505 104 
2003 515 65 786 8680 108 
2004 497 63 712 8972 112 
 
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
The Queensland Fisheries Service has established a system of Management Advisory 
Committees for all fisheries. These committees are expertise based and include 
representation from major stake holders such as fishers, marine park managers, scientists, 
marketers and conservation groups. 
 
User groups and communities are consulted and involved in the development of GBR Marine 
Park zoning and management plans. Communication and education program further enhances 
understanding and acceptance of the fishing regulation in the Marine Park management 
strategy. 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
In 1992, the Australian and local government committed to an ecologically sustainable 
approach to the use of natural resources including fisheries. Queensland commitment to 
managing fisheries in a sustainable way is embedded in the Fisheries Act 1994. The Australian 
government introduced the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
and the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment Act 2001. 
Following these acts fisheries must have management plans and demonstrate through an 
ecological assessment submission that fisheries are managed in a sustainable manner. The 
Department of the Environment and Heritage is responsible for auditing the submissions. All 
submissions must be based on a Guideline for the Ecologically Sustainable Management of 
fisheries. The guidelines cover a number of objectives relating to impact on target species; 
bycatch and byproduct species; endangered, threatened and protected species, ecologically 
threatened ecosystems and the marine ecosystem generally. 
 
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 provides for the establishment, control, care 
and development of the GBR Marine Park. This act has significant influence on the 
management and accessing of fish stocks, principally via the GBR Marine Park zoning plans, 
which regulate activities including fishing. The Queensland Fisheries Service and the GBR 
Marine Park Authority consult regularly to ensure that fisheries and Marine Park management 
planning arrangements are complementary and compatible. 
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 3.4 Halibut fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering 
Sea  
Introduction 
The pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) longline fishery takes place on the continental 
shelf of the United States and Canada (water depth 130 m) ranging from California to the 
Bering Sea (Figure 4). Halibut can grow to be as much as 500 us pounds and are popular 
food fish and wanted by sport fishermen because of size and strength. Males are mature at 8 
years, females are mature at 12 years. Maximum age is 40-50 years. 
 
Figure 4. Regulatory areas of the Pacific Halibut fisheries (IPHC, 1998). 
 
Type of fishery or culture 
Halibut has been fished commercially with longlines for more than 100 years. From 1930 until 
1970 the commercial catch of halibut varied roughly around 25,000 metric tons6. An increase 
in foreign fisheries for halibut and an increase in bycatch of halibut in the ground fisheries 
along with a natural decline in halibut recruitment contributed to a decline in the population 
with a historical low catch of 9,500 metric tons in 1974. During the 1970s and 1980s the 
halibut fishery was regulated with low catch limits so that the stock could recover. The catch 
peaked again in 1988 at over 33,566 metric tons. After a decline in the first half of the 
1990s, what is believed to be a natural cycle of abundance, the catch is now at a level again 
of over 30,000 metric tons (Figure 5). 80% of the catches take place in the waters off British 
Colombia and the central Gulf of Alaska (regions 2b, 2c, 3a and 3b, Figure 4). Average 
individual weight of the catch is 14-18 kg (the range is 5-91 kg) (IPHC, 1998). 
 
Halibut is also a wanted fish for sport fishermen. The catches of recreational fisheries are 
considerable when compared to the commercial catch (Figure 5). Bycatch of halibut in the 
ground fisheries is also considerable. The majority of the halibut bycatch occurs in the Bering 
Sea, killing smaller and younger halibut (IPHC, 1994). 
                                                   
6 All weights are net weight (head off, guts out and ice and slime removed). Net weight is 0,75 of round 
weight. 
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Figure 5. Catch statistics of the Pacific Halibut in IPHC regulatory areas (IPHC, 2004). 
 
 
The regulation of the halibut fisheries also has a long history and started in the 1920s. 
By 1910 over-fishing of Halibut was evident and the American and Canadian fishery industry 
asked for regulations by the United States and Canada. The International Pacific Halibut 
Commission was formed to make these regulations. Since 1920 regulations for commercial 
and sport fishery have evolved, including:  
o Minimum size of landed fish of 32 inch (81 cm) these individuals are mature and 8 years 
old 
o Closed area for fishing. 
o Closed season in winter 
o Regulation of gear used 
o Fishing grounds are divided in 10 regulatory areas (Figure 4). In these areas the fishery is 
regulated in different ways, by setting catch limits and limiting the number of vessels or 
fishermen with an individual quota system. In Canada there are 435 quotas to vessels. In 
the US in Alaska, there are individual quotas to 5000 fishermen not to vessels as in 
Canada. Within the open season the fishermen can choose which days they want to fish 
on halibut within the restriction of their quota. In the west coast (regions 2A an 2B) the 
number of vessels is not regulated. The fishery remains open access or ’derby’ fishery of 
7 determined days of 10 hrs 
o Fishing period limits, this is the maximum amount of halibut that may be retained and 
landed by a vessel during one fishing period. 
o Regulation of sport fishery by individually daily takes and in one region by total catch rate 
 
From stock assessments the exploitable biomass (over 81 cm) is calculated. The constant 
exploitation yield is calculated as a fixed proportion (20-25%) of the estimated exploitable 
biomass. The constant exploitation yield is reduced with estimates of bycatch of halibut in 
ground fisheries, wastages from halibut fisheries, personal use and sport fish catch. What is 
left is the catch limit of the commercial fisheries. 
 
Because bycatch of halibut in the groundfish fishery reduces the commercial catch of halibut 
an effort is made to reduce bycatch. Only domestic vessels are allowed in the ground 
fisheries. Since 1990, the US have certified observers on board of groundfish vessels to 
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 gather information on catch and bycatch. In the Bering Sea and Alaska for each groundfish 
fishery or group of fisheries a limited amount a discarded dead halibut is set. Once the 
mortality rate is reached the groundfish fishery is stopped.  
In Canada in 1995 an individual bycatch quota system along with a mandatory observer 
program for trawl fishers in all major ground fish fishing areas was introduced. Fishers made 
dramatic changes and improved techniques to reduce the bycatch. 
 
The pacific halibut fishery is currently undergoing full assessment for the Marine Stewardship 
Council certification. 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
The effect of the halibut fisheries on the state of the ecosystem is relatively small. There is 
concern on seabird mortality caused by longline fishing. Techniques are developed to be able 
to quantify bird kills and to make adjustments to the gear tot prevent bird kills (Ames et al., 
2005). Other fisheries for instance on pollock, yellow fin sole and pacific cod are more 
intensive and are more likely to have an impact on the ecosystem (IPHC, 1994). 
 
Status of the fished stock 
The halibut population is very well regulated. Only a small proportion of the total stock is 
fished. Halibut enter the fisheries when they are mature so that they can reproduce before 
being caught. Most of the fish caught are 9-17 years old (IPHC, 1998). 
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
Pacific halibut is one of the most valuable fish species in the North Pacific. In 1996 the 
average price per pound in US was $ 2,27 and in Canada $ 2,67. Total value of the 
commercial catch in 1996 was 111 million US dollar (Canada $ 25 million, US $ 86 million). In 
Canada the average catch per year per vessel is 10,000 kg and the income per vessel is 
estimated as $ 59,000. In the US in the Alaska region the catch is 2700 kg per fisherman and 
the income is $ 14,000. Crew size ranges from 1-8 people. The larger vessels usually carry 5 
crew members and a skipper (IPHC, 1998). 
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
The fishery industry is involved in fishery management. In the 1950s voluntary regulations 
have been initiated by the industry to manage the halibut stock such as 8 and 10 days lay-up 
programs between fishing trips. Nowadays the stock assessment is made with participation of 
the fishermen. The stock assessment is presented annually and fishers, industry and other 
interest groups can comment and make recommendations of their own. 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
The pacific halibut fishery is regulated by The International Pacific Halibut Commission. The 
commission meets each year to set catch limits and regulations based on a model that 
estimates the exploitable population. Individual governments and regional councils enforce the 
regulations and allocate fish among users. Only domestic vessels are involved in the fishing. 
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 3.5 Lugworm fishery in the Wadden Sea, the Netherlands  
Introduction 
The Wadden Sea is wetland of international importance that is nowadays primarily managed as 
a nature reserve under the EU Birds and Habitats Directives. However, fisheries for fish, 
shellfish, shrimps and worms have existed there since many centuries. 
 
Type of fishery or culture 
In the Dutch Wadden Sea a small fishery exists for lugworms (Arenicola marina). Four fishing 
companies have a license to fish mechanically for these worms in certain lots. Lugworms are 
the most commonly used bait used in angling off the Dutch coasts. It is estimated (van Wijk et 
al., 2003) that 87% of all marine anglers use lugworms in the Netherlands. Lugworms live in 
the Wadden Sea sediments on intertidal flats. They used to be harvested by hand. Today, 
some 80% of all lugworms are harvested at high tide by machines operated from barges. This 
mechanical harvesting in the Wadden Sea has been operational for over 25 years. The fishery 
uses a form of suction dredging in which the sediment is dug up, sieved and put back into the 
sea, while the lugworms are removed manually from a conveyor belt. Worms are kept and 
sold alive to specialized bait shops, sports fishing vessels, etc. 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
In the fished lots there is a considerable impact on the environment because the fishing gear 
draws deep scars in the seabed. However, in comparison with the total area of sand- and 
mudflats, the surface area of the lugworm lots is relatively small.  
 
Status of the fished stock 
The four licensed companies worked under two different management regimes that can be 
compared for their effectiveness in terms of stock development, stewardship and 
sustainability. Three of the four companies share common fishing grounds while the fourth has 
a license to fish exclusively in another lot. The three companies that shared common grounds, 
over fished the local stock of worms and were allowed to fish in new fishing grounds directly 
adjacent to the lot of the fourth company. The fourth company, working on its own lot without 
competition from other companies, showed good stewardship and has not suffered a 
reduction in its local worm stock. The areas where fishing is allowed have changed little over 
the years, only recently one area has been fished out and the fishermen involved have 
successfully asked for other lots. Apparently therefore, the stock can locally be overfished, 
but this only happened in a situation where three companies shared several lots between 
them. In the alternative situation, where only one company fished a lot, overfishing has never 
been reported within this lot. Given this fact, it seems possible to fish in a sustainable manner 
for lugworms, in a private lot, i.e. in a situation that is not a “tragedy of the commons” setup. 
Where several companies fish in competition, this has not worked in one case. Given the total 
size of the Wadden Sea in comparison to the sizes of the combined fished areas, there is no 
danger that the whole stock might be significantly affected. 
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
A total of 9 people are fully employed in the four companies that are involved in the lugworm 
fishery. The total annual turnover is estimated at about 1 million, with an added value of about 
€ 800.000 Euro over the years 1999-2001 (van Wijk et al., 2003). Another 14 people are 
employed part time in the distribution process of the lugworms (7 full time jobs).  
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 Lugworms are sold to be used in the Dutch Wadden Sea itself, and in the Dutch Delta area, 
and abroad in the German and Danish Wadden Sea, the UK and France. The companies (and 
anglers) are active throughout the year with a peak of activity in summer.  
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
The lots for fishing have been given out by the government. Fishermen need to spare certain 
structures within these lots, should these be encountered (e.g. mussel beds, seagrass 
stands). The lots are policed by the government. There have been irregular contacts between 
fishermen and government, particularly when changes in the licensing were due. The recent 
installment of extra lots for 3 of the 4 companies next to the existing lot of the fourth company 
has stirred up discussions. The fourth license holder feels threatened by the encroachment of 
the other three. He fears that lugworms may now also be fished out in the general area where 
he has been fishing in a sustainable manner for many years. The location of the new lots has 
been discussed at length between the government and the three companies that requested 
this move. 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
There is no total allowable catch (TAC) set by the government. The governmental policy for 
this fishery is one of restriction. The fishery is only allowed within the appointed fishing lots. 
Licenses of the current fishermen cannot be sold or otherwise transferred. Their companies 
will cease to exist when the current fishermen stop working.  
 
 
3.6 Sea turtle protection, Brazil  
Introduction 
Along the 1100 km mainland coastline and oceanic islands of Brazil 5 protected species of 
sea turtles occur (Caretta caretta, Eretmochelys imbricata, Chelonia mydas, Lepidochelys 
olivacea and Dermochelys coriacea). Up to the end of the seventies sea turtles were 
disappearing rapidly due to capture at sea by fishing activities, killing of females and collection 
of eggs. Both nationally and internationally there was pressure to respond to the situation. In 
1980 the Brazilian government established the National Sea Turtle Conservation Program 
(Projeto TAMAR), which is affiliated with the Brazilian Institute for Environment (IBAMA). Today 
a network of 20 research and conservation stations has been established, in 8 states. 
Conservation activities focus on major nesting and feeding grounds (Figure 6) (Marcovaldi & 
Marcovaldi, 1999). Fishermen and the fishing community are actively involved in protection of 
the sea turtles. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of sea turtle conservation stations in Brazil. 
 
 
Status of the ecosystem 
Breeding Areas 
Intensive study areas and conservation areas have been implanted in each of TAMAR 
continental stations in the main nesting areas. Each intensive study area is coincident with a 
major concentration of nesting. A research team patrols the intensive study area each night 
during the nesting season. All nests left in the original sites are marked. In areas where 
predators are a serious threat, nests are protected with a plastic or wire mesh buried just 
below the surface of the sand, above the eggs.  
 
The conservation areas are monitored and protected by local fishermen. When a fisherman 
encounters a nest, he carefully transfers it to a box that is delivered to a TAMAR’s station 
collection point. The eggs are then moved to hatcheries, located centrally in natural nesting 
habitat. Hatcheries are a necessary interim step; at present, nests that cannot otherwise be 
protected from predators, heavy beach traffic, or erosion are moved to hatcheries for safe 
incubation. The main goal of TAMAR in the near future is to keep as many nests as possible in 
the original site. Nowadays, nearly 70% of all nests are left in their original places. 
 
Feeding Grounds 
The stations dedicated to protecting turtles on their feeding grounds (Figure 6) were set up in 
areas, where it was believed that large numbers of turtles were accidentally caught and 
subsequently drowned in various forms of artisanal fishing nets and wooden weirs (Marcovaldi, 
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 1993). Building on the positive experience at the other stations, research and monitoring of 
turtles in the water have been designed to incorporate participation of the coastal residents. 
Fishermen and coastal residents are taught about the natural history of sea turtles, and their 
role in the ecosystem. The objective involves developing strategies to reduce the numbers of 
turtles drowned through incidental capture. Results so far, include the introduction of 
alternative fishing methods, as oyster and mussel culture. Several families that once relied on 
fishing nets for their livelihood now work with shellfish culture.  
 
Another positive measure has been recruitment of the fishermen to actively resuscitate 
“stunned” turtles. Frequently, after being caught in a net, a sea turtle becomes comatose and 
appears dead (Shoop et al., 1990). In the past, stunned turtles accidentally caught by the 
fishermen were quickly thrown back in the water, causing their death. These actions were 
based on the fishermen's fear of punishment, since turtles in Brazil are protected by law and 
their intentional capture is banned. In response to this situation, TAMAR began distributing 
brochures and posters explaining how the fishermen can save turtles that are accidentally 
caught. The fishermen are encouraged to check their nets often for sea turtles, and are 
instructed how to revive an unconscious animal. After rehabilitation, the turtles are released in 
the ocean by the fishermen, usually with tags.  
 
Since June 2001, TAMAR develops the National Program for the Reduction of Sea Turtles 
Incidental Capture in the Fishing Activity. The purpose is to reduce the incidence of turtles 
captured and deceased by the different fishing activities, through the development of 
mitigation measurements adequate to each one. 
 
Economic status of the fishermen 
Due to the country’s economic situation, the small coastal communities adjacent to TAMAR 
areas of activity historically have problems of social exclusion, lack of opportunity, and income 
distribution. Such problems transform themselves in tensors, disrupting TAMAR modus 
operandi. Therefore another challenge appeared: to develop ecologically sustainable 
strategies that would distribute income by creating direct job opportunities and generating 
other economic alternatives, conditions which are essential to neutralize non sustainable 
human pressures on sea turtles (Patiri, 2002). 
 
After years of activity, having acquired insight regarding the peculiarities and logistics specific 
to its areas of activity, TAMAR identified ‘market openings’ for communities with a high profile 
for tourism, and for those with lesser potential. Consequently, strategies creating economic 
alternatives are created with two focal points in mind: institutional self support and 
development of community policies generating economic alternatives. 
 
Institutional Self Support 
TAMAR seeks to use ecotourism principles when developing activities in areas with high 
potential for tourism. In this context, places for public visitation called Visitors centres have 
been constructed in areas adjacent to operational stations. Visitor centres usually include a 
small museum, retail store(s), and aquaria containing local species in various life cycle stages, 
signs explaining species biology and status, and program activities. The museum may serve 
multiple purposes, sponsoring activities, such as video clubs, art centres, and school group 
presentations (Marcovaldi & Marcovaldi, 1999). Visitor centres in areas of program activity 
provide opportunities for direct contact between residents, visitors, and sea turtles. Such 
centres are important tools for education and fund-raising campaigns. The first TAMAR Project 
experience in conciliating tourism with conservation took place at Praia do Forte, situated on 
the northern coast of the state of Bahia.  
 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 43
 Generation of Economic Alternatives for Communities: Stimulation of Community 
Entrepreneurship 
Most of TAMAR financial resources are generated by visitor centres, mainly through thematic 
garment sales. These products, T-shirts, caps, local handicrafts, and other souvenir items, 
inspired by sea turtle conservation campaigns, impart the Project’s principal objective. 
Resources are also raised through admission ticket sales, space rentals for restaurants and 
other services. To strengthen local production, TAMAR began to develop production 
verticalization. In this way, communities closer to the operational stations, located in areas 
with lesser potential for tourism, became product suppliers for the other visitor centres. In the 
course of time two T-shirt factories were established, one in Regência, Espírito Santo, and the 
other in Pirambu, Sergipe. Both factories produce articles of clothing, especially T-shirts, to 
meet the demands of gift shops associated with visitor centres that receive a high number of 
tourists. All the products made at the factories also help to promote the conservation 
message of sea turtles through pictures emphasizing the institutional message. A total of 127 
thousand pieces have been produced in 2003, of them about 94 thousand in Regencia and 33 
thousand in Pirambu. 
 
Participation of fishing community in policy-making 
Along with its mission of sea turtle protection, TAMAR incorporated human and social issues 
into its conservation efforts. Indeed, the first strategy adopted, in order to effectively promote 
sea turtle protection was to involve the fishing community. For this purpose, fishermen were 
hired to carry out sea turtle conservation and management activities, which not only provided 
an alternative source of income for them, but also made future community-based resource 
administration possible. The fishermen were in the past the main turtle hunters and egg 
collectors (Marcovaldi & Marcovaldi, 1999). This community involvement strategy has 
solidified, as TAMAR stations managers began to reside within the communities adjacent to 
areas of sea turtle occurrence, and consequently identifying more quickly the expectations 
and prospects of these native communities. As a result, an opportunity was created to initiate 
an on-going learning process about local customs and traditions, and also the biology of this 
species. Years of cohabitation between TAMAR teams and community members, resulted in 
the development of ties of trust. This factor has been fundamental in motivating these 
inhabitants to participate in sea turtle conservation efforts. This allowed for integrated 
environmental conservation and social inclusion effort to be made, especially of the kind 
related to education and betterment of local population’s quality of life (Patiri, 2002). Of the 
people involved in the sea turtle protection 90% are members of the communities where the 
stations are established. 
 
Institutional context of fishery 
As a Federal program, TAMAR was initially affiliated with, and assisted by, several national non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). However, as the program matured in scope and 
personnel, and financial needs expanded at a quickening pace, these alliances became 
unmanageable. In response, PRO-TAMAR Foundation, a private, non profit organization, was 
legally created in 1988 to support, raise funds, and co-manage the TAMAR jointly with the 
IBAMA. The Foundation is comprised of a board of Trustees, a president, an executive 
director, a self-supporting director and seven regional directors responsible for the 20 
stations. A system of partnerships between the public and non-profit sectors creates an 
institutionally hybrid environment, making the efforts for protection, handling and research of 
sea turtles more effective (Figure 7). 
 
In the case of - IBAMA, the Brazilian agency for environmental policy execution, its role is to 
guarantee the protection and recuperation of species in danger of extinction, such as in the 
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 case of five sea turtles species on the Brazilian coast. On the other hand, PRO-TAMAR 
Foundation, which functions as a stabilizing element, complements the role of the State, and 
throughout all these years, has provided continuous effort of sea turtle conservation. The 
Foundation has provided about 70% of the funding for TAMAR. The sources of such funds 
originate with Brazilian private and public organizations, international agencies, with income 
generated trough its own self-support activities (manufacture and sale of TAMAR products - T-
shirts, embroidery, crafts, tourism, and visitors centres).  
 
 
 
Figure 7. TAMAR’s hybrid management and partner institutions. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
The case studies that we described above are not an exhaustive review of all possible cases 
of sustainable fisheries that are both economically viable and do not cause significant harm to 
the ecosystem. Additional cases are described in Chapter 4 dealing with fisheries certified by 
the Marine Stewardship Council and in chapter 5 dealing with fisheries self management in 
general. Also, most of the cases listed in this chapter seem sustainable fisheries from the 
point of view of exploitation of the stock. However, closer inspection suggests that in some 
cases the impact on the ecosystem is quite considerable. Initially, the Ria’s in Galicia seemed 
quite promising, but closer inspection revealed that the impact on the natural environment of 
the large number of fishermen is probably quite considerable. The same seems to apply to Ria 
Formosa. Thus, these artisanal fisheries may be sustainable from the point of view of the 
shellfish stock that is harvested and from an economic point of view, but there is a 
considerable negative impact on the ecosystem. 
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 Nonetheless some cases remained that seemed to meet all three criteria, including proper 
protection of the ecosystem. In some cases, this is achieved through a marine protected area 
(MPA7). In other cases, this is achieved because there is a market for nature conservation. In 
the extreme case, fishermen stop fishing and start earning money from nature conservation. 
 
 
                                                   
7 See the list of acronyms at the end of the report for a detailed description. 
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 4 The possible role of eco-labelling in reducing the 
conflict between nature conservation and fishery 
4.1 Introduction 
The idea behind a fishery eco-label is that consumers can reward fisheries that are undertaken 
in a ‘sustainable’ manner. Potentially, eco-labelling could reduce, or even completely eliminate, 
the conflict between nature conservation and fishery. The latter requires that (a) the majority 
of the consumers can be persuaded to buy only eco-labelled fish and (b) the eco-label provides 
sufficient guarantees for the ecosystem. This chapter investigates whether these conditions 
are met or will be met in the future. 
 
With regard to the first condition it may be remarked that at present most fish and fish 
products on sale for consumers are unlabelled. Kaiser & Edwards-Jones (2006) explain this 
among other things on a general lack of consumer concern for marine fish and sustainable 
fisheries. It is easy to get public support for protecting seals and dolphins, but fish are 
generally “unloved” in their opinion. However, it may be questioned if consumers should be 
and/or are the prime direct target of the eco-label. The primary target could be the 
supermarket chains and the trading companies, instead of the consumers, even though it is 
consumer concern that should persuade companies to buy labelled fish. It is certainly the case 
that supermarket chains and trading companies show a growing interest in eco-labelled 
products. The Marine Stewardship Council for instance was co-founded by the multinational 
Unilever. Our condition that the majority of consumers buy eco-labelled fish is also met if 
supermarket chains and trading companies preferentially or even exclusively buy properly 
labelled fish. This is not a utopia. In a communication of the commission of the European 
Communities that seeks to launch a debate on a Community approach towards eco-labelling 
schemes for fisheries products (EU 2005), we find the following statements: 
 
The most frequently cited, and possibly most controversial, case of eco-labelling in the fisheries 
sector is the “dolphin-safe/dolphin-friendly” labelled tuna. This label is meant to certify that the tuna 
was caught in a way that protects dolphins, either based on the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Programme (AIDCP), a multilateral Regional Fisheries Organisation, or in line 
with a programme promoted by the Earth Island Institute, a US based non-governmental 
organisation. Although “dolphin-safe/dolphin-friendly” labelling started out as a technical regulation, 
it has ever since changed the market to such an extent that tuna which is not labelled as "dolphin-
safe" is no longer acceptable in some countries. However, the AIDCP and the US norms are not 
complementary. As a matter of fact, the “dolphin-safe” label bars tuna caught in accordance with 
AIDCP standards from access to the US markets. This has given rise to an ongoing dispute 
between Mexico and the US. Attempts by the US administration to amend the US law to meet 
AIDCP requirements have been challenged in the US courts by some NGOs that consider the 
AIDCP measures not to be stringent enough.  
 
On the one hand, the tuna example shows that eco-labelling may lead to labelled fish 
completely displacing unlabelled fish from the market. On the other hand, it shows the 
importance of our second condition that the eco-label provides sufficient guarantees for the 
ecosystem. 
 
In this chapter we have made no attempts to present a comprehensive review of all extant 
fishery eco-labels. Instead, we have restricted ourselves to the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) for several reasons. First, it is the best known fishery eco-label that seems to “dominate 
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 the market” of fishery eco-labels. Second, the information on the MSC label and the certified 
fisheries was easily accessible on the MSC internet site (www.msc.org). Third, time was 
limited. Our leading question in this chapter is whether the MSC label provides sufficient 
guarantees for protection of the ecosystem. We will examine information on MSC certified 
fisheries and at the end of the chapter explicitly discuss Dutch fisheries and MSC certification. 
 
 
4.2 Criteria for certification 
The Marine Stewardship Council was founded in 1997 by Unilever, the world’s largest buyer of 
seafood, and WWF, the international conservation organisation. However, it became an 
independent non-profit organisation in 1999. The first fisheries were certified in 2000 and in 
December 2006 a total of 21 fisheries were certified (Figure 8). Another 18 fisheries are 
currently undergoing assessment. 
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Figure 8. The number of newly certified fisheries and the cumulative number of fisheries certified 
under MSC. 
 
Recently, the FAO has drafted guidelines for the eco-labelling of fish and fishery products from 
marine capture fisheries (FAO 2005a), following extensive discussions by experts (FAO 2003c; 
FAO 2005b). For the purpose of this project, it is important to note that the implementation of 
the precautionary approach to protect the “stock under consideration” and to preserve the 
aquatic environment is considered a minimum substantive requirement in these guidelines. In 
fact, this is article 7.5 of the code of conduct for responsible fisheries that was drafted by the 
FAO in 1995 (FAO 1995). How many of these guidelines are actually met by the Marine 
Stewardship Council is not easy to tell, but the core requirements certainly seem to be met. 
According to the MSC internet site (www.msc.org): 
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 The MSC programme shares key characteristics with the new FAO guidelines including: 
· objective, third-party fishery assessment utilising scientific evidence; 
· transparent processes with built-in stakeholder consultation; 
· a three-pronged standard based on the sustainability of target species, ecosystems and 
management practices. 
At present, we have no reasons to doubt these statements. According to Kees Lankester 
(pers. comm.) there are only two minor items for which the MSC standard does not meet the 
FAO guidelines at present8: 
• The separation between accreditation and “standard-setting”. 
• The way in which a dispute panel is assembled and executed. 
 
The current MSC principles and criteria for sustainable fishing can be found on the MSC 
internet site (www.msc.org) and we have copied them below with a grey background: 
 
PRINCIPLE 1 
 
A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or 
depletion of the exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted, 
the fishery must be conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their 
recovery 9: 
 
Intent: 
 
The intent of this principle is to ensure that the productive capacities of resources are 
maintained at high levels and are not sacrificed in favour of short term interests. Thus, 
exploited populations would be maintained at high levels of abundance designed to retain their 
productivity, provide margins of safety for error and uncertainty, and restore and retain their 
capacities for yields over the long term. 
 
Criteria: 
 
1. The fishery shall be conducted at catch levels that continually maintain the high 
productivity of the target population(s) and associated ecological community relative to its 
potential productivity. 
2. Where the exploited populations are depleted, the fishery will be executed such that 
recovery and rebuilding is allowed to occur to a specified level consistent with the 
precautionary approach and the ability of the populations to produce long-term potential 
yields within a specified time frame. 
3. Fishing is conducted in a manner that does not alter the age or genetic structure or sex 
composition to a degree that impairs reproductive capacity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
8 During the completion of this report the MSC standard was adapted and now meets all FAO criteria. 
9 The sequence in which the Principles and Criteria appear does not represent a ranking of their 
significance, but is rather intended to provide a logical guide to certifiers when assessing a fishery.  The 
criteria by which the MSC Principles will be implemented will be reviewed and revised as appropriate in 
light of relevant new information, technologies and additional consultations 
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 PRINCIPLE 2: 
 
Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, 
function and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated dependent 
and ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends. 
 
Intent: 
 
The intent of this principle is to encourage the management of fisheries from an ecosystem 
perspective under a system designed to assess and restrain the impacts of the fishery on the 
ecosystem. 
 
Criteria: 
 
1. The fishery is conducted in a way that maintains natural functional relationships among 
species and should not lead to trophic cascades or ecosystem state changes. 
2. The fishery is conducted in a manner that does not threaten biological diversity at the 
genetic, species or population levels and avoids or minimises mortality of, or injuries to 
endangered, threatened or protected species. 
3. Where exploited populations are depleted, the fishery will be executed such that recovery 
and rebuilding is allowed to occur to a specified level within specified time frames, 
consistent with the precautionary approach and considering the ability of the population to 
produce long-term potential yields. 
 
PRINCIPLE 3: 
 
The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, 
national and international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and 
operational frameworks that require use of the resource to be responsible and 
sustainable. 
 
Intent: 
 
The intent of this principle is to ensure that there is an institutional and operational framework 
for implementing Principles 1 and 2, appropriate to the size and scale of the fishery. 
 
A. Management System Criteria: 
 
1. The fishery shall not be conducted under a controversial unilateral exemption to an 
international agreement. 
The management system shall: 
 
2. demonstrate clear long-term objectives consistent with MSC Principles and Criteria and 
contain a consultative process that is transparent and involves all interested and affected 
parties so as to consider all relevant information, including local knowledge. The impact of 
fishery management decisions on all those who depend on the fishery for their livelihoods, 
including, but not confined to subsistence, artisanal, and fishing-dependent communities 
shall be addressed as part of this process; 
3. be appropriate to the cultural context, scale and intensity of the fishery – reflecting specific 
objectives, incorporating operational criteria, containing procedures for implement-tation 
and a process for monitoring and evaluating performance and acting on findings; 
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 4. observe the legal and customary rights and long term interests of people dependent on 
fishing for food and livelihood, in a manner consistent with ecological sustainability; 
5. incorporates an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of disputes arising within the 
system10; 
6. provide economic and social incentives that contribute to sustainable fishing and shall not 
operate with subsidies that contribute to unsustainable fishing; 
7. act in a timely and adaptive fashion on the basis of the best available information using a 
precautionary approach particularly when dealing with scientific uncertainty; 
8. incorporate a research plan – appropriate to the scale and intensity of the fishery – that 
addresses the information needs of management and provides for the dissemination of 
research results to all interested parties in a timely fashion; 
9. require that assessments of the biological status of the resource and impacts of the 
fishery have been and are periodically conducted; 
10. specify measures and strategies that demonstrably control the degree of exploitation of 
the resource, including, but not limited to: 
a. setting catch levels that will maintain the target population and ecological 
community’s high productivity relative to its potential productivity, and account for the 
non-target species (or size, age, sex) captured and landed in association with, or as a 
consequence of, fishing for target species; 
b. identifying appropriate fishing methods that minimise adverse impacts on habitat, 
especially in critical or sensitive zones such as spawning and nursery areas; 
c. providing for the recovery and rebuilding of depleted fish populations to specified 
levels within specified time frames; 
d. mechanisms in place to limit or close fisheries when designated catch limits are 
reached; 
e. establishing no-take zones where appropriate; 
11. contain appropriate procedures for effective compliance, monitoring, control, surveillance 
and enforcement which ensure that established limits to exploitation are not exceeded and 
specifies corrective actions to be taken in the event that they are. 
 
B. Operational Criteria 
 
Fishing operation shall: 
 
12. make use of fishing gear and practices designed to avoid the capture of non-target 
species (and non-target size, age, and/or sex of the target species); minimise mortality of 
this catch where it cannot be avoided, and reduce discards of what cannot be released 
alive; 
13. implement appropriate fishing methods designed to minimise adverse impacts on habitat, 
especially in critical or sensitive zones such as spawning and nursery areas; 
14. not use destructive fishing practices such as fishing with poisons or explosives; 
15. minimise operational waste such as lost fishing gear, oil spills, on-board spoilage of catch, 
etc.; 
16. be conducted in compliance with the fishery management system and all legal and 
administrative requirements; and 
17. assist and co-operate with management authorities in the collection of catch, discard, and 
other information of importance to effective management of the resources and the 
fishery. 
 
                                                   
10 Outstanding disputes of substantial magnitude involving a significant number of interests will normally 
disqualify a fishery from certification. 
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On paper, the guarantees for the ecosystem provided by the MSC eco-label through principle 
2 are very good. For instance, criterion 3 of principle 2, which states that depleted fish 
populations should be fished in such a way that “recovery and rebuilding is allowed to occur to 
a specified level within specified time frames, consistent with the precautionary approach” 
offers hope that overfished stocks will recover under the MSC scheme. However, a similar 
condition for ecosystems that are damaged from fishery is lacking. Furthermore, the proof of 
the pudding is in the eating.  
 
 
4.3 Impact on the ecosystem of fisheries with the MSC 
certificate 
In August 2005, five (very) large and seven small fisheries were certified with the MSC label. 
These certified fisheries are described in Table 4. The information that we collected includes the 
species fished, the fishing gear used, the annual landings, whether or not the fishery is shared 
with other nations, the management body, the management mechanism and the market. 
 
What do we know of the protection that is offered to the ecosystem in each of these cases? 
To investigate this question we studied the reports on the certification that can be downloaded 
from the MSC website trying to extract the following information: 
1. What is known on the impact of the fishery on the ecosystem? 
2. In which way is the impact on the ecosystem monitored? 
3. Were objections raised against the certification or during the certification process? 
 
The results are displayed in Table 5. Although significant depletion of the fished stock is a 
clear ecosystem effect, the information in Table 5 specifically relates to principle 2 (which 
deals with the ecosystem effects of the fishery) and not to principle 1 (which deals with effects 
of the fishery on the fished stock). The information that we collected includes the start of the 
assessment, the year the fishery was certified, the species fished, whether or not the stock is 
also fished by other fishermen, a list of the ecological problems and impacts on the 
ecosystem, the ecosystem indicators that are monitored and whether or not formal objections 
were raised against certification of the fishery. All data in the table were extracted from the 
MSC internet site www.msc.org. It proved convenient to distinguish between small-scale 
fisheries harvesting on average 10.000 tonnes per year or less, and large-scale fisheries 
harvesting on average 100.000 tonnes per year or more. 
 
Small-scale fisheries 
For several of the small-scale fisheries there seems to be very little actual information on the 
ecological impact of the fishery. However, experts are quoted in these cases who believe the 
ecological impact to be minimal. From the descriptions of the fishery one is inclined to agree.  
 
So far, no objections have been raised against the certification of 6 of the 7 small scale 
fisheries. Objections were raised against the certification of the South Georgia Patagonian 
Toothfish Longline Fishery. This led to the convening of an Objections Panel and the 
certification report and the accompanying Scoring Table were modified to meet the 
requirements of the Objection Panel. Subsequently, the fishery was certified under no less 
than 10 conditions, each of which should be met within a specified time frame. These 
conditions include (1) a study of the impact of the fishery on rajid populations and the 
development of mitigation measures, (2) an estimate of hooks discarded in fish heads (and 
swallowed by birds) and, if necessary, implementation of a monitoring program, (3) research 
into the ecosystem relations of toothfish, and (4) a determination if there are significant 
interactions with the benthic habitat. It was also recommended to develop an ecosystem 
model for the fishery. The first annual surveillance report describes in detail the progress that 
has been made in meeting the conditions. The report concludes that progress is sufficient. 
 
 Table 4. Key features of fisheries awarded Marine Stewardship Certification as of August 2005. Data extracted from the MSC website www.msc.org. where further details on 
each fishery are available. Annual landings are given as approximate values (in the case of Alaska salmon this has been estimated from landings of 200 million fish per annum) as 
these are likely to vary from year to year according to the level of Total Allowable Catches (TACs). Table reproduced from (Kaiser & Edwards-Jones 2005) and extended with 
information on Gulf of Alaska Pollock fishery, which certified after (Kaiser & Edwards-Jones 2005) constructed their table. 
Fishery 
 
Gear Annual 
landings (t) 
Fishery shared 
with other nations? 
Management body Management mechanism Market 
Large-scale fisheries       
Bering Sea/Aleutian 
Islands pollock fishery  
Midwater 
trawls 
c. 1 100 000 No North Pacific Fishery Management Council 
(US) 
TAC and quota allocation to meet management plans, 
permit limited entry, fishing seasons, observer 
monitoring, area and fishing gear restrictions 
Asia, USA, Europe (frozen product) and 
Japan (surimi) 
The Alaska salmon 
fishery  
Drift and set 
gillnets 
Purse seine 
Trolling 
c. 320 380 
 
No Alaska Department of Fish and Game Occurs within delineated districts, multiple technical 
regulations (bag limits, minimum landing sizes) and 
management of other participants (sport fishing) and 
components of the ecosystem (e.g. habitat) 
Whole frozen or processed canned, 
Japan, EU, USA 
South African Hake 
Trawl Fishery 
Bottom 
trawling 
c. 195 000 No Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism: Branch Marine and Coastal 
Management 
Technical measures (mesh size), TACs allocated to 
companies, limits on number of vessels and closed areas 
South Africa, frozen product to Spain, 
France, Portugal, Italy, Australia and US, 
fresh chilled product to Germany, Spain 
and France. 
New Zealand Hoki     Midwater 
and bottom 
trawling 
c. 100 000 No New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries and 
Hoki Fishery Management Company 
(fishers) 
TAC set below maximum sustainable yield, satellite 
monitoring of large vessels (> 42 m), industry run 
observer programme, severe penalties for breach of 
regulations 
Primarily export to US, Japan, European 
Union and Australia 
Gulf of Alaska Pollock 
fishery 
Trawling c. 90 000 No North Pacific Fishery Management Council 
(US) 
TAC and quota allocation to meet management plans, 
permit limited entry, fishing seasons, observer 
monitoring, area and fishing gear restrictions 
USA, Europe (frozen product) and Japan 
(surimi) 
Small scale fisheries       
Western Australian Rock 
Lobster  
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 10 500 No Government of Western Australia, 
Department of Fisheries, processors and 
fishers 
Technical measures (seasonal area closures, minimum 
landing sizes, prohibition on catching breeding females), 
TACs and licensing 
Exported to Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, 
China, US and Europe 
South Georgia 
Patagonian Toothfish 
Longline fishery  
Bottom set 
longlines 
c. 4 400 Yes, but managed by 
single organisation 
Commission for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Implementation by the Government of 
South Georgia and South Sandwich 
Islands (UK territory) 
Seasonal restriction (open from May to August). TAC set 
by CCAMLR, management funded through license fees, 
providing for enforcement and monitoring 
US, European Union and Japan 
Burry Inlet cockles  Hand raking c. 3 500 No South Wales Sea Fisheries Committee Defined area, minimum landing size, participation 
controlled by license 
as processed product, UK, Spain, 
Holland, France and Portugal 
South West Mackerel 
(Scomber scombrus) 
handline fishery  
Handlining c. 1 750 No Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the Cornish Sea 
Fisheries Committee 
Minimum landing size, TAC, fishery closure upon reaching 
TAC. 
UK wholesale, Europe (France and Italy) 
Red Rock Lobster 
Mexico 
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 1 300  No Sub-delegation of fisheries (fishers), 
National Fisheries Institute and 
governmental research bodies 
Defined area, limited entry, user rights given to fishing 
co-operatives, TACs, minimum landing sizes and 
protection for gravid female  
Primarily export to Asia, US and France 
Loch Torridon 
Nephrops norvegicus 
Static 
bottom set 
trap fishing 
c. 150  No European Union and Scottish Executive 
for Environment and Rural Affairs 
Defined area closed to other forms of fishing Primarily exported to Spain as live 
product 
Thames Blackwater 
Herring 
Drift gill net  c. 121 No Department of Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs and the Essex Sea Fisheries 
Committee 
TAC, technical measures (mesh size), trawling prohibition 
over herring spawning grounds. N.B. concurrent trawl 
fishery not certified. 
UK processors 
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 Table 5. Information on what is known on the ecological impact of the fisheries certified with the MSC label as of August 2005. Also indicated is the way this ecological impact is 
monitored or will be monitored and whether objections were raised by conservation groups against the certification. Data extracted from the MSC internet site www.msc.org. 
Fishery Start 
assess
ment 
Certifi
cation 
Species Latin name stock also fished by other 
fishermen? 
Ecological problems and 
impacts on the ecosystem 
Ecosystem indicators that are 
monitored 
Objections 
Large-scale 
fisheries 
        
Bering 
Sea/Aleutian 
Islands pollock 
fishery  
2001 2005 Alaskan Pollock Theragra 
chalcogramma 
Same stock also fished by Russian 
fishing fleet 
Effect on protected predators of 
Pollock (seabirds and Steller’s sea lion, 
harbour seal, northern fur seal) 
through bycatch, competition for food 
(high proportion Pollock taken from 
critical habitat of Steller sea lion) and 
fishing waste (lost nets causing 
entanglement mortality for fur seals) 
and discards (seabirds) 
Conditions for continued certification 
include studies of the effects of fishing 
on Steller sea lion and its critical 
habitat, studies of the effects of fishing 
on prey for Steller sea lion and fur 
seals, better bycatch reporting, effects 
of lost fishing gear on seals, 
experiments with fished and unfished 
areas including collecting data on 
seals and seabirds 
objections by Alaska 
Oceans Program, 
Greenpeace 
International, National 
Environmental Trust, 
Oceana 
Gulf of Alaska 
pollock fishery 
2001 2005 Alaskan Pollock Theragra 
chalcogramma 
Exclusive access Effect on protected predators of 
Pollock (seabirds and Steller’s sea lion, 
harbour seal, northern fur seal) 
through bycatch, competition for food 
(high proportion Pollock taken from 
critical habitat of Stealler sea lion) and 
fishing waste (lost nets causing 
entanglement mortality for fur seals) 
and discards (seabirds) 
Conditions for continued certification 
include studies of the effects of fishing 
on Steller sea lion and its critical 
habitat, studies of the effects of fishing 
on prey for Steller sea lion and fur 
seals, better bycatch reporting, effects 
of lost fishing gear on seals, 
experiments with fished and unfished 
areas including collecting data on 
seals and seabirds 
Objections by Alaska 
Oceans Program, 
Greenpeace 
International, National 
Environmental Trust, 
Trustees for Alaska 
Sockeye Oncorhynchus 
nerka 
Chum Oncorhynchus 
keta 
Chinook Oncorhynchus 
tshawytscha 
Coho Oncorhynchus 
kisutch 
The Alaska 
salmon fishery  
1999 2000 
Pink Oncorhynchus 
gorbuscha 
Native and subsistence fisheries bycatch of other fish, shellfish, birds 
and marine mammals 
Within 3 years of the certification in 
2000 implement a sampling program 
to identify major bycatch of non-
salmon fish species, birds and marine 
mammals. Within 5 years provide 
evidence and summary on this topic.  
no formal objections 
South African 
Hake 
Merluccius 
paradoxus 
South African 
Hake Trawl 
Fishery 
2002 2004 
 Merluccius 
capensis 
Longline and handline hake fishery 
take ca. 10% of the stock; small 
numbers of hake as bycatch in 
fishery on horse mackerel; 
assumption that South African 
stock and Namibian stock are 
separate may be wrong 
bycatch (sometimes Kob - an over-
fished species) and discarding; trawls 
attract seabirds, but high bird mortality 
as reported in hake fisheries 
elsewhere have not been reported for 
this fishery, but the issue has not yet 
been seriously studied; mortality of 
Cape Fur Seal reported to be 
insignificant for the population; 
increasing populations of Cape Fur 
Seal may lead to increasing 
competition between fishers and seals; 
Fishery is certified under several 
conditions including: (1) 
implementation of a bycatch plan, (2) 
development of a plan to study 
ecosystem relations and inclusion in 
monitoring, (3) study impact on benthic 
fauna and derive mitigation measures 
from results, (4) implement monitoring 
plan to study impact on seabird 
populations. It is also recommended to 
initiate an Ecological Risk Assessment. 
no formal objections 
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International co
impact on benthic fauna is likely, but 
this has not been seriously studied 
New Zealand Hoki    2000 2001 New Zealand 
Hoki 
Macruronus 
novaezelandiae 
The hoki stock is restricted to New 
Zealand’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone. Recreational fishing and 
Maori customary fishing believed 
to be negligible. Some bycatch of 
hoki in large offshore trawl 
fisheries. 
Bycatch of other fish species, New 
Zealand fur seals and seabirds. Impact 
of bottom trawling on the seafloor. 
Ecological effects on midwater 
ecosystems 
Monitoring of bycatch of icon species 
by independent observer programme 
operated by the Ministry of Fisheries. 
Monitoring programmes are limited to 
stock issues and to issues related to 
formally protected species. There are 
no habitat or ecosystem monitoring 
systems in place. 
formal objections by 
Royal Forest and Bird 
Protection Society of 
New Zealand 
Small scale 
fisheries 
        
Western Australian 
Rock Lobster  
1998 2000 Western 
Australian Rock 
Lobster 
Panulirus 
cygnus 
smaller numbers taken by 
recreational fishermen 
bycatch of icon species (sea lions) bycatch of icon species no formal objections 
South Georgia 
Patagonian 
Toothfish Longline 
fishery  
2001 2004 South Georgia 
Patagonian 
Toothfish 
Dissostichus 
eleginoides 
exclusive access some effect of lines on biogenic 
structures (entanglement in coldwater 
coral); bycatch of rays and seabirds; 
hooks in discarded heads; IUU fishery 
(very high in 1997, but drastic decline 
in recent years) 
bycatch is monitored by observers. 
Fishery is certified under several 
conditions, including (1) a study of the 
impact of the fishery on rajid 
populations and the development of 
mitigation measures, (2) an estimate of 
hooks discarded in fish heads (and 
swallowed by birds) and, if necessary, 
implementation of a monitoring 
program, (3) research into the 
ecosystem relations of toothfish, (4) 
Determine if there are significant 
interactions with the benthic habitat. It 
is also recommended to develop an 
ecosystem model for the fishery.  
objections 
Burry Inlet cockles 2000 2001 Cockle Cerastoderma 
edule 
exclusive access removal of mussel "crumble" (young 
mussels which bind cockles together), 
which serves as food for waterbirds 
shorebirds (oystercatcher) are 
monitored by BTO, but no "target" 
numbers are specified 
no formal objections 
South West 
Mackerel 
2001 2001 Mackerel Scomber 
scombrus 
large commercial fleets fishing 
same stock elsewhere 
Negligible expert judgement  no formal objections 
Red Rock Lobster 
Mexico 
2001 2004 Red Rock 
Lobster 
Panulirus 
interruptus 
exclusive access in Mexico 
granted to cooperatives (that now 
have MSC label) since 1930s; 
virtually no illegal fishing; smaller 
catches of same stock in USA 
bycatch of fish, crustaceans and other 
epifauna; ghost fishing by lost traps 
not considered a problem 
no specific studies, but general studies 
of parts of the ecosystem (especially 
in biosphere reserve) and experts 
believe ecological impact to be 
minimal  
no objections 
Loch Torridon 
Nephrops Creel 
Fishery 
2002 2003 Norway Lobster Nephrops 
norvegicus 
creel fishery in area closed to 
trawlers is minor part of total 
catch of stock in ICES Sub Area 
Via, Management Area C 
small amount of bycatch of fish, 
crustaceans and other epifaunal 
evidence of absence of ecosystem 
effects apparently based on single 
inspection visit on 30th May 2002 
no formal objections 
Thames 
Blackwater 
Herring 
1999 2000 Herring Clupea harengus large commercial fleets fishing 
same stock elsewhere 
occasional bycatch of Alosa fallax and 
Alosa alosa 
area is under EU habitats directive - 
fishery is believed not to damage the 
ecosystem 
no formal objections 
 
 
 The example of the Patagonian Toothfish illustrates that at the moment of the certification, 
there may be many uncertainties and lack of adequate information on ecosystem effects, but 
that with the MSC certificate a process is initiated towards a better understanding of 
ecosystem effects and a better protection of the ecosystem against negative impacts of the 
fishery. As yet, there are no examples that failure to meet the conditions has led to a fishery 
losing the MSC certificate, but continuation of certification is not automatically guaranteed. 
Surveillance reports can be quite critical as the Western Australian Rock Lobster fishery 
demonstrates. In the 2005 MSC Final Surveillance Report by Scientific Certification Systems, 
Inc. (SCS) one can read the following:  
 
“Despite repeated and considerable discussion between SCS, the client, and the fishery managers 
a number of the procedures still do not appear to be working smoothly:  
Properly functioning advisory systems for providing independent expert scientific advice to the 
fishery managers about the ecological impacts of the fishery or the impacts of the fishery on sea 
lions;  
A rigorous and effective system for engaging stakeholders and securing input about key 
ecological issues in the fishery;  
The lack of an effective process for identifying and implementing research in relation to ecosystem 
impacts of the fisher”.  
Expert advice about ecosystem risks identified as needing further research and possible mitigation 
are still handled in a cumbersome and time consuming manner that does not allow for the smooth 
and timely handling of potentially important ecosystem risks.” 
 
Large fisheries 
The certified large fisheries include some of the largest fisheries in the world. In contrast to 
the small fisheries, the large fisheries are more likely to be contested than uncontested: 
objections were raised against 3 of the 5 large fisheries that were certified. Thus, the rule that 
“outstanding disputes of substantial magnitude involving a significant number of interests will 
normally disqualify a fishery from certification” is not always adhered to by the MSC.  
 
The large fisheries that are contested are the New Zealand Hoki fishery, the Gulf of Alaska 
Pollock fishery and the Bering Sea/Aleutian islands Pollock fishery. 
 
According to the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand (a partner of 
BirdLife International) the hoki fishery is New Zealand’s largest fishery and it also has the 
greatest impact of any fishery (http://www.forestandbird.org.nz). The two methods used to 
catch hoki are mid-water and bottom trawling and it is fished all year in depths of 400-800 
meter, i.e. both spawning and non-spawning stocks are targeted. The Bird Protection Society 
lists as the main problems of the fishery “the bycatch of hundreds of NZ fur seals, albatrosses 
and petrels each year, the management of two stocks as one quota management area, the 
declining state of the Western stock fishery, the lack of a management plan, and the need for 
the annual quota to be reduced to 100,000 tonnes in 2004”.  
 
The damage to the ecosystem is specified in more detail: 
• “Bycatch: Hundreds of NZ fur seals, albatrosses and petrels are drowned in the hoki 
fishery each year. The affected albatrosses and petrels include several globally 
threatened species such as black-browed and Buller's albatross and white-chinned petrel. 
Non-target fish species bycatch is also a problem with hake, ling and silver warehou being 
caught in West Coast hoki fisheries. Other bycatch species are deepwater sharks 
including shovelnose dogfish, seal shark and Baxter’s dogfish. Threatened basking sharks 
are also caught. 
• Habitat damage: Bottom trawling bulldozes the sea floor, destroying soft corals, 
sponges and long-lived bryozoans. The expanding use of double linked nets with a large 
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 heavy roller in between has increased the impact of this fishery on fragile deepwater 
habitats. 
• Ecological effects: The dumping of bycatch and other fish waste during processing at 
sea has an ecological effect together with the impact of bottom trawling. “ 
 
The public summary of the certification report issued 14th March 2001 by SGS admits that in 
many places knowledge is inadequate and monitoring of impacts insufficient. Several 
corrective actions (CAR) are raised to correct weaknesses with regard to MSC principle 2 on 
ecosystem impact:  
• Minor CAR No. 004: Information is not sufficient on the distribution of habitats, major 
assemblage types and the natural functions and trophic relationships among species in 
the midwater and benthic ecosystems where the fishery operates. 
• Minor CAR No. 005: A full ecological risk assessment has not been conducted 
• Minor CAR No. 006: Action needs to be taken to correct the following weaknesses: (1) 
the impact of the hoki fishery on non-target quota species is not well defined, (2) research 
programs are mainly limited to aspects of setting the TAC for hoki, (3) the information 
availability is not adequate to comply with the requirements for full implementation of the 
Fisheries Act.  
• Minor CAR No. 007: The risks to seabirds have been assessed but the assessment of 
the risks to seals is insufficient. 
 
The report concludes that since there are no major CARs, the assessment team recommends 
certification of the New Zealand Hoki fishery. For the minor CARs the HFMC (Hoki Fishery 
Management Company Ltd) is required to present an action plan and commence the agreed 
actions before 14 September 2001. These final conclusions seem rather favourable for the 
fishery, given that the same report also concludes that: 
1) No ecological objectives or targets for habitats or ecosystems are in place in the fishery 
management system. The responsibility for setting and implementing such ecosystem-
based objectives is not clear. 
2) No targets have been developed and implemented for levels of unacceptable impact on 
non-target species 
3) Monitoring programmes are limited to stock issues and to issues related to formally 
protected species. There are no habitat or ecosystem monitoring systems in place. 
4) Both industry and government measures are available to alter fishing practices where 
unacceptable impacts are identified. However, the responsibility for management of non-
commercial species that are not also formally protected under legislation – the bulk of the 
marine biodiversity – and marine habitats is not clear. 
 
The Bird Protection Society launched a formal complaint against the certification and a panel, 
consisting of Sir Martin Laing, Dr. Dick Deriso, Dr. Jake Rice and Sir Michael Connell, was 
formed to investigate the complaint. With regard to MSC principle 2, the panel concluded that 
“at the time of the original assessment, the information used to assess these impacts was 
poor to non-existent. There had been little directed action taken to measure the extent or 
magnitude of these impacts, and little use had been made of information collected for other 
purposes but possibly informative about the impacts of the hoki fishery on other ecosystem 
components. Where impacts on ecosystem components were known or suspected, little had 
been done to ameliorate them. The Complaint gave much attention to real shortcomings in the 
fishery at the time of application for certification. However, in several instances the Complaint 
proposed to evaluate the fishery against relative standards that were unrealistic or 
unworkable. Having said that, since the original assessment the industry has recognized these 
issues and focused quite strongly on remedying the deficiencies in their Corrective Action 
Plan. The CAP includes measures that will substantially increase knowledge of the actual 
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 impacts of the fishery on the wider environment. It also includes measures that increase the 
openness and inclusiveness of how environmental risks are evaluated, how needs for 
mitigation are determined, and mitigation measures are chosen and implemented. These are 
significant improvements, although sustainability of the fishery at the ecosystem scale remains 
the greatest concern for certification.” In addition, the panel makes the following 
recommendations: 
1. Seal excluding devices be tested in New Zealand waters as a complement to the trials off 
Western Tasmania. 
2. The trawl grounds should be mapped, especially those areas where trawls impact on the 
sea bed. 
3. Using the information from 2, a preliminary ecological risk assessment of the impact of 
the fishery on benthic habitats should be undertaken as a priority, even if the full 
ecological risk assessment proposed in the CAP requires several years to complete. 
4. Interim but measurable management objectives for key ecosystem components should be 
set using existing knowledge, consistent with the principles of the Precautionary 
Approach, and with the full understanding that these objectives would be revised as the 
Ecological Risk Assessment is completed.  
 
The discussion between the Bird Protection Society and the Hoki Fishery continues to this day. 
The most recent surveillance report by SGS posted on 12 October 2005 on the MSC website 
again concludes considerable progress, but at the same time notes that minor CAR No. 17 
dealing with the lack of an overall strategy for managing the environmental impacts of the hoki 
fishery, which should have been completed by 31 March 2005, remains open. For this CAR 
the report ends with the warning: “This CAR remains open because although significant 
progress on the Middle Depth Fisheries Plan has been made, the plan has not been completed 
with sufficient detail and information. Completion of the Plan is required by 26 November 
2005. It shall be reviewed during a surveillance on-site assessment visit at the end of 
November 2005. If the Plan is not finally completed and made available for audit at that time, 
SGS will be likely to raise the CAR to the status of Major, requiring immediate completion or 
revocation of the MSC certificate within 30 days.” Reassessment commenced in early 2005, 
because a full reassessment is required every 5 years and the certificate was awarded in 
March 2001 
 
Emotions also run high in the discussion on the Pollock fishery, which is believed by several 
conservation organizations to have a negative impact on several toppredators, especially the 
threatened Steller’s Sea Lion, via direct competition for food. For this reason these 
conservation organisations objected against the MSC being awarded to both the Pollock 
fishery in the Gulf of Alaska and the Pollock fishery in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands. 
Objection panels reviewed the objections raised, but concluded in both cases that the MSC 
certificate was rightfully awarded. A huge research effort (140 million US dollar) is initiated to 
investigate the ecosystem effects of the Pollock fishery, but some claim that this research is 
not targeted at the most pertinent questions (Dalton 2005). One bone of contention is the lack 
of direct experiments comparing fished and unfished areas. In fact, the initiation of such 
experiments is one of the conditions that need to be met for the continuation of MSC 
certification in both Pollock fisheries. For the Gulf of Alaska Pollock fishery, the certifying body 
concluded that assessments “to identify and estimate impacts of the fishery on protected, 
endangered, threatened or icon species” were insufficient. This led to the following condition 
(#10): “the fishery must design and carry out experiment(s) to test the possible impact of the 
Pollock fishery on Stellar sea lions by comparing outcomes of regulated levels of fishing in 
experimental and control areas on Steller sea lion behaviour, breeding and population trends.  
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 The hypothesis to test would then be that Steller sea lion numbers or productivity in reduced 
fishing areas would show a positive deviation relative to values in fished areas, and the null 
hypothesis that performance of Steller sea lion would be no different between areas. Such an 
experiment should be underway no later than 2006”. The action plan of the At-sea Processors 
Association (dated April 27, 2005) to meet the conditions for continued certification contains 
the following on this particular condition: “The Final Reports on the Bering Sea / Aleutian 
Islands and Gulf of Alaska Pollock fishery recognize the legal and practical impediments 
identified by fishery management authorities and scientists to conducting the controlled area 
experiments proposed by the National Research Council (NRC) in 2002. In addition, NMFS’ 
scientists have provided fishery management authorities with a detailed analysis of the 
substantial cost of such experiments, the decades-long commitment required for such a 
program and the likely prospect that the findings would be inconclusive”. The impression that 
the fishery sector is trying to find a way out of this condition is increased by the text that 
follows, which more or less implies that they will do everything except planning a direct 
experiment. They will organize meetings and summarize current research and prepare a 
review which “will contain a thorough analysis of how the current research meets the 
condition, which is to conduct a direct experiment”. It will be interesting to follow how this 
issue develops in the years to come. 
 
 
4.4 Dutch fisheries and the MSC certificate 
4.4.1 North Sea Herring 
In May 2006, the fishery for North Sea Herring (Clupea harengus) was the first “Dutch” fishery 
awarded with the MSC certificate. The fishery targets the North Sea and Eastern English 
Channel autumn-spawning stock within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the EU and 
Norway. The stock is managed according to the EU-Norway Agreement (December 1997). In 
addition, the fishery also implements, on a voluntary basis, the additional management 
measures as set out in the Policy Plan of the Pelagic Freezer-Trawler Association (PFA), whose 
members are based in The Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Germany and France. Thus, the 
fishery is only partly Dutch. The stock of Herring was badly overfished in the 1970s, but has 
since recovered. The Herring fishery is a pelagic fishery targeting the large shoals of this 
species. It is known that pelagic fisheries can recover faster than other fisheries, when 
overfishing stops (Hutchings 2000)11. The likely reason is that pelagic fisheries do not disturb 
the benthic fish habitat and tend to be highly specific, targeting only one species. Thus, the 
only major impact of the fishery is on the fishing mortality of the target species and once this 
fishing mortality is sufficiently reduced, stocks can recover. To continue certification, several 
conditions have to be met. These include: 
• Making available all VMS, logbook, or other information relating to the fishery, that would 
reasonably be requested for management or research purposes; 
• Maximise the access to PFA vessels participating in this fishery for observers and/or to 
maximise the availability of catch sample information; 
• Recording of additional and incidental sources of herring mortality; 
• Recording of interactions with rare, protected or threatened species (cetaceans, 
seabirds, seals, elasmobranches, turtles etc.), 
 
 
                                                   
11 The main message of the paper by Hutchings is actually that many fisheries take surprisingly long to 
recover after fishing stops and some fisheries haven’t recovered decades after the overfishing was 
stopped. 
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 4.4.2 Shellfish fisheries 
In 2001 MSC pre-assessment reports were published for the Dutch mussel fishery (Agro Eco 
Consultancy, 2001c), the Dutch mechanized cockle fishery (Agro Eco Consultancy, 2001b) 
and the Dutch hand-gathering of cockles (Agro Eco Consultancy, 2001a). In 2001, the pre-
assessments were paid for by the respective producer organisations. In actual fact, a first pre-
assessment was already undertaken in 1999, paid for by the international conservation 
organisation WWF. At the time, these shellfish fisheries were at the centre of a heated debate 
between conservationists and fishermen whether such fisheries should be allowed in nature 
areas like the Wadden Sea. In 2000, the Dutch government initiated a major research effort, 
EVA II, to study the impact of the mechanized shellfish fisheries on the ecosystems of the 
Wadden Sea and Oosterschelde (Ens et al., 2004). In 2004, a new policy was introduced (LNV 
2004) which included a complete ban of mechanized cockle fishing in the Wadden Sea. The 
pre-assessments were not followed up by actual assessments to obtain the MSC certificate. In 
a letter accompanying their reports, Agro Eco hypothesized that this was primarily due to the 
bad public image of the mechanized shellfish fishery, making MSC reluctant to certify such a 
fishery. However, whether or not a fishery is contested is not part of the formal criteria used 
by MSC to judge whether a fishery can be certified (pers. comm. Aldin Hilbrands). 
 
For the mechanized mussel fishery, Agro Eco concluded that it might be possible to conform 
to principles 1 (no overfishing of the stock) and principle 2 (no damage to the ecosystem) with 
the exception of fishery on stable littoral mussel beds and unregulated fishery on sublittoral 
mussels. They expected that the MSC certificate could only be granted if the sector provided 
convincing and watertight measures that would prevent any damage to stable littoral mussel 
beds. They also expected that part of the sublittoral mussel seed would be needed to be 
reserved for the birds. Related to this, most problems were expected with regard to meeting 
the demands of principle 3 (adequate management system): adequate measures to protect 
littoral mussel beds were lacking, there should be more transparency with regard to data on 
the fishery, structured consultation of conservation organisations was lacking, there was no 
active support for initiatives to improve the sustainability of the sector, there was insufficient 
certainty with regard to economic sustainability (due to insecurites about the new policy that 
was supposed to come into effect in 2003). Under the new policy (LNV, 2004) mussel fishery 
is allowed to continue in the Wadden Sea under the condition that it will transform into a more 
“sustainable” fishery. If this transformation is successful, one suspects that it would be 
relatively easy for the mussel sector to obtain the MSC certificate. 
 
For the mechanized cockle fishery, Agro Eco concluded that it would be possible for the 
sector to comply with principle 1 (no overfishing of the stock). For principle 2 (no damage to 
the ecosystem) Agro Eco expected problems with fulfilling criterion 1 (no ecosystem 
changes). They expected that this criterion would only be met with additional constraints on 
the fishery with regard to disturbance of the sediment and with regard to food needs of the 
birds. They expected that especially principle 3 (adequate management system) might prove 
to be a problem, due to insufficient transparency in the accounting and the verification of the 
sector. In their pre-assessment Agro Eco stressed the difficulty in reaching unambiguous 
conclusions on the impact of the fishery and the fact that at the time no article in a peer-
reviewed scientific journal had appeared that demonstrated negative and irreparable effects of 
the cockle fishery. From this uncertainty Agro Eco concluded that the fishery might possibly 
meet the MSC criteria. However, the precautionary approach is at the heart of the MSC 
criteria, so this uncertainty is an argument against instead of in favour of meeting the MSC 
criteria. It is the uncertainty on the ecological impact, and not the public debate, that would 
have been the major obstacle against MSC certification. Since that time several articles have 
appeared in peer-reviewed scientific journal showing a negative impact of the mechanized 
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 cockle fishery (Piersma et al. 2001; Atkinson et al. 2003; Verhulst et al. 2004; van Gils et al. 
2006). Under the new policy, mechanized fishing for cockles is no longer allowed in the Dutch 
Wadden Sea, but it is allowed to continue in the Oosterschelde and the Westerschelde. 
 
For the hand gathering of cockles, Agro Eco concluded that at the current scale (20 fishermen 
that actively fish by hand gathering) it should be easy to meet the criteria of principles 1 (no 
overfishing of the stock) and 2 (no ecosystem damage). However, they expected problems 
with meeting the criteria of principle 3 (adequate management system). Some of the problems 
were due to the government as a result of the uncertainties with regard to the new shellfishing 
policy. Other problems could be mended by the sector: starting structural contacts with all 
stakeholders, better registration of catches; better labelling of cockles gathered by hand in 
the production line. The cockles should not be mixed with cockles gathered via methods not 
labelled as sustainable. Under the new policy, hand gathering is allowed to continue in the 
Wadden Sea. Hand gathering of cockles in the Burry Inlet in Wales was one of the first 
fisheries to obtain the MSC label, but the Dutch sector does not appear to take initiatives to 
obtain the certificate. 
 
4.4.3 Shrimp fishery 
In terms of the number of permits, shrimp fishery is the largest fishery in the Wadden Sea. 
There are 90 permits for shrimp fishery in the Wadden Sea and 160 permits for fishery 
outside the Wadden Sea (Johan Nooitgedagt, pers. comm.). In December 2005, SGS was 
awarded the contract for a pre-assessment of the shrimp fishery in the Netherlands 
(http://crangon.nl)12. In September 2006, this pre-assessment was completed. According to a 
press release published on the website http://crangon.nl the pre-assessment concluded that it 
should be possible to obtain the MSC-certificate when current practices were sufficiently 
changed. The most urgently needed change was a strong reduction in the amount of bycatch 
of young Sole (Solea solea) and Plaice (Pleuronectes platessa). Also the management of the 
sector should be improved, including a better self regulation. A more active role of the Dutch 
government is needed to harmonise the permit system and law enforcement in the different 
countries. The press release also mentions that conservation organisations are worried not 
only about the discards, but also about the disturbance of the sea bottom. The press release 
ends with the statement that the fishery should comply with all legislation, including the Dutch 
nature conservation legislation, to obtain the MSC certificate. It seems that actual certification 
for MSC had not yet commenced in December 2006, as this logical next step was neither 
mentioned on the website http://crangon.nl , nor did the MSC website www.msc.org mention 
the Dutch shrimp fishery as being in the process of certification.  
 
 
4.5 Discussion and conclusions 
A major advantage of MSC certification is transparency. The criteria for certification, 
assessment reports and the formal handling of objections can be freely downloaded from the 
internet. Another advantage is the active involvement of all stakeholders. Neither transparency 
nor active involvement of stakeholders is necessary to obtain a nature conservation permit to 
fish in a SAC or SPA (marine areas protected by the European directives). What is needed 
                                                   
12 The initiative for MSC certification was taken by the conservation organisations “Stichting de 
Noordzee” and the “Waddenverening” in cooperation with “Scomber”, a consultancy for sustainable 
fisheries. The project is financed by the “Stichting Doen” and endorsed by the international conservation 
organisation WWF, the ministry of LNV and the society for improvement of shrimp trading (VEBEGA – 
Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Garnalenhandel). 
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 nowadays is an impact assessment that shows that there is little risk that the activity causes 
significant damage to the nature goals for which the area was designated a nature reserve. 
Reasonable doubt on the absence of significant impacts is sufficient ground to withhold the 
permit (see also Chapter 2). Can the MSC certificate remove such doubts? 
 
On the basis of our review, we conclude that the MSC does not offer an absolute guarantee 
against damage to the ecosystem by the fishery, because the MSC certificate was awarded to 
several fisheries where there was great uncertainty with regard to the impact on the 
ecosystem, yet damage from the fishery seemed likely. From this it can be concluded that 
obtaining the MSC certificate does not guarantee that fisheries in areas protected under the 
EU Birds and/or Habitats Directive will be allowed to continue, but that fisheries permitted in 
areas protected by the European Directives will find it easy to obtain an MSC certificate. 
However, at the workshop it was remarked that the MSC certificate requires that all national 
and international legislation is strictly adhered to. Thus, for the fisheries in the Wadden Sea 
(like the mussel fishery and the shrimp fishery), a nature conservation permit is a necessary 
condition for the MSC certificate. From the point of view of nature conservation, the added 
value of MSC certification for fisheries in nature reserves may not be high, except if the MSC 
includes nature values that are not covered by the conservation goals of either or both EU-
directives (see Chapter 2). This could be the case for fish species not listed in the Habitats 
Directive, or fish species that migrate over large areas. 
 
The situation is quite different for fisheries in areas without the status of marine protected 
area or adequate government policies to prevent ecosystem damage from fishery. The MSC 
conditions specify that fish populations that are depleted should be fished in such a way that 
recovery occurs to a specified level within a specified time frame, consistent with the 
precautionary approach and considering the ability of the population to produce long-term 
potential yields. And although the MSC conditions do not offer an absolute guarantee against 
damage to the ecosystem, they can require corrective actions to remedy negative impacts on 
the ecosystem. Certification should be revoked if the corrective actions are not acted upon in 
time. So far, this has not happened. Given the many scientific uncertainties with regard to 
ecosystem functioning and fishery impact, the MSC certificate may be a good way of starting 
a process towards reducing the scientific uncertainties and reducing the ecosystem impact. 
Outside nature reserves, the MSC certificate benefits both nature and the fishery. At the 
workshop it was remarked that if the EU had succeeded in devising and executing a proper 
communal fishing policy, there would be no added value to the MSC certificate. The very 
existence of a certificate for sustainability should be regarded as a testimony to the failure of 
the communal fishing policy of the EU to adequately protect the fish stocks and the marine 
ecosystem. 
 
Whereas this chapter was exclusively devoted to the MSC, which only certifies entire fisheries, 
the workshop also addressed the issue of certification of individual fishermen, e.g. the 
“Waddengoud” certificate for sustainable regional products (http://www.waddengoud.nl/). It is 
self-evident that certification of individual fishermen offers less protection against overfishing 
and damage to the ecosystem than schemes that certify an entire fishery, like MSC. However, 
certification of individual fishermen may be a good way to commence the process of 
certification of an entire fishery. 
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 5 Fisheries self-management and nature conservation  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the question to what extent fishermen self-organisation can contribute 
to maritime nature conservation. There are many cases in the literature where fishermen self-
organisation contributes to stock preservation. Are there also cases where fisheries self-
organisation contributes to maritime ecosystem conservation? This chapter does not provide 
exhaustive empirical evidence to answer this question, but rather its purpose is to review the 
fisheries management literature in order to provide a conceptual basis for future analysis of 
empirical cases. The chapter consists of three parts: a conceptual part in which the literature 
on co-management will be reviewed, an empirical part in which the relation between co-
management and nature conservation will be explored, and an analytical part in which the 
points raised in the conceptual part will be used to discuss the cases introduced in the 
empirical part.  
 
In order to answer the question, we first review the literature on fishermen self-organisation or 
co-management13. Co-management involves the sharing of management responsibilities 
between government and fishermen organisations (Jentoft 1989). As fishermen become 
actively involved in co-management decision making, this will improve the quality of decision 
making, as well as its legitimacy, hence its adequacy and effectiveness (Jentoft and Mikalsen 
1994). Co-management is often presented as an innovative alternative management 
instrument which is more effective than classical state-initiated instruments such as 
administrative rules (e.g. gear restrictions) and/or property rights (e.g. individual transferable 
quota; Dubbink & van Vliet 1996). We conclude, however, that co-management is not so much 
an alternative management instrument, but rather it indicates an alternative approach to 
management decision-making, whether it includes state-initiated rules, market-based 
instruments, voluntary agreed constraints, or any combination of these. This alternative 
approach embodies the notion that the quality of decision-making should not only be judged in 
terms of performance criteria (effects on stocks or fishing communities), but also in terms of 
process criteria (to what extent are basic principles of good governance observed?).  
Next, we introduce the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. The ecosystem 
approach entails an explicit recognition of the complexity and dynamics of marine ecosystems 
and of the interconnections among its component parts (FAO 2003a). On this account fish 
stocks cannot be singled out as isolated management units, as has been done in fisheries 
management more traditionally, but rather fish stocks are integrated parts of larger 
ecosystems, which have an impact on fisheries as well as are impacted by fisheries. There 
seems to be an intimate –as of yet not very well understood however- connection between 
over-all ecosystem health and fisheries productivity. Apart from that, ecosystem conservation 
as part of wildlife management has become a legitimate management goal in its own right, not 
just in the terrestrial but increasingly also in the aquatic environment. There are several ways 
in which public as well as private parties, including fishermen themselves, can contribute to 
maritime nature conservation. The institution of marine protected areas is one such way, 
which will be elaborated in this chapter, the certification of ecosystem-friendly fisheries 
practices is another one, to be discussed in another chapter of this report. Several cases of 
co-management which include nature conservation will be discussed, while we make use of the 
                                                   
13 Fishermen self-organisation may in theory exist without any formal interference of the state; hence, 
there is not always a co-management component to it. In practice, however, fishermen self-organisation 
almost always exists in some form of interaction with state management of fisheries. Hence, we speak 
of co-management. 
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 points raised in the conceptual part of this chapter. This chapter concludes that private sector 
self-organisation can indeed contribute to maritime nature conservation, and it should be 
pursued more systematically in order to bring about a transition towards more sustainable 
fisheries. 
 
 
5.2 Fisheries management practice 
Classical government intervention in fisheries has been facing many problems over the past 
decades. When over-fishing occurred, governments have tried to regulate fishing behaviour in 
one way or the other. Fishermen who are economically dependent on fishing have been trying 
to circumvent the rules. This has lead to increasingly complex regulation, which in many cases 
has also been increasingly difficult to enforce. Rules may also be counterproductive, in that 
they turn out to have unforeseen negative side effects, and do not result in the objectives 
intended. 
 
 
Flat-fisheries management in the Netherlands
April 1976: introduction of individual catch restrictions; 
enforcement problems. 
1975-1976: voluntary decommissioning (but no HP restriction instituted). 
 
January 1983: Common Fisheries Policy into force; 
October 1984 European Commission infraction procedure against NL; enforcement efforts increase; 
1985-present: quota market. 
January 1984: voluntary catch effort limitation (PO groups). 
February 1985: introduction of HP licences. 
April 1987: introduction of days at sea. 
1988-1991: voluntary decommissioning. 
September 1990: Minister resigned. 
 
January 1993: introduction of quota management groups; public flexibility in exchange for private 
responsibility; introduction of closed areas; tightening of gear restrictions (beam size, mesh size). 
An example of the classical government approach to fisheries management is provided by the 
Dutch flat fisheries (see textbox). This is a telling example because the Dutch government is 
not an under-resourced, underdeveloped state government, but a fully equipped modern state 
administration. To be sure, one part of the problem has been that for a rather long period of 
time EC member states were lacking a formal basis in law to intervene. The Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) came into force only in 1983; more than 15 years after the EC member 
states established a common fisheries zone covering large parts of the Northeast Atlantic. But 
even when it came into force officially, the CFP (and its translation into national regulation) still 
was not immediately effective. It took another 10 years in the Netherlands before a practically 
working system of quota management was instituted, which –notably- incorporates some form 
of fishermen’s self-organisation. This is the Biesheuvel quota group management system, in 
which fishermen voluntarily take up some extra management responsibility in exchange for 
more flexibility in public rules (Van der Schans 2001). Almost 15 years after this co-
management system was introduced, there may be seen another change in fisheries 
management in the Netherlands, to the extent that ecosystem and nature conservation 
management goals not only apply to the coastal zone, but are beginning to extend their 
influence to fisheries management at large.  
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 This brief overview of fisheries management in the Netherlands shows that it may take several 
years before changes in public policy making translate into changes in fisheries management 
institutions. The Dutch experience also shows that some experience has been gained with 
directly involving fishermen groups in management decision making. New management goals 
such as nature conservation appear on the agenda, but it remains to be seen whether and 
how fishermen self-organisation can be more actively involved in reaching those goals.  
 
 
5.3 Fisheries management theory 
The idea that fishermen can themselves contribute to managing a fish stock responsibly has 
gained prominence in recent years, not just from a practical policy point of view (as a 
response to overly complex government regulation), but also as a reflection of resource 
management theory which informs practical policy making. In this section we discuss 
developments in fisheries management theory. Classical fisheries management theory starts 
from the assumption that the problem of over-fishing is just another example of the famous 
tragedy of the commons, as popularised by Hardin (1968; see also Chapter 1). On this 
account, the open access character of the fishery induces fishermen to compete with each 
other to catch more fish. Eventually, the fish stock will collapse as there is no way in which a 
responsible fisherman can protect the positive effects of his restraint from other fishermen 
who behave more opportunistically. Given this situation, the only way in which fish stocks can 
be preserved is through state-initiated regulation, be it either in the form of state-administrated 
constraints or the introduction of some form of private property. Economic theory also 
suggests that the introduction of private property is superior to administrative rules, because 
it changes the incentive structure such that the owner of the resource bears all the costs of 
over-fishing and/or reaps all the benefits of exercising restraint. 
 
Over the past decades, the classical model of fisheries management has been criticised for 
being overly optimistic about the possibilities of governments to develop, implement and 
enforce rules and property rights that prevent fisheries from being over-exploited. Also, the 
classical fisheries management perspective tends to underestimate the capacity of fishermen 
to self-organise in order to prevent overexploitation of the resource on which they depend. 
There have been many cases documented in literature which show that community-based 
management systems exist in which fishermen cooperate together in order to exercise 
restraint among themselves and exclude outsiders (Berkes 1989, Ostrom 1990). As a result, 
co-management has been proposed as a promising way forward for fisheries management. 
Co-management takes a middle course between state-initiated approaches on the one side 
and community-based approaches on the other side (Jentoft 1989). It involves the delegation 
of some management responsibility currently residing with the government to fishermen 
organisations themselves. The idea is that direct involvement of fishermen increases the 
legitimacy of the rules, and that by increasing the legitimacy of the rules fishermen are more 
likely to abide to them voluntarily (Jentoft and Mikalsen 1994). Co-management therefore 
entails a critique of traditional fisheries management theory, which assumes an unrealistically 
prominent role for the state. However, the co-management perspective itself has been 
criticized too, from an empirical point of view, as more experience had been gained with co-
management in practice, but also from a more theoretically point of view, in terms of modern 
democratic governance theory. We will now turn to this critique of co-management.  
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 5.4 Co-management reconsidered 
5.4.1 Instrumental versus empowering co-management 
Social scientists studying co-management initiatives in practice distinguish between two types 
of co-management: instrumental and empowering (Viswanathan et al., 2003). In the former 
case, co-management is basically seen by governments as just another instrument to reach 
their objectives more efficiently by involving fishing communities in the implementation 
process. In the latter case, co-management is seen as a more radical institutional innovation, 
where governments and fishermen organisations really share the power on more equal terms. 
This may entail fishermen involvement not just in issues of implementation but also in setting 
management objectives as such. Empowerment of fishing communities would mean to give 
the people within the fishing communities a real chance to influence their own future. If we 
look at co-management in practice, it is true that fishermen organisations quite often are only 
involved in the implementation process. In the Dutch co-management system for example, 
fishermen are involved in managing some practical aspects of the quota system (intra and 
inter group trade of quota, group administration of days at sea, private obligation to auction all 
fish under quota). Fishermen involvement does not extend to the constitution of the quota 
management system as such (individual quotas and a national days at seas regulation existed 
already before the co-management system was introduced). Neither does the Dutch co-
management system extend to the setting of fisheries management objectives as such. Total 
Allowable Catches for example are set in the context of the prevailing decision making 
procedures of the European Union Common Fisheries Policy. This explains why quota 
management groups in the Netherlands have indeed complained that they are made co-
responsible for enforcing rules, in which they had no say in making (Van der Schans, 2001).14
 
From a public administration theory perspective however, we should not belittle of private 
sector involvement in the implementation and enforcement of rules that are basically public in 
nature (Van der Schans et al., 2003). Given the inherent complexity of much public policy 
making, and also given the limited capability of state administrators to oversee the practical 
consequences of many complex rules, a lot can be gained if the target group of the rules is 
involved in the implementation process. This is a basic principle in much environmental 
regulation in the Netherlands and other developed countries (Van Vliet, 1992). It is particularly 
in the implementation and enforcement process, that public rule making often develops its 
own logic, such that the state administration not only prescribes the goals to be reached but 
also, and often in great detail, the means deemed appropriate to reach the goals. In this way, 
public regulation may however become more burdensome for the target group affected, than 
would be strictly necessary to reach public goals.15 For example, in order to increase the 
efficiency of monitoring and enforcement of individual quota uptake, the Dutch government in 
the 1980s introduced detailed rules to land fish (e.g. landing hours and procedures). Fish not 
landed according to the prescribed rules was assumed to be fished illegally (above quota), 
whereas in practice it was almost impossible for fishermen, even if they did not want to, not to 
break a rule. Under the co-management system introduced in 1993, fishermen voluntarily 
committed themselves to auction all fish under quota, which improved the transparency of the 
landing process to such an extent that strict landing hours and procedures could be relaxed or 
abolished. The same happened with public restrictions on trade in fish quota among 
fishermen. In order to keep track of changes in catch entitlements in relation to the amounts 
                                                   
14Fishermen have some influence over CFP policy goal setting however through their regular sectoral 
interest representation in the national and EU decision making machinery.  
15Apart from that, when the means to reach a public goal are prescribed in law in detail, this tends to 
remove the incentive for innovative companies to come up with more effective means to reach the goal. 
Means-oriented regulation tends to frustrate innovation (for examples in pig farming; see Van der Schans 
et al. 2000).   
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 of fish landed by individual fishermen, the government previously had to put severe restrictions 
on trade in quota among fishermen. Most fishermen would benefit from unrestricted trade in 
quota however; as this allows them to respond to unforeseen circumstances (such as break 
down of an engine, or adapt the balance of catch entitlements for different target species in a 
mixed fishery). Under the 1993 co-management system, fishermen are allowed to trade quota 
throughout the year, in exchange for providing the government with more transparency in 
quota transactions (control and enforcement agency AID was granted access to relevant 
group administrations). A study conducted in 1996 to evaluate the co-management system 
estimated that group members gain over 70.000 DFL (32.000 Euro), mainly because they are 
able to use their individual quota more effectively given the flexibility provided by the co-
management system (LEI, 1996). Thus, being involved in rule implementation may increase 
the legitimacy of regulation already, even if the target group is not (directly) involved in the 
goal setting stage of the regulation.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that fishermen involvement in rule implementation cannot be 
discarded too easily, as being just instrumental rather than empowering co-management. 
Fishermen may benefit substantially if public policies are implemented more flexibly and more 
responsive to individual circumstances and local business practices, without compromising 
the publicly decided objectives to be reached. Apart from that, it should be noted that 
fishermen are but one group with a stake in the marine environment, there are other societal 
interests as well. So if fishermen are granted a more prominent place in public decision-
making, this should be extended to these other stakeholders as well. This point will be 
elaborated next.  
 
5.4.2 Corporatism versus multi-stakeholder approach 
The co-management approach has been criticised also for being biased too much towards 
fishermen organisations as the only group to be involved more directly in the management of 
the fishery. In practice there are often differences of interest both within fishermen groups and 
also between the fisheries sector and society at large. Increasingly, it is recognised therefore 
that fishermen organisations may not be perfectly representative, and that other societal 
groups are affected by management decisions as well. Hence, the interests of a variety of 
stakeholders should be somehow included in the decision making process (Jentoft and McCay 
1995). Fishermen may differ according to the technology they employ, the species they fish, 
the licenses they have, the area they come from, etc. There may also be difference between 
boat owners and crew members, part-time and full-time fishermen, etc. Given this variety of 
interests, it can not be taken for granted that delegating management responsibility to 
fishermen organisations just like that increases the expediency and legitimacy of rules among 
all fishermen belonging to the target groups. In addition, it should be recognised more 
explicitly that other societal groups also have a stake in the management of the fisheries.16 
Environmental groups for example have long drawn attention to the negative side effects of 
fisheries management (by catch, high-grading, ecosystem disturbances more generally). In 
addition, it is generally acknowledged now that other uses of the marine environment -apart 
from economic activities, such as fisheries, transportation, and fossil energy extraction- are 
also important, most notably nature conservation (see later in this chapter).17  
                                                   
16 These other groups obviously include fish traders and processors, whose economic performance is 
directly affected by the success of the fisheries management system locally. Evidence suggests that 
fishermen self-manage their fishery not so much to preserve the stocks at sea, but rather to increase the 
price they are paid for fish in the market. A case in point is the fishermen co-operative in the New York 
Bight region, which discovered that it was able to influence the price of whiting in its favour by limiting 
the supply of fish (McCay 1980; Van der Schans 2001, p. 279 and following). 
17 There are also arguments in favour of a special position for fishermen in the regulatory process. In the 
end of the day it is the fisherman who must abide to the rules, so it is better to engage him in rule 
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 Traditionally, fishery management systems do not take into account the wider societal 
concerns sufficiently. This is particularly so in European countries with a corporatist tradition, 
such as the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark (Van Hoof et al 2005).18 In the corporatist 
tradition, industries can be organised in sectoral sub-divisions (occupational groups or 
professions), consisting of employers and employees under the direction of the state, which 
assume management responsibility for certain aspects of economic activity, such as labour 
conditions, quality standards, trading rules, etc. In a corporatist form of economic 
organisation there is no conflict in principle between sector and societal interests, as both are 
assumed to be organically intertwined. In practice however, corporatist decision making has 
often been criticised for being dominated too much by the particularistic interests of a small 
group of organised industry, at the exclusion of other non-organised industry groups and 
societal interests not represented by the corporatist elite.  
 
For The Netherlands, the corporatist decision making arrangement was able to resist the 
imposition of severe restrictions in agriculture throughout the 1970s and 80s. The agricultural 
policy community at that time has been referred to as an “iron triangle”, consisting of 
organised industry, sectoral Ministry government officials and sectoral spokes persons in 
Parliament (Frouws, 1994). Towards the end of the 1980s, the erosion of the “iron triangle” 
irreversibly began, as the limits to growth in agricultural production became visible 
(overproduction, environmental degradation), the sector became internally divided, and 
pressure group activism gained prominence in the public decision making process. Even 
though the over-all corporatist landscape changed drastically in The Netherlands over the last 
couple of decades, corporatist institutions have not been dismantled in each and every sector 
equally, nor has the corporatist way of thinking disappeared completely. In fisheries, the 
corporatist Commodity Board for Fish and Fish Products traditionally played an important role 
in regulating the fisheries, for example in 1959 it instituted an obligation to auction all fish 
landed in the Netherlands. This semi-public obligation to auction was however believed to be in 
conflict with (expected) EC market regulation. The Board therefore abandoned its obligation to 
auction in 1975 (Van der Schans 2001). In the same year however, the North East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) established Total Allowable Catches (TACs) for several bottom 
species in the North Sea, including sole and plaice, cod, haddock, saithe and whiting. The 
Dutch government initially delegated the management of the national quota to the Fish 
Commodity Board. The Board was not able to sufficiently control fishing effort during the year, 
however, and the Ministry closed the sole fishery before the end of 1975 because the national 
quota was exhausted. In the beginning of 1976 the Fish Commodity Board therefore returned 
its quota management task to the Dutch government. In the turbulent years that followed 
(1776-1990), the Fish Commodity Board seemed to have lost its grip on sectoral policy 
making (Van Hoof et al 2005).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
making than to force him into rule compliance, which will be difficult to enforce (Jentoft, 1989). Apart 
from that, fishermen have a direct interest in the regulatory outcome, since their livelihood depends on 
it, whereas NGOs for example do not have such a direct interest, hence their participation in decision 
making may be organised differently (Jentoft and McCay 1995). 
18 In a survey studying the division of management responsibilities between fishing industry and 
governments in several European countries, it was found that in Northern-European countries (NO, DK, 
NL, FR) in particular there is a discussion how to include environmental interests more systematically in 
(co-)management decision making. In southern European countries (SP) the more important issue seems 
to be how to involve local fishermen organisations more prominently in national and regional fisheries 
management decision making (Van Hoof et al 2005).  
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 The introduction of the co-management system in 1993 has been analysed as a re-formulation 
of the corporatist way of organising (Hoefnagel 2002). The co-management system re-
introduced an obligation to auction all fish under quota (albeit under private rather than 
corporatist law), and also it re-introduced involvement of the Product Board of Fish in 
administrating the quota system (the Board provided secretarial support to quota 
management groups and also the groups’ fishing plans were subject to approval of the Board). 
Interestingly however, it was the Ministry’s Directorate of Fisheries, who took the political 
initiative to develop the co-management arrangement, and the Product Board of Fish (the 
corporatist organisation in fisheries) at first only offered lukewarm support. Also, the 
obligation to auction is private law and not semi-public (corporatist) law. This suggests that the 
co-management system in the Netherlands is perhaps not so much a sign of revitalisation of 
corporatism, but really co-management is competing with corporatist organisation (Van Hoof 
et al 2005). Quite interestingly, however, the Ministry’s Directorate of Fisheries did not 
completely by-pass or ignore the existing corporatist structure, but offered it a coordinating 
role in the design of the co-management system as well as in its implementation. Thus, the 
technical and organisational support initially provided by the Product Board of Fish indeed 
seems to have been an important factor accounting for the success of co-management in the 
Dutch flatfish industry (Van der Schans 2001).19 A drawback of this evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary approach however may be that other societal concerns, such as environmental 
groups, are not represented in the flatfish co-management arrangement, as they also do not 
have a place in the existing corporatist structure in fisheries in The Netherlands.  
 
The previous discussion indicates the relevance of raising the question how a multi-
stakeholder approach to fisheries management can be organised in practice. From a public 
administration perspective, this could either be done by re-orientating the existing institutional 
arrangements by integrating other societal concerns more systematically. For example, in the 
Netherlands it has been proposed to open up the existing corporatist structure for NGOs (SER 
2000, pp. 38-40). Or it could be done by superseding the existing decision making machinery 
through the introduction of new and innovative, but less exclusive, and more flexible, some 
may argue therefore also more adequate, co-governance arrangements (Kooiman et al 1999).  
 
5.4.3 System character of governance problem 
A final point of critique of the co-management approach is related to the fact that formally 
delegating management responsibility to fishermen organisations does not yet mean that 
fishermen organisations actually control the most important factors influencing their fishing 
behaviour. A case in point is the situation that the relevant ecosystem boundaries extend 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the co-managing fishermen organisation. This is in fact a 
classical tragedy of the commons problem. Any voluntary effort to restrict catches will be 
undermined if the fish stock is over-exploited elsewhere by fishermen who share access to the 
same resource base, but are no party to the co-management arrangement. The fact that there 
must be congruence between the decision making capacity of the resource users and the 
boundaries of the resource base to be managed is generally recognised as a pre-condition for 
                                                   
19Experiments with farmer self-organisation (as part of a co-management arrangement) also took place in 
other agricultural sectors in the Netherlands, for example the development of farmer environmental 
cooperatives, which play a role in the implementation of nature conservation and manure application 
policies. These experiments have not been so successful however, as the Biesheuvel group system, and 
this may be (partly) due to the fact that they were introduced quite independently of the corporatist 
institutions still existing in these sectors (Van der Schans 2003). The co-management approach in 
fisheries presupposes the existence of strong fishermen organisations. If such organisations do not 
exist, they must first be developed before fishermen can take over (some) management responsibilities 
(Jentoft and Sandersen 1996).  
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 the success of resource user self-management (Ostrom 1990). It is all the more remarkable 
therefore that the Dutch co-management system is a success, even though no such 
arrangements exist in other European countries bordering the North Sea with fishermen 
fishing side by side with the Dutch. This can be explained however if we take into account that 
the Dutch co-management system is more about implementation rather than goal setting (as 
we discussed before), and also that the Dutch co-management system was designed such 
that it provides concrete benefits for Dutch fishermen who join the system, vis a vis other 
fishermen who do not join the system (as discussed above). Obviously, it is not always 
possible to design a co-management arrangement in such a way that fishermen participating 
in the system capture concrete benefits, even if other fishermen fishing the same fishing 
grounds do not participate. Hence, there are limits to the development of co-management at 
the local level, when a tragedy of the commons remains unresolved at the system level. A 
case in point may be the extensions of the Dutch co-management system that have been 
proposed more recently. A committee was formed in 2002 to review the existing co-
management system and also to study ways to extend the (enforcement) responsibilities of 
the groups, notably in the field of technical measures (where and when to use which mesh 
sizes), and also engine capacity control (does the actual HP power of the engines conform to 
the licensed HP power?). This extension of responsibilities was resisted by the fishermen 
organisations however, who argued that the differences in control and enforcement between 
EU countries were too large in order for the Dutch to incorporate these measures in the co-
management approach (this would undermine a level playing field; Van Hoof et al., 2005).  
 
There may be other systemic mechanisms preventing fishermen who have been formally 
delegated management responsibility to actually take (some) control over their destiny with 
regard to a fishery. Due to the globalisation of markets, fishing as an economic activity is 
increasingly being dominated by international market forces. Thus, in a very real sense the 
penetration of distant markets has contributed to the declining ability of local communities to 
manage their local resources (McCay and Jentoft 1996). In a context of non-local fish trade, it 
is for example not so easy anymore for fishermen organisations to increase the price in the 
local fish market by limiting the supply of fish. The possibility to manipulate prices however 
has often been an important motivation for groups of fishermen to self-organise (e.g. McCay 
1980). For example, the introduction of voluntary catch effort limitations in Dutch flatfisheries 
in January 1984 (see text box above) was motivated by expected price increases in the local 
fish market (Van der Schans 2001). The introduction of bureaucratic rules may be another 
factor limiting the ability of fishermen organisations to self-manage their exploitation of a 
fishery. Where the state takes over control, this may in effect mean a disruption of social and 
ecological responsibility that used to be a concern of co-managing resource users themselves 
(McCay and Jentoft 1996). An example of this with respect to the Dutch co-management 
system is the introduction of a days-at-sea regulation at the European level in 2004, replacing 
the national days at sea regulation that existed in The Netherlands since 1987. The problem 
with European days at sea regulation is that it doesn’t allow for the flexibility, which had been 
awarded to fishermen participating in the co-management system under the national days at 
regulation (10% extra days at sea for group members and the sharing of surplus days-at-sea 
among group members). Group boards argued therefore that this type of regulation is dis-
proportionate and inconsistent, as it prescribes in detail the means (EU defined days at sea) to 
reach goals (EU decided catch restrictions). Thus, at EU level a policy instrument is introduced 
to replace an alternative developed at the national level (NL defined days at sea), which has 
proven to be effective while allowing for flexibility and a sharing of management 
responsibilities between government and industry (Van Hoof et al 2005). Group boards were 
asked to oversee compliance to a rule, but they didn’t have a say in the constitution of the rule 
(a case of instrumental rather than empowering co-management, as discussed above).  
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 5.4.4 Co-management is not an alternative to ‘state’ or ‘market 
The discussion in the previous paragraph brings home the point that co-management can only 
thrive if it is properly embedded in the overall governance system in place to manage a 
fishery. This point may seem obvious enough, but note that in the public administration 
literature co-management is often presented as an alternative to more classical governance 
instruments, such as bureaucratic rules or private property rights which are presumed to be 
ineffective per se to manage the fishery (Dubbink and Van Vliet 1996, Kooiman et al 1999). In 
practice however co-management is often complementary to other governance instruments (it 
does not replace the classical mix of governance instruments, but rather makes it more 
complete).20 In the Dutch case, co-management did not replace the existing governance 
structure, but rather made more intelligent use of its components (it provided a more 
sophisticated implementation of the quota and national days at seas regulations, instruments 
which in themselves remained in place without change). In fact, the public system of rules and 
regulations was complemented (rather than replaced) by a private system of rights and 
obligations (group contracts and bylaws). This private system was in principle voluntarily 
agreed among group members themselves, but in practice the Ministry provided detailed 
guidelines as to how the system of private rules should be framed in order for group members 
to qualify for more flexibility in public rules. Thus, co-management should not be seen as a 
stopgap to undo the failures of state-initiated regulation or market-based approaches, rather 
for co-management to be successful it seems to require a well-functioning public 
administration that has a clear view on which responsibilities can be shared with industry and 
also which steps need to be taken to create the conditions that are conducive for the industry 
to take up its co-management tasks properly. 
 
 
5.5 Co-management as an example of ‘good governance’ 
More fundamentally, the co-management debate has brought to the foreground the notion that 
regulation will be more effective, if it is perceived as more legitimate by those addressed by 
the rules. But this holds for any form of regulation, including state-administrated bureaucratic 
rules, and market based instruments such as tradable rights. The legitimacy of regulation is a 
challenge for democratic government anyhow. Modern democracy should strive for legitimate 
government anyway, not just with respect to voluntarily agreed co-management arrangements 
but also -and perhaps even more so- in relation to state-centred and/or market based 
governing arrangements -as these ultimately depend on the state using its monopoly of force 
(Van der Schans 2001). Advocates of co-management also seem to take for granted that 
giving fishermen organisations a greater say in fisheries management as a matter of course 
improves the quality and legitimacy of decision making. In practice however co-management 
decision making may be dominated by local elites of fishermen, who do not necessarily take 
into account the interests of the whole fishing community to be represented. Other interests 
(outside the fishing community) also play an increasingly prominent role (the multi-stakeholder 
approach, as discussed above).  
 
In order to improve fisheries management, we must therefore look for a perspective which 
does not limit itself to the possibility of introducing co-management but rather addresses the 
                                                   
20In countries where governments are under-resourced and markets are underdeveloped, co-
management may function in practice as an alternative to state-initiated or market-based regulation. But 
in the context of a lawful society, where governments have the capacity and resources to implement 
bureaucratic rules and oversee markets, co-management arrangements can be sustainable in the long 
run only if they are embedded properly in the wider institutional context. In such cases, co-management 
is not an alternative instrument to classical fisheries management instruments, but rather it provides an 
alternative perspective on fisheries management.  
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 issue of good governance in general. Related to this is the point that direct participation -a 
defining characteristic of co-management- is but one way to increase the legitimacy of 
regulation. There are other ways to increase the legitimacy of public decision making as well, 
for example by improving the process of indirect participation (political representation), by 
encouraging transparency (which allows constituencies to monitor what their representatives 
decide and to take notice of the reasons used to legitimate decisions) and accountability 
(which allows constituencies to hold their representatives responsible for what they have 
decided).21  
 
An increasing number of government agencies, including international ones, have explicated 
the normative conditions to satisfy the way in which they exercise power. For the European 
Union these principles are (COM(2001) 428): 
• openness (relevant information should be accessible and understandable) 
• participation (a wider group of relevant stakeholders should participate in the policy chain; 
from conception to implementation) 
• accountability (it should be clear who at which level is responsible for what) 
• effectiveness (policies must include explicit objectives, and they must be based on an 
evaluation of future impact and past experience, they must also be properly enforced) 
• coherence (policies in one field and by one agency should be coherent with those in other 
fields and of other agencies), proportionality (the instruments selected should be 
proportionate to the goals to be achieved) 
• subsidiarity (is the European level indeed the most appropriate level?).  
 
These principles apply to governance in general, but they are also relevant to the functioning 
of fisheries management in particular. In its Roadmap to reform the Common Fisheries Policy, 
the EU Commission has explicitly taken the position that these European governance 
principles should be embodied into the new Policy (COM(2002) 181). This change of 
perspective can be seen in the global fisheries management debate more generally (Kooiman 
et al 2005), such that the focus shifts from a purely technical-instrumental approach (‘which 
policy instruments are effective?’) to a more social-political approach (‘which policy proposals 
are perceived as legitimate?’). This also involves a shift in focus from performance-oriented 
criteria (impact on fish stocks, socio-economic goals, etc.) to performance- and process-
oriented criteria (quality of decision making process; Van der Schans et al 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
21Alternative ways to produce legitimacy may in fact be more appropriate in the context of a modern 
society where governance issues are so complex and diverse that it is hardly possible for all 
stakeholders involved in practice to participate directly in each and every step of the decision making 
process. To make a multi-stakeholder approach practical, one can think of a co-management 
arrangement in which fishermen are involved directly, while representatives of NGOs are involved only 
indirectly in decision making. Still this co-management decision making should be legitimate for NGO 
constituencies as well. Hence, decision making should be transparent and it should be possible to hold 
the decision makers accountable.  
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 EU Governance, a White Paper, COM (2001) 428:  
Five principles underpin good governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence. Each principle is important for establishing more democratic governance. They underpin 
democracy and the rule of law in the Member States, but they apply to all levels of government – global, 
European, national, regional and local.  
• Openness. The Institutions should work in a more open manner. Together with the Member States, 
they should actively communicate about what the EU does and the decisions it takes. They should use 
language that is accessible and understandable for the general public. This is of particular importance in 
order to improve the confidence in complex institutions.  
• Participation. The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU policies depend on ensuring wide 
participation throughout the policy chain – from conception to implementation. Improved participation is 
likely to create more confidence in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies. 
Participation crucially depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when developing 
and implementing EU policies. 
• Accountability. Roles in the legislative and executive processes need to be clearer. Each of the EU 
Institutions must explain and take responsibility for what it does in Europe. But there is also a need for 
greater clarity and responsibility from Member States and all those involved in developing and 
implementing EU policy at whatever level. 
• Effectiveness. Policies must be effective and timely, delivering what is needed on the basis of clear 
objectives, an evaluation of future impact and, where available, of past experience. Effectiveness also 
depends on implementing EU policies in a proportionate manner and on taking decisions at the most 
appropriate level. 
• Coherence. Policies and action must be coherent and easily understood. The need for coherence in 
the Union is increasing: the range of tasks has grown; enlargement will increase diversity; challenges 
such as climate and demographic change cross the boundaries of the sectoral policies on which the 
Union has been built; regional and local authorities are increasingly involved in EU policies. Coherence 
requires political leadership and a strong responsibility on the part of the Institutions to ensure a 
consistent approach within a complex system.  
 
Each principle is important by itself. But they cannot be achieved through separate actions. Policies can 
no longer be effective unless they are prepared, implemented and enforced in a more inclusive way.  
 
The application of these five principles reinforces those of 
• proportionality and subsidiarity. From the conception of policy to its implementation, the choice of 
the level at which action is taken (from EU to local) and the selection of the instruments used must be in 
proportion to the objectives pursued. This means that before launching an initiative, it is essential to 
check systematically (a) if public action is really necessary, (b) if the European level is the most 
appropriate one, and (c) if the measures chosen are proportionate to those objectives. 
  
In conclusion of this review of the literature on fisheries self-organization, it should be noted 
that it is possible to reformulate both the argument for co-management as well as the critique 
on co-management, as discussed above, in terms of principles of governance, such as 
introduced above. At first, one could argue that the debate on whether co-management is 
instrumental or empowering is captured by the governance principles of participation and 
subsidiarity (to what can fisheries decision making power be delegated to the local level of 
government and/or to fishermen organizations?) and proportionality (are the means publicly 
prescribed proportionate to the goals to be reached, or is there room for private deviations of 
means without compromising public goals?). Secondly, the question whether fishermen 
organizations should play a special role in management or whether co-management should be 
based on a multi-stakeholder approach is captured by the governance principles of openness 
(relevant information should anyhow be accessible), participation (a wider group of relevant 
stakeholders should be able to participate in principle) and accountability (for those who do 
not participate directly, it should be clear who is responsible for what). Lastly, the fact that 
fisheries co-management should be embedded in a larger institutional framework is covered 
by the governance principles effectiveness (co-management decision making capacity should 
be congruent to the boundaries of the resource to be managed) and coherence (the larger 
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 institutional setting should facilitate rather than frustrate the delegation of decision making 
capacity to fishermen organizations). In the final section of this chapter we will use the points 
raised here to discuss several empirical cases of co-management which include nature 
conservation. But first these cases will be introduced in the next section. 
 
 
5.6 Fisheries self-management and nature conservation 
We now have some more insight in the way in which fishermen self-organisation or co-
management can contribute to the more classical goals of fisheries management 
(conservation of target species, socio-economic goals). This section aims to address the 
question to what extent fishermen self-organisation can contribute to maritime nature 
conservation. Maritime nature conservation also includes the protection of non-target species, 
and the reduction of negative side effects of fishing on the maritime ecosystem more 
generally. These are goals that fishermen may find difficult to pursue voluntarily, as it is not 
immediately obvious how they directly benefit from them.  
 
The more encompassing perspective on fisheries management, which goes beyond stock 
conservation, is often referred to as the ecosystem approach to fisheries (FAO 2003a). From 
an ecosystem perspective, fish stocks are not just isolated natural production units but also 
functionally integrated (parts of) living ecosystems (Van der Schans 2001). Ecosystems tend 
to exhibit a high degree of interpenetration. Ecosystem elements are related in many ways to 
each other, and to the whole: 'everything is connected to everything else'. Ecosystems 
therefore possess properties that cannot be predicted on the basis of knowledge of 
component parts; ecosystem properties 'emerge'. Incorporating ecosystem considerations in 
fisheries management entails, among other things, taking into account the impacts of fisheries 
on the marine ecosystem and also the impacts of the marine ecosystem on fisheries 
(Reykjavik Declaration on Responsible Fisheries in the Maritime Ecosystem 2001). This 
interconnectivity should be taken into account even if there is incomplete scientific knowledge 
about the structure, functioning, components and properties of the ecosystem as well as 
about the ecological impact of fishing; the precautionary approach. The objective of including 
ecosystem considerations in fisheries management is to contribute to long-term food security 
and to human development and to assure the effective conservation and sustainable use of 
the ecosystem and its resources (Reykjavik Declaration 2001; see also FAO 2003b). There 
have been several calls over the past decades to incorporate the ecosystem approach into 
fisheries management: UN Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm 1972, UN 
Convention of the Law of the Sea 1982, UN Conference on Environment and Development 
1992, including the Agenda 21 which advocates an ecosystem approach to ocean 
management, Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, Johannesburg 2002 (see also FAO 2003a). We are now entering an era 
however that ecosystem considerations are not just called for in international conferences but 
they actually become enshrined in national laws, for example in Canada, Australia and the 
United States of America (Sainsbury and Sumaila 2003). More recently there is also a move to 
include ecosystem considerations more prominently in international agreements covering the 
high seas, such as the Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, which was established in 1995 and is currently under review 
(UN 2006).  
 
The increased attention for ecosystem considerations in fisheries management stems from at 
least two sources. Firstly, fisheries management based on a single species approach has 
failed to conserve fish stocks, even those that are valuable from a commercial point of view, 
let alone reduce the negative impact of fishing on non-commercial species and habitats. The 
standard bio-economic model of a fishery assumes a direct relation between stock size and 
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 recruitment success, a relation that has been very difficult to quantify in practice however and 
also that fails to take into account the complex and dynamic interactions with other species 
and the natural environment at large. A more ecologically informed alternative model suggests 
that the biomass of the ecosystem as a whole is relatively stable, but the biomass of individual 
species varies unpredictably (Wilson et al. 1994). Even if minor variations in quantitative inputs 
may lead to considerable differences in outcomes, the qualitative behaviour of the ecosystem 
is relatively stable throughout the years. From a management perspective, this analysis 
implies a shift away from quantitative harvesting limits for individual species, which used to be 
the policy instrument most favoured in the conventional analysis of the overfishing problem (as 
discussed earlier). Rules should not so much focus on maintaining minimum stock sizes of 
individual species, as recruitment success anyway fluctuates erratically given the complex 
ecosystem dynamics at sea. But rather rules should focus on maintaining the basic biological 
processes, which constitute the long-term reproductive capacity of the ecosystem (spawning, 
migration, etc.). The ecosystem approach to fisheries management therefore argues for 
instruments such as territorial use rights, gear restrictions, and/or other rules which prescribe 
how, when and where to catch the fish (rather than how many fish should be taken). It also 
suggests adaptive harvesting strategies that allow for switching between species. When catch 
per unit effort for one species declines, it makes ecological sense to switch to another 
species.22 In conclusion, the idea is that if fisheries management is extended to include 
ecosystem considerations, it is better able to ensure the continued productivity of the seas; 
hence, to secure a livelihood for fishermen whilst maintaining the natural integrity of the 
maritime ecosystem (FAO, 2003a).  
 
Secondly, ecosystem considerations get more attention in fisheries management due to the 
fact that in many countries the societal appreciation for the different functions of the seas has 
changed, notably the nature function gains importance over economic functions such as 
fisheries. From an ecosystem point of view -some call this ecocentric (Eckersley 1992)- 
ecosystems are to be protected for their own sake, not just for their capacity to provide 
goods and services to humankind. In any case, there are now many examples around the 
globe where ecosystem conservation, as a form of wild life management, has become a 
legitimate management goal in its own right, not just on land but increasingly also at sea. In 
the Netherlands, for example, in 1993 the government produced the Sea and Coastal Fishery 
policy document which recognised that the relation between fisheries and nature needed to be 
reconsidered, such that nature considerations should be more prominent in fisheries policy 
making (LNV 1993). This was particularly so for designated areas in the coastal zone, such as 
the Wadden Sea, where fishing was still possible but only within the constraints of sustainable 
development and conservation. Under the new policy certain areas were permanently closed 
for mussel seed and cockle fisheries, and in years of poor production a certain amount of 
shellfish had to be reserved as food for birds at the expense of what was available for 
fisheries. The protection of the Wadden Sea ecosystem is accorded under national spatial 
planning law (there is a special national planning decision which formulates the Dutch 
government policy with respect to the Wadden Sea; PKB Waddenzee), and nature 
conservation law (some parts of the Wadden Sea are accorded the status of National Nature 
Reserve). We return to The Wadden sea example later.  
 
It is important to note that there has been an interesting development over the past decade in 
the Dutch maritime policy arena, in that it is now recognised that nature conservation is not 
limited to designated areas of the coastal zone, such as The Wadden Sea, but should extent 
                                                   
22One drawback of assigning quantitative catch restrictions per species to individual fishermen is that 
switching between species is more difficult. The Dutch group system, precisely re-introduces some of 
this adaptive flexibility by allowing fishermen to trade in excess sole or plaice quota among group 
members. 
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 to the territorial sea (up to 12 mile) and the Exclusive Economic Zone (Dutch part of 
Continental Shelf) as well. The largest amount of nature in The Netherlands is to be found at 
sea, and environmental pressure groups increasingly demand that areas of special interest at 
sea are to be protected; for example the Foundation North Sea asks for the protection of five 
areas in the North Sea (SDN, 2003): Doggersbank, Centrale Oestergronden, Klaverbank, 
Friese Front en Kustzone).23 But also at the European level it is recognised that land-based 
conservation policies should be extended out to the seas. For example, in 2002 the EU 
Commission decided to expand its ambitious European ecological network Natura 2000 to 
include an offshore marine environment network. This means that the EU Birds and Habitat 
Directives (79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC respectively) also apply to the seas (COM(2002) 
539). In addition, the European Ministers of the Environment (in the OSPAR Commission) 
recommended in 2003 that there should be a network of marine protected areas by the year 
2010 (OSPAR 2003). Even though these international initiatives do not preclude fisheries in 
principle, it should be noted that their principle aim is to protect the marine environment rather 
than ensure the long term productivity of the fishery. For example, in areas designated under 
the Birds and Habitat Directives fishing activities (as well as other economic activities) may 
continue in principle only if it can be proven that they do not negatively impact the specific 
nature qualities that are afforded protection under the Directives. Initially it was assumed that 
this would hold for the development of new (fishing) activities in the protected areas, but there 
have been court rulings already that existing (fishing) activities should also comply with the 
new rules; see also Chapter 2. In 2004 Dutch nature conservation groups successfully 
questioned the licences issued by the Ministry of Fisheries to fishermen who use a mechanical 
suction gear to catch cockles in the Wadden Sea. In a prejudicial ruling, the European Court 
confirmed that the European Birds and Habitats Directives were indeed applicable to this type 
of activities (C-127/02). The Dutch Administrative Court (Raad van State) in turn ruled that the 
licences issued indeed needed to be withdrawn since the required appropriate assessment of 
environmental impacts had not been made (Raad van State 200407395/1 and 
200409107/2). The contours of the new regime at the North Sea are not so clearly 
established yet as compared to the Wadden Sea. It is obvious however the relation between 
economy and nature is profoundly changing at sea also, even though it may still take years 
before it is exactly clear how the European directives will be implemented in national 
legislation, and which activity is allowed where and under what conditions (this was the opinion 
of fisheries and conservation policy experts at the SDN/W-UR workshop 01-12-05).  
 
There are at least two somewhat different sources in theory which inspire the increased 
attention for ecosystem consideration in fisheries management; namely ecologically informed 
fisheries management, and wildlife management extended to the seas. In practice however 
there are many opportunities for ‘fusion’ rather than ‘collision’ to paraphrase the FAO 
document on the ecosystems approach (FAO, 2003a). For example, the institution of marine 
protected areas (MPAs) may protect habitats and ecosystem functioning, which should benefit 
wildlife, as well as structurally improve the production capacity and resilience of commercially 
exploited fish stocks, which should benefit fishermen (Roberts et al 2001).24 In practice, it 
however depends very much on the particular fish stock and habitat characteristics under 
consideration whether or not proposed MPAs serve both the goals of nature conservation and 
                                                   
23The very fact that the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency commissioned this research 
project proves that there is growing interest in nature protection at sea.   
24MPAs are controversial, however; see for example the discussion following the Roberts et al 2001 
article (Science 15 Febr. 2002, pp. 1233-1235). The reported positive effect on fisheries can hardly 
ever be attributed to MPAs only, combinations of instruments, including conventional instruments such as 
catch limits,  are therefore often preferable to stand alone MPAs. Nevertheless, MPAs are singled out as 
example here, because they are seen as the ecosystem management instrument par example, whereas 
conventional fishery management instruments such as catch limits are seen as representing the ‘single 
species’ approach of the past (Roberts 1999).  
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 increased commercial yield equally and simultaneously (see below). Ecosystem-based fisheries 
management and wildlife protection both draw attention to the possible negative side-effects 
of other uses of the marine environment, ecosystem productivity is affected not just by fishing 
but also by pollution, for example. On this account, the institution of an MPA may prompt for 
example the adoption of land-based pollution reduction plans that also benefit fisheries, a case 
in point are the herbicide and pesticide reduction targets agreed with the sugarcane industry 
to protect the Great Barrier Reef MPA, which also benefited fisheries (WWF, 2005). More 
generally, both the ecosystem approach to fishery management and wildlife management 
extended to the sea draw attention to multi-stakeholder involvement in management decision 
making. Both recognise that the inherent complexity and dynamics of maritime ecosystems 
are difficult to comprehend from a single actor perspective. In fact, the multi-stakeholder 
perspective should not be limited to involving fisheries and nature conservation interests, but 
more pro-actively efforts should be made to involve other sectors of industry and society as 
well; for example the leisure industry. In this way, nature conservation may actually create new 
sources of income for fishermen, who on the one hand are limited in their possibilities to catch 
fish, but on the other hand may become involved in new ecosystem-based economic activities 
such as recreational diving, tourism, and supplying eco-certified fish to premium market 
outlets. Some examples of a more or less successful transition from a fisheries-based to an 
ecosystem-based local economy will be provided later.  
 
 
5.7 Marine protected areas 
The institution of marine protected areas is seen as a key tool to include ecosystem 
protection as a management objective in its own right (Greenpeace 2004). Marine protected 
areas (MPAs) are ‘discrete geographic areas that have been designated to conserve and 
enhance marine resources by an integrated plan that includes restrictions on some activities’. 
A very commonly used definition of MPA internationally is provided by IUCN, ‘any area of inter-
tidal or sub-tidal terrain, together with its overlying water and associated flora, fauna, 
historical, or cultural features, which has been reserved by law of other effective means to 
protect part or all of the enclosed environment’ (Kelleher and Kenchington 1992, cited in: 
Agardy et al 2003). The term MPA covers the full range of area designations, from completely 
protected areas (no-take zone’s or marine reserves proper), to areas where all extractive uses 
are excluded but other activities are permitted (e.g. recreation), and areas where a variety of 
activities (included fishing) is permitted, but within the restriction of sustainable use 
(Greenpeace 2004). MPAs are expected to be able to protect habitat and marine life within 
their boundaries, enhance spawning potential, and contribute to fisheries through larval 
transport and spill over of juveniles and adults. They are also controversial, however, 
especially when they include closed areas or no-take zones, as it is not always clear where 
boundaries need to be drawn at sea, and also which human activities exactly need to be 
restricted to what extent in order to prevent irreversible ecosystem damage.  
 
MPAs have been advocated as an alternative to more conventional fisheries management 
tools, which were unable to prevent overexploitation and ecosystem degradation, but MPAs 
are not without problems themselves. The science underlying the (proposed) establishment 
and (proposed) management of an MPA is not always unproblematic (Agardy et al 2003). 
There is much debate among marine ecologists and fisheries biologists concerning the 
relative size of an MPA; the percentage of total ecosystem that needs to be set aside in order 
to reach certain biodiversity and fisheries management objectives. There may also be debate 
over the exact location of the MPA. Setting an MPA boundary may be relatively straightforward 
when clearly delineated fixed structures, such as coral reefs, are in need of protection, but it 
is a much more complex and ambiguous task, when the objective is to protect marine 
ecosystem characteristics which quite naturally change gradually in space and over time. The 
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 latter may be the case for ecosystem characteristics in need of protection under the EU Birds 
and Habitats Directives.25 Another issue heavily discussed by the marine conservation 
community is the proposed character of the MPA; which designation is most desirable given 
the (conservation) goals that must be reached. Should the MPA be strictly a no-take reserve, 
or a protected area, where destructive fishing practices are outlawed but sustainable fisheries 
are permitted? A combination of MPA designations may be the solution such that smaller no-
take MPAs are integrated within larger multiple-use MPAs (Agardy et al 2003). Another issue 
which may be controversial is the (proposed) duration of an MPA in relation to the evaluation of 
its performance; which biomass targets must be reached within what timeframe before the 
MPA is revoked? Apart from these science related problems, there are also policy related 
problems with many MPAs. It is one thing to formally establish an MPA, but it is quite another 
thing to actually enforce compliance to MPA boundaries and restrictions, and to support and 
educate users to cope with the change of regime (Roberts and Hawkins 2000). This is 
particularly problematic when MPAs are quite large, when government agencies are under-
resourced, and also when the users groups affected don’t really accept the new regime. It 
tends to be difficult to restrict or ban human activities at sea when there is only limited 
evidence that they irreversibly damage the marine environment (outlawing the use of dynamite 
to fish coral reefs is more self-evident than outlawing practices such as mussel seed 
collection). It may be consistent with the ecosystem approach to embrace a precautionary 
approach anyway (FAO 2003a), but in practice this is not always easy, in particular when 
social and economic stakes are high (for example the user groups affected have few 
alternative means of employment). The establishment of an MPA may be challenged in court, 
which not only undermines its effectiveness but may also lead to a polarisation between user 
groups and NGOs that are involved, or between private parties and the government: “us” 
against “them” (Roberts et al. 2000). Against this background, it should come as no surprise 
that MPAs are not always successful; the degree of failure being estimated at approaching 
90% in some countries (Christie et al 2003). 
 
 
5.8 MPAs and co-management 
Given the controversies and problems around the establishment and management of MPAs, it 
is interesting to see how affected parties are actually involved in decision making, more in 
particular to what extent co-management or community-based management can play a role. 
There is a growing literature now discussing the link between MPAs and co-management 
(Pomeroy 2003) or community based management (Roberts and Hawkins 2000:, p.80). In 
fact, the idea that community-based and co-management institutions may have clear, if not 
always intended, nature conservation benefits, has been around for quite some time already 
(Johannes 1978, Pinkerton 1989). Local self- or co-management arrangements often include 
marine reserves in the form of temporary or permanent spatial closures of areas of fishing for 
particular or all species (Wilson et al 1994, Pomeroy 2003). Interestingly, the Dutch 
government also linked the concepts of co-management and nature conservation more 
explicitly in its Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy adopted in 1993 (LNV 1993). The new policy 
was focussed around two central themes: the (re-)distribution of management responsibilities 
between Government and fishing industry, and the (re-)consideration of the balance between 
economic activities and nature conservation.26  
                                                   
25This point was brought forward by marine biologist Niels Daan at the SDN/W-UR workshop 01-12-05 in 
relation to the protection of North Sea ecosystem characteristics generally referred to as the Frisian 
Front. The Frisian Front is no ‘ecosystem’ in any practical sense; it is a phenomenon which varies in 
space and time. It is anyhow strongly affected by natural developments taking place within the North Sea 
at large. 
26For North Sea fisheries this led to the introduction of the quota management group system, discussed 
above (Van der Schans 2001). For North Sea fisheries, a fundamental re-consideration of the balance 
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 Arguments in favour of a co-management approach to nature conservation are in essence 
rather similar to arguments in favour of a co-management approach to fisheries management 
as discussed above. Resource users and managers, scientists and other stakeholders can 
provide essential scientific and local knowledge on the biophysical and human dimensions of 
marine resource use to aid the design of marine reserves to achieve their goals and avoid 
unintended negative outcomes (Pomeroy 2003). It is expected that co-management’s diverse 
participants will bring their particular knowledge and concerns to the process, and assist in 
the identification and definition of problems. The boundaries and objectives of MPAs may differ 
if local resource users are more actively involved, as this often leads to smaller MPAs and also 
to MPAs having social and economic objectives apart from merely biological ones, but it is 
expected that resource user involvement will also increase the legitimacy, hence 
effectiveness, of MPAs (Christie et al 2003). If local fishermen are involved, the MPA may be 
established and managed in such way that it is more likely to provide improved yields to the 
local fishery (Casia 2000, pp. 11-12). Community involvement may also lead to a more 
equitable distribution of economic benefits from establishing an MPA (local income from user 
fees, visitor facilities, etc.). It may lead to increased employment opportunities, both inside 
and outside the MPA (local people employed as guides, and in transportation, hotels, 
restaurants etc.). Resource users may also play an important role in implementation and 
monitoring, in that public and private parties are each uniquely equipped to handle specific 
aspects of enforcement, and all parties cooperating together are better able to provide an 
integrated approach (Pomeroy 2003). Community involvement can facilitate enforcement of 
regulation, as local people will understand and accept the purpose of the rules more readily, 
and also they may apply informal sanctions next to the formal ones in order to stimulate 
compliance (Casia 2000). Finally, engagement in monitoring provides participants with direct 
and credible evidence of the successes or failures of MPAs (Pomeroy 2003). Apart from that, 
involving local people on a voluntarily basis may also reduce the financial burden for 
government agencies, which may be under-resourced for example to develop interpretative 
and educational programs (Casia 2000).  
 
Examples of local community involvement in the establishment and management of MPAs 
come from around the world, well-published cases are located in the Caribbean (St. Lucia, but 
also for example Saba Marine Park at the Netherlands Antilles; Roberts and Hawkins 2000), 
the Philippines (Apo Island and Sumilon Island, but also many marine reserves around other 
Philippine islands, for example Balicasag and Pamilacan; Christie et al 2002), and in the 
Pacific (Vanuatu, Samoa, and other island states in the Western Pacific; Johannes 2002).  
 
                                                                                                                                           
between nature and fishing at the national level is hardly possible, as these fisheries are managed within 
the context of the EU Common Fisheries Policy (Van der Schans 2004). For the Wadden Sea this led to 
the introduction of a co-management approach which includes nature conservation goals more explicitly 
(Stein 1999), to be discussed below.   
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The Soufrière Marine Management 
Area provides a well-documented 
example of a participatory approach 
to nature conservation (Roberts and 
Hawkins 2000, pp. 98-101; Pomeroy 
2003, p. 218). The town of 
Soufrière, at the Caribbean island of 
St. Lucia, attracts thousands of 
tourists every year because of its 
magnificent coastal scenery, sandy 
beaches and beautiful coral reefs. By 
the mid-1980s however, local fish 
catches declined and also conflicts 
between local fishermen and tourism 
operators increased. The St. Lucian 
government therefore tried to 
establish a country-wide system of 
fish priority areas and marine 
reserves. This top-down approach 
was viewed as arbitrary however, 
and strongly resisted by local 
fishermen.  
 
A couple of years later, the St. Lucia 
government reconceived the 
process, using a more cooperative 
strategy this time however, 
coordinating with the Soufrière 
Regional Development Foundation 
(SRDF), a local NGO, and the 
Caribbean Natural Resources 
Institute (CANARI), a regional 
knowledge institute. This time the process involved all local stakeholders, including fishers, diving 
operators, hoteliers and representatives of the yachting community. A comprehensive management plan 
was crafted for 11 km of coastline, which lead to the establishment of the Soufrière Marine Management 
Area (SMMA) in July 1995. The plan involves a series of four no take zones interspersed between fishing 
areas and yacht mooring areas. The SMMA is a non-governmental organisation responsible for enforcing 
the management plan. This organisation employs a small staff of people, some of whom are responsible 
for patrolling the coastline by boat. Part of the running costs of the SMMA come from user fees paid by 
divers and yachters. Some fishermen felt that they had not been properly represented in the negotiations 
leading to the establishment of the SMMA, and resisted the plan initially. A compromise was worked out, 
which allowed a few older fishermen (with no other employment opportunities) to fish in part of one of the 
no-take zones, and also they were temporarily compensated not to fish in the rest of the no-take zones.  
 
The SMMA has resulted in a higher biomass of commercially important fish, a higher biodiversity 
throughout the entire management area, and a reduction in conflicts between fishermen and tourists 
(Roberts and Hawkins 2000, p. 101). In fact more fishermen become engaged in tourism as they turn 
their boats into water taxis or pick up a part time job in construction. This does not mean that all problems 
are gone, however; the SMMA faces many challenges, for example coral reef degradation due to high 
sedimentation resulting from run-off from the land and via rivers (Pierre Nathoniel 2003).  
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The establishment of marine reserves at Sumilon 
Island and Apo Island, both small coralline islands 
in the central Philippines, has been well-
documented (Russ and Alcala 1999, Roberts and 
Hawkins 2000, Pomeroy 2003), and provides an 
interesting example of the impact of community 
involvement on nature conservation. In both cases 
the conceptualisation of the marine reserve began 
with marine conservation and education programs 
at community level, initiated by the Marine 
Laboratory of Silliman University, located on the 
nearby island of Negros. In 1974 scientists from 
Silliman University, persuaded the municipal council 
of Oslob to declare one of the world’s first marine 
reserves on Sumilon. By local government decree, 
a quarter of the island’s coral reef was set aside 
for marine research and totally protected from 
fishing. The University appointed an experienced 
local fisherman as caretaker to ensure that no 
fishing occurred in the reserve, to disseminate 
information about the reserve among other 
fishermen, and to monitor fish catches from areas 
close to the reserve. Although some fishermen 
reported increased yields following the 
implementation of the reserve, fishing violations 
started to increase, when in 1980 a new major 
was elected in Oslob who favoured ‘giving Sumilon 
Island back to the fishermen’ (Russ and Alcala 
1999). Confronted with this change in the local 
political climate, Sulliman University asked the 
national Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources 
to assume legal responsibility for the reserve, 
which it did. Local resentment against this top-down management approach grew however, and after 
1985 the reserve became heavily fished. The municipal government, quite opportunistically as it seems, 
changed its policies several times in the following years. From 1988 it upheld a no fishing rule around 
the whole island to support the development of a tourist resort on Sumilon Island; when the resort was 
opened in 1992, all restrictions were lifted again, and over-fishing of the reserve resumed. These 
changes in local rules occurred despite the fact that Sumilon reserve officially retained a national 
protective status throughout the whole period, which shows that local support for nature conservation is 
more important than formal protection by national law (Roberts and Hawkins 2000). The Sumilon case 
stands in sharp contrast to the Apo marine reserve, which was also initiated by Silliman University, 
following a similar marine conservation and education programme begun in 1976. In 1982 Silliman 
University and Dauin municipality, under which jurisdiction Apo Island falls, reached an agreement to 
establish a marine reserve. Informally, protection by the local community started in 1982. Officially the 
reserve was established in 1986. The local community was involved in the establishment and 
management of the reserve from its conception. In 1985, the local community endorsed a 
comprehensive marine reserve plan, which included the no take sanctuary established in 1982, as well 
as a marine reserve covering the entire reef (up to 500 meters offshore), in which only non-destructive 
fishing techniques were allowed. A Marine Management Committee, consisting of local residents, was 
formed and given responsibility to maintain the sanctuary and reserve, with the Philippine Constabulary 
providing enforcement support and Sulliman University providing scientific and management advice. 
Evidence suggests that the reserve has strong local support and a good degree of community 
compliance with regulations (Russ and Alcala 1999). Apo Island marine reserve is a show case example 
of community based conservation management. Many fishermen report increased catches since the 
reserve and sanctuary are set up, and also most fishermen acknowledge the creation of island revenue 
from tourism. Two small tourist resorts have been set up (1991 and 1996) and the Apo sanctuary area 
is now a well-known dive site (Time Asia Magazine, May 27 2002, 
http://www.starwaves.tv/corp/2005/viewroom_rs04.jsp).  
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 The Dutch Wadden Sea has been an important fishing ground for centuries, today shrimp, cockles and 
mussels being the most important target species. It is also Europe's largest wetland ecosystem; the 
area being an important habitat for coastal waterfowl and shorebirds. Furthermore, the Wadden Sea is 
an important nursery area for fish species from the North Sea and surrounding coastal waters (Stein 
1999). Consequently, a large number of national and international nature conservation designations 
apply to the area, or parts of it. Apart from fisheries, the economic value of the Wadden Sea area 
includes merchant shipping, military defence, recreation, and also quite importantly the extraction of 
gas. Traditionally, fisheries management for the Wadden Sea was aimed at fish stock conservation.  
 
 
 
In 1993 the Dutch Government adopted a new Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy, signalling a 
re-consideration of the balance between fishing and nature conservation and introducing the concept of 
co-management as a guiding principle for policy implementation. For the Wadden Sea, this meant that 
management is aimed at nature conservation and the protection of natural processes. Fishing activity is 
allowed but only if it doesn't negatively affect nature values (LNV 1993, p. 52). More concretely, a total 
area of 26% of the Wadden Sea was closed for cockle fishing and mussel seed fishing to protect the 
development of mussel and cockle beds and eelgrass. Furthermore, in years with food shortage for 
birds a minimum of 60 % of the calculated mean food demand was to be reserved for the birds, and 
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 fishermen were to be allocated quota for the remaining shellfish. If less than 60% of the mean food 
requirement for birds was available, the fishery would be closed. Within this framework the shellfish 
industry, in collaboration with nature conservation groups, was responsible for the design and 
implementation of a Shellfisheries Management Plan (1993-1998). Within the structure of this 
collaborative co-management framework, the Producer Organisations for the mussel and the cockle 
sectors were responsible for the design, and implementation of yearly fishing plans, which prescribe 
more precisely how, where and when shellfish can be fished (Stein 1999, Odus 2001). An important 
aspect of co-management was the installation of a black box on cockle dredgers and mussel vessels, 
which allowed an objective monitoring of compliance with (voluntary agreed and mandatory) zoning 
regulations. In an evaluation of the Sea and Coastal Fisheries Policy conducted in 2002, it was concluded 
that the shellfishery sector complied exactly with the restrictions agreed under the co-management 
arrangement (van Geffen et al 2002, p. 20). For the cockle sector this in effect meant a considerable 
economic loss: estimated at 32.9 million Euros over the period 1993-1997 (Stein 1999, p. 134). The 
whole idea of allowing mechanical cockle dredging in Europe's largest wetland ecosystem remained 
controversial however with certain conservation groups. They argued that, even though they were 
consulted about the content of the fishing plans, these didn't go far enough in terms of nature 
conservation (Stein 1999, p. 137). In subsequent years, the goal of nature conservation became more 
and more prominent in Dutch Wadden Sea policy making. This was in accordance with international 
obligations and agreements (Odus 2001, PKB Wadden Zee 2001). The policy framework gradually 
shifted from a situation were fishing was allowed until proven that it harmed the ecosystem, to a situation 
were fishing was not allowed unless it could prove that the ecosystem was not harmed. Conservation 
groups continuously challenged the licences issued by the Ministry of Fisheries, and court cases led to a 
further polarisation between the mechanical cockle fishing industry and NGOs. In 2000 the Dutch 
Government commissioned a research project to evaluate the effects of the Dutch shellfishery policy on 
the Wadden Sea ecosystem (EVA II), the results of which were published in December 2003 (Ens et al. 
2004). The research concluded, among other things, that cockle fishery by suction dredging has 
significant impacts on the Wadden Sea ecosystem: e.g. there is more cockle biomass in closed areas 
than in open areas, cockle fishing disrupts the development of sea grass, and cockle fishing disrupts the 
sediment (see also Meijer et al 2004). On the basis of this research, the Dutch Administrative Court 
(Raad van State) ruled that mechanical cockle fishing licences issued in 2004 indeed needed to be 
withdrawn, since they didn't fulfil the requirements of the EU Birds and Habitats directives. This in effect 
meant the definite closure of mechanical cockle fishing at the Wadden Sea as of January 2005. 
 
 
Although these examples are all listed as evidence that community involvement increases the 
success of an MPA, one should be careful to draw the conclusion that community based MPAs 
are always successful. First of all, there are important differences between the examples 
listed, as to the way in which the community has been involved more precisely in establishing 
and managing the MPA. Secondly, evidence suggests that the community based approach 
exemplified by the well-published success stories cannot be translated indiscriminately to 
other contexts. Inspired by the initial success at Apo Islands, the community based MPA 
model has been replicated throughout the Philippines, but with a disappointing high rate of 
failure (Christie et al 2003). There is also much debate whether the experiences gained with 
(small-scale, community-based) MPAs in the tropics can be translated for use in temperate 
conditions (Polunin 1999). Although this is not the place to provide a comprehensive analysis 
of the literature on community based MPAs, in the last section of this chapter some comments 
will be made. The structure of the analysis follows the issues singled out in the first part of this 
chapter, when the concept of co-management was critically reviewed in light of principles of 
good governance.  
 
 
5.9 Fishermen participation in MPAs 
There are several ways in which fishermen organisations can be involved in establishing and 
managing MPAs. The evidence suggests that fishermen themselves hardly ever take the 
initiative to include nature conservation in self-management efforts. The exceptions to this are 
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 probably the traditional fisheries management practices described by Johannes, who reports 
that artisanal fishermen often adopt measures, such as self-imposed closed seasons, closed 
areas, and gear restrictions that deliberately or inadvertently function as conservation 
measures (Johannes 1978). In most other cases, the initiative is taken by parties outside the 
local fishing community, for example a government (St Lucia, Dutch Government vis a vis 
Wadden Sea), a research institute (Sulliman University), a development agency (Soufrière 
Regional Development Foundation), or a nature conservation society (Saba Conservation 
Foundation in the case of Saba Marine Park, Netherlands Antilles, not discussed any further in 
this text, see www.sabapark.org). In the Wadden Sea case, shellfishermen adopted voluntary 
restrictions already two years before co-management became an official policy in 1993, but 
one could argue that they did so in re-action to mounting societal and administrative pressure 
(Steins 1999, p. 129).27 As experience is being gained with MPAs, fishermen may more 
enthusiastically endorse them, especially when they see that fish production actually increases 
(Apo Island Marine Reserve), or when they discover some other concrete benefits from nature 
conservation (income from tourism, diving, education, etc.; Soufrière Marine Management 
Area, Saba Marine Park; Roberts and Hawkins 2000).  
 
If we look at the nature of fishermen involvement, this may also differ considerably, sometimes 
fishermen organisations are involved throughout the policy making process (Apo Island Marine 
Reserve), sometimes they are only involved in implementation rather than goal setting 
(Wadden Sea, shellfish POs are mainly involved in fishing plans, the appropriate balance 
between nature and fishing is decided by national government). It has been suggested to 
analyse this type of difference in involvement in terms of empowering versus instrumental co-
management (Viswanathan et al 2003). The evidence presented here suggests however that it 
is not so easy to establish whether fishermen involvement is empowering or instrumental. In 
any case, the legitimacy and therefore also effectiveness of co-management tends to depend 
on other factors as well. The shellfish POs in the Wadden Sea seem to have learned to accept 
that the goals of Wadden Sea policy making are decided elsewhere. Within the overall policy 
framework of the Dutch Government, the shellfish POs, as co-management institutions 
involved in implementation only, have indeed been able to define a meaningful role for 
themselves. In 2001 they published their own vision on sustainable development of the Dutch 
shellfishery (Odus 2001). In this way they created a real chance to influence their own future, 
which is a defining characteristic of empowering co-management (Viswanathan et al 2003). 
Problems in legitimacy arose, but not so much because of the instrumental nature of the co-
management arrangement but rather, because of a lack of consistency and transparency of 
the co-management model. In 1997-1998, a preliminary evaluation of the Wadden Sea co-
management arrangement was carried out. As the recovery of wild mussel beds fell short of 
expectations, additional measures needed to be implemented, such as the closure of 
additional areas of sea for cockle and mussel fishing. The shellfish POs didn’t resist this 
closure in principle, but suggested alternative areas for the ones proposed by biologists, on 
the basis of their practical knowledge of the territory. Nature conservation groups also had 
their opinion. Under the time pressure of a debate in the Dutch parliament, the Ministry passed 
over the principles of co-management by not allocating time for a discussion of the proposed 
additional measures involving all relevant stakeholders, as they had done before when co-
management was first introduced (Stein 1999, p. 145). The Ministry’s own evaluation carried 
out in 2002 concludes co-management in the Wadden Sea worked well in the early years, but 
in later years the Ministry reduced its own involvement too much, especially when it became 
                                                   
27Given high mortalities of birds, in 1991 the Ministry for Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Fisheries 
closed almost 50% of the Wadden Sea for cockle fishing. The cockle sector took legal action and the 
fishery was re-opened again. Fisheries legislation at that time did not grant the Government power to 
take nature conservation measures. It is within this situation of potentially losing access to the fishing 
grounds that the shellfish sector decided to self-imposed restrictions (Steins 1999, p. 150).  
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 clear that the relation between fishermen and nature conservation groups polarised (van 
Geffen 2002, p.20).  
 
In the case of the Soufrière Marine Management Area, local fishermen were indeed involved in 
the initial stages of the policy making process; they participated in drawing maps and 
establishing zoning designations. But several problems arose in the implementation stage; for 
example some older fishermen felt their specific concerns were not adequately addressed 
(Sandersen and Koester 2000). In addition, enforcement of the zoning agreement was 
inconsistent and insufficient (Pierre Nathoniel 2003). Even though the establishment of the 
SMMA is generally regarded as a good example of a bottom up, collaborative approach, the 
evidence suggests that the Department of Fisheries was to retain overarching control. The 
Department was to consult with and delegate selected management responsibilities to a 
Technical Advisory Committee, consisting of community representatives (Pomeroy 2003). In 
order to solve the problems that arose in implementing the SMMA, the Department worked out 
a solution however with the fishermen involved directly, and did so without consulting the 
Technical Advisory Committee. The lack of transparency about and ad hoc character of, this 
type of solutions undermined the legitimacy of the SMMA as (co-)management institution. The 
problems in implementing the SMMA have been numerous and continuous (for a 
comprehensive discussion; Pierre Nathoniel 2003). A new Management Agreement was 
signed in January 2001, which among other things, strengthened the legal basis of the SMMA 
and also more clearly defined the role of all parties to the Agreement. For example, SMMA 
rangers were given proper policing functions in order to adequately enforce the management 
plan (Pierre Nathoniel 2003). This shows that fishermen involvement is both relevant in goal 
setting as well as implementation, and also that problems arise when a collaborative approach 
is not consistently applied throughout the policy implementation process, or at least it is not 
clear to all stakeholders who is responsible for what decision at what stage of policy 
implementation (the governance principles of transparency and accountability, which should be 
taken into account, especially when direct participation as governance principle is not possible 
or desirable throughout the decision making process). 
 
 
5.10 Multistakeholder approach in MPAs 
The next question we turn to is to what extent a multi-stakeholder approach has been adopted, 
alternatively are the examples of co-management in relation to nature conservation still very 
much a fisheries centred approach? It is interesting to note that in most of the examples 
reviewed the inclusion of nature conservation in fisheries management has been approached 
from a spatial planning perspective (in response to resource user conflicts) and/or from a 
development perspective (in response to marginalisation of fishery dependent communities).28 
This is in line with the observation that fishermen, or their sectoral representative 
organisations (or respective sectoral government departments) hardly ever played an initiating 
role (as discussed above). Public and private actors in both the spatial planning as well as 
socio-economic development policy arena are more used to take a multi-stakeholder 
approach, than actors in the more traditional sectorally divided policy arenas such as 
agriculture and fisheries; where until recently a corporatist tradition prevailed, at least in many 
European countries (discussed earlier). In contrast, in the examples presented here many 
stakeholders were actively involved in drafting the zoning agreements, either on a more 
                                                   
28The introduction of MPAs as management instrument not only implies a different perspective on fish 
stocks as integrated parts of the marine ecosystem, but it often also implies that fishermen have to find 
their way in a policy arena that is quite differently institutionally embedded than it used to be. This aspect 
hasn’t been researched very much yet.  
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 consultative or more decisive basis (Wadden Sea, Apo Island and Soufrière respectively).29 
Note that even if a multi-stakeholder approach is consensus oriented; it cannot be guaranteed 
that consensus is always reached (Van der Schans 2001). In the case of the Wadden Sea, the 
impression arose that whatever measures the Producer Organisation for mechanical cockle 
fishers would take and despite the fact that nature conservation groups were consulted in the 
drawing of fishing plans, in the end of the day it was just unacceptable for (some) nature 
conservation groups, that this type of fishery would be allowed in the Wadden Sea. In theory it 
may be possible to work out acceptable solutions if parties are willing to communicate openly 
and negotiate on the basis of rational argumentation, but in practice stakeholder involvement 
always happens in a context were there is a time pressure to act, and also parties may be 
drawn in a negotiation based on strategic action rather than open-minded deliberation 
(Habermas 1981). In such case, multi-stakeholder negotiation may lead to polarisation rather 
than mutual understanding and innovative problem solving. This is what happened with multi-
stakeholders involvement in co-management at the Wadden Sea. The mechanical cockle 
fishery was banned in 2005. The consultation and negotiation structure that evolved around 
the Wadden Sea shellfish co-management was not strong enough yet to accommodate the 
mounting pressures between nature conservation groups and mechanical shell fishermen. It 
could be argued that The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Fisheries withdrew 
its active involvement too early. This conclusion seems all the more warranted since it became 
clear at the SDN/W-UR workshop that with hindsight and according to some marine 
ecologists, it might have been possible to work out a solution in which mechanical cockle 
fishery would have been allowed but with different techniques and within a limited area (see 
also interview Lindeboom, Resource, nr. 10, 9-11-2006).  
 
 
5.11 Institutional framework supporting MPAs 
Finally, we discuss the way in which the grass-roots co-management arrangements presented 
here are embedded in the larger system of bureaucratic rules or market incentives. In the 
case of the Wadden Sea it is clear that the implementation of EU Directives concerning nature 
conservation and environmental protection gradually became more important. This, in 
combination with the outcomes of scientific research evaluating the impact of shellfisheries on 
the Wadden Sea ecosystem, led to a turning point in Dutch Wadden Sea policy making in 
2004. In this year the Dutch Administrative Court decided that the licences for the mechanical 
shellfisheries should be revoked, which in practice meant a definite ending of this type of 
fishing in the Wadden Sea. The social-economic impact of this policy outcome was 
ameliorated by the introduction of a compensation scheme for the cockle fishermen who were 
forced to stop. This shows how important wider institutional and societal developments are for 
the functioning of co-management in practice.  
 
Another example is provided by the Soufrière Marine Management Area. Despite many 
achievements, in the years that followed the successful establishment of the SMMA, there 
were also many controversies. The St. Lucia Marine Police’s vigilance to oversee compliance 
soon dropped when it became clear that the SMMA and Department of Fisheries didn’t follow 
up by confiscating the fishing gear (Pierre Nathoniel 2003). The impression raised that 
management and regulatory bodies gave preferential treatment to certain user groups in 
terms of enforcement of the rules. Voluntary compliance to the zoning arrangements eroded 
                                                   
29It is not always clear from the evidence however to what extent direct participation of stakeholders 
actually changed the draft proposals that where initially put forward by scientists or civil servants. In the 
case of the Soufrière Management Agreement the maps drawn as a result of the participatory process 
where similar to the ones the Department of Fisheries had drafted earlier. They were viewed as 
“everybody’s maps” however and therefore deemed more legitimate (Pomeroy 2003, p. 218). 
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 and old conflicts between fishermen, divers and tour operators re-merged. Fishers complained 
that the ‘rich’, predominantly white tourists that visit the SMMA, and the tourist service 
operators, were the only parties benefiting from the SMMA arrangement. The problems of the 
SMMA were amplified by several unfavourable economic developments, such as the closure of 
a local factory and a major hotel, which implied that many people returned to fishing as a 
readily available source of income. The controversies around the SMMA have been attributed 
to the fact that the St. Lucia Fisheries Act and relevant Government decisions did not provide 
an adequate legislative basis for management and regulation of the SMMA. More 
fundamentally, there is no connection between the SMMA and a national development plan for 
St. Lucia, in fact there is no comprehensive national development policy at all in St. Lucia 
(Pierre Nathoniel 2003). As a consequence the effectiveness of the SMMA is too dependent 
on ad hoc developments in local politics and other areas of land-based and maritime activity, 
which are beyond its sphere of influence. The New Management Agreement signed in 2001 is 
supposed to provide a more adequate institutional backing for the SMMA.  
 
Precisely such a move to integrate smaller locally embedded MPAs in an overall national 
planning strategy has taken place in the Philippines. Sulimon and Apo Island were among the 
first marine reserves in the country, and they were initially established under municipal law. 
Authority for declaring such reserves is the Local Government Code of 1991 (Raymundo 
2002).30 Since 1999 more extensive coastal areas or those perceived as being of particular 
importance, may be classified under the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS). 
Apo Island was declared a ‘Protected Landscape and Seascape’ of the NIPAS in 1994. The 
declaration of Apo into the NIPAS scheme was recommended by the Silliman University 
research group involved in Apo reserve management already, and it was expected to be a 
positive move that would result in better management (Raymundo 2002).31 Although there is 
no up to date evaluation available of the effectiveness of management under NIPAS, it is clear 
that the community based approach is being replaced by a more formalised approach, which 
on the one hand reduces the direct participation of the local community, and on the other 
hand increases the involvement of regional and provincial government agencies, and the 
representation from various NGOs. Although this transition has not been without problems 
(e.g. there are more delays in channelling tourist fees back into the local community), there 
are also positive effects. Placing Apo into the NIPAS framework increases the level of support 
the community can draw upon for establishment and enforcement of management regulations, 
which is of particular importance, as impacts from increasing tourism pressure are starting to 
affect reef health (Raymundo 2002, p. 4).  
 
 
                                                   
30Following the initial success of marine reserves such as Apo Island, the establishment of small-scale 
locally based MPAs proliferated throughout the Philippines. In 1991 the authority to manage natural 
resources was officially devolved to local governments. In the years to follow it became clear however 
that the Apo Island model of community based reserve management could not always be replicated with 
similar success (White et al 2005). Local governments were sometimes under-resourced to provide 
proper management and enforcement, fishing pressure increased outside the no take areas, spill over 
effects were sometimes smaller than expected, diving as alternative source of income also created 
negative impact on the coral reef, pollution from land-based sources also affected the quality of nature 
protection in marine reserves. Hence, the need grew to integrate small-scale MPA projects in the 
framework of an overall coastal zone management approach (White et al 2005). 
31The exact reasons to place the Apo Island Reserve under NIPAS remain unclear however, as there is no 
evidence in the literature that the system of community based management and enforcement established 
in the 1980-ies showed major flaws in the 1990-ies. 
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 5.12 Fishermen involvement in the development of North 
Sea spatial planning 
5.12.1 Introduction 
Before we discuss the possible role for co-management in North Sea nature conservation, 
there is one point already mentioned earlier, that should be re-iterated here. There is much 
debate among marine biologists and ecologists whether the experiences gained with small-
scale, community-based MPAs in the tropics can be translated directly for use to establish and 
manage MPAs in temperate zones (Roberts 1999). There is evidence that on tropical reefs, 
small MPAs will lead to increase of the individual size and / or abundance of many species 
within the areas so protected. But this effect has not been observed for all species, and also 
increased size / abundance within MPAs does not always equate to increases in yield for 
fisheries outside MPAs. Spill-over effects tend to operate over very limited distances (Polunin 
1999). In temperate waters, small MPAs can be expected to work well for sessile species 
(such as lobster, rockfish and shellfish), and /or they may be of use when overlapping with 
nursery areas.32 But, as fisheries biologists argue, it can not be taken for granted that 
establishing (relatively) small MPAs will have a positive impact on the major commercial 
species in temperate zones in Europe (such plaice, sole, herring and mackerel) cannot be 
taken for granted (Polunin 1999). The reason is that these fish stocks are highly migratory, 
whereas coral reef fish species tend to be sedentary as adults while dispersing widely as 
larvae. The implication would be that in temperate zones MPAs should be either very large, or 
in some way move along with the fish stocks when they migrate.33 A similar point was made 
by a fisheries biologist at the SDN/W-UR workshop, who argued that the very concept of 
ecosystem implies that relations within the system are more relevant than boundary crossing 
relations, i.e. between the system and its environment (Niels Daan, pers. comm. 2006).  
 
For many species in the North Sea the water system as a whole is their habitat, and water 
currents do not limit themselves to arbitrary delineated areas within which there exists some 
form of protection. ‘On this account, the National Ecological Network of the North Sea is the 
North Sea itself and protecting this network can only be done by regulating the fisheries 
impact for the whole system and not for some of its parts’ (Niels Daan, pers. comm. 2006)34. 
This perspective does not imply that area protection as such should be rejected for temperate 
zones, but rather area delineations need to be very carefully chosen (Roberts 1999). Apart 
from that, the arguments used to establish areas cannot be easily borrowed from experiences 
gained elsewhere. In contrast to reef fisheries, the impact of area closure on recruitment 
success may be less important in the North Sea than natural or human initiated processes that 
occur anyway.35 There are still very few situations where it has been possible to research the 
                                                   
32The success cases presented in this chapter all fall within this category: they are either reef fisheries in 
the tropics (Philippines, Caribbean) or shellfisheries in a temperate zone (Wadden Sea).  
33In the boundary waters of San Juan Islands, for example, a mobile species specific MPA has been 
developed to manage whale watching (Osborne et al, 2001). This community based MPA only applies 
when orcas are present, and it exists around the whales as they move through the region.  
34 It should be noted though that the aim of the MPA’s in the North Sea was to specifically protect 
selected natural values, especially bird populations. These bird populations depend on specific areas for 
part of the year. 
35A case in point is the establishment of the so-called Plaice box. The Plaice box is an area of sea close 
to the Dutch, German and Danish border. Only small beam trawlers (<300 HP) are allowed to fish here. 
The Plaice box has been established to protect young plaice coming from the Wadden Sea. In 2004 the 
effects of this MPA have been evaluated. Although effects of the closed areas in terms of the size 
structure of the fish assemblage can be shown, the expected positive effects on the fisheries are more 
difficult to demonstrate. The importance of the closed area as nursery has decreased over the last 
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 ecological effects of an MPA over a longer period of time and under controlled conditions. The 
Apo Island case is an exception; the effect of this MPA has been studied extensively in 
comparison with results on reference sites without MPA (Russ and Alcala 1999). In any case, 
much more experience must be gained with MPAs in different sizes, character and duration 
before ecological and socio-economic effects that are predicted in theory will be actually 
realised in practice (Agardy et al 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Areas in the North Sea 
with specific ecological values 
 
5.12.2 Fishermen participation in North Sea planning 
To conclude this chapter on the possible role of fishermen co-management in nature 
conservation a couple of remarks will be made with respect to the process of establishing 
nature conservation areas in the North Sea. Given the possible benefits of active stakeholder 
involvement in policy making, one may wonder how fishermen are actually involved in this 
process. At the SDN/W-UR workshop it became clear that even though the process of 
establishing the areas at sea is well under way, fishermen as important target group do not 
seem to be very well informed.36 There is a very informative web-site which provides a lot of 
                                                                                                                                           
decade, due to a changing geographical dispersion of young plaice. In any case, the data is limited to 
draw more definite conclusions (COM2005 422).  
36The Ministry of Traffic and Waterways coordinates the designation of protected areas at sea. The 
contribution of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Conservation and Fisheries/Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality is coordinated by the Nature Department, with the Fisheries Department in a 
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 information for the general public (www.noordzeeloket.nl), but stakeholders still tend to be 
rather confused as to the exact location of the areas as well as the type of management 
regime that will apply (De Vos et al 2006a, p. 20). The official policy of the Dutch government 
is that the fishing industry is not to be involved in the designation of areas; they will be 
involved in the implementation (De Vos et al 2006a, p. 18). As such, this would be consistent 
with the co-management approach to fisheries management as adopted by the Dutch 
Government in 1993. In 2005, the Dutch Government published the Integrated Management 
Plan for the North Sea 2015, in which the spatial planning policy for the North Sea was 
presented (IBN 2015). In this plan, co-management is not explicitly mentioned, however, as a 
strategy to implement more nature conservation oriented policies vis a vis the fishing industry. 
On the basis of the international review presented in this chapter, this would be an option 
worth considering.  
 
This is not the place to provide a full discussion how this might work out in practice. One could 
imagine that certain areas are closed for certain fishing gear types, but also that if the 
appropriate technical measures are taken closure is waived. The establishment, control and 
enforcement of these appropriate technical measures could be included in the co-
management approach that already exists; the Biesheuvel quota group management system. 
Biesheuvel groups gradually have taken on a more adaptive -if you like ecosystem oriented- 
approach to quota management already, in that they voluntarily stop fishing for plaice in the 
spawning season, and also they voluntarily implement real time area closures when too many 
undersized plaice are caught (De Vos et al 2006b). One could also imagine that control and 
enforcement of group rules is more systematically taken up by group boards, and that 
compliance to group rules that come above what is legally required are monitored by private 
auditing companies (Van der Schans 2001). A fishermen representative at the SDN/W-UR 
workshop also made another suggestion, which is worth considering. He advocated analysing 
the implications of closing certain areas at sea for the fishing plans of individual fishermen.  
 
This approach again would be consistent with the co-management model that is already 
operational for Dutch North Sea fisheries and the Wadden Sea. For, the most important 
management instrument of group boards to prevent over-fishing of quota at the North Sea, 
and to include nature conservation at the Wadden Sea is the fishing plan of individual group 
members, which must be approved by the group board. A logical next step would be that 
Biesheuvel group boards become more active in overseeing the adaptation in fishing patterns 
that will be required when marine protected areas become operational at the North Sea.37 
From a transition management perspective, analysing the implications of closed areas for the 
fishing plans of individual fishermen (or fishermen organised in groups) would be a good 
alternative to a societal cost/benefit analysis at sector level which is currently used to assess 
the implications of nature conservation for the fishing industry. More research is needed to 
see whether and to what extent the Biesheuvel co-management system could actually be used 
to practically adapt fishing patterns of individual fishermen and groups of fishermen in order to 
                                                                                                                                           
secondary role. The fishing sector may have to re-orientate its relation with the Ministry in order to be 
more actively involved in the rapidly emerging field of nature conservation at sea.  
37If areas are closed at sea, this is a collective problem for all fishermen engaged in the fishery, because 
fishermen who lose their fishing plot can easily re-direct their activity to areas that are still open. This 
may create a problem of crowding and over-fishing, if no additional measures are taken. A co-managing 
group of fishermen may be well placed in theory to more proactively co-ordinate an orderly adaptation of 
fishing patterns collectively. In practice however, it may require a careful institutional development 
strategy to move the Biesheuvel group system into this direction, as closed areas at the North Sea are 
still quite controversial among fishermen (De Vos et al 2006b). On land however, experience has been 
gained already to support groups of farmers in adapting their farm strategy to meet environmental and 
nature considerations (Van der Schans 2006). It may be worthwhile to explore whether this interactive 
strategic management approach can be applied in the fishing sector as well.   
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 accommodate the establishment of marine protected areas and other nature conservation 
instruments at the North Sea. More research is also needed to see how the development of 
the North Sea spatial planning policy is actually embedded within the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality, and how this affects the extent of participation of various stakeholder 
groups including the fishing industry. 
 
5.12.3 Multistakeholder approach in North Sea planning 
With respect to the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach, the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works, and Water Management is the lead Ministry in developing the Integrated Management 
Plan for the North Sea 2015. This Ministry does not have a corporatist tradition such as the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries used to have, or at least it doesn’t 
have a close clientele relation with the fishing industry. This may explain to some extent why 
fishermen feel somewhat lost in the North Sea spatial planning policy making process. In any 
case, North Sea fisheries are mainly regulated within the framework of CFP, whereas certain 
other uses of the North Sea fall under national jurisdiction (De Vos et al 2006a, p. 18). These 
other uses have been more actively involved in the North Sea spatial policy development 
process right from the start. The development of the Integrated Management Plan for the 
North Sea 2015 is supervised by a steering group consisting of the various Directorates and 
Ministries involved in North Sea spatial planning. The Ministries and Directorates within 
Ministries are each responsible for involving their own traditional circle of stakeholders in the 
planning process. The nature of involvement of various stakeholders may therefore differ 
across Ministries (De Vos et al 2006a, p. 18). More research is needed to see how the actual 
involvement of various stakeholders can be evaluated in terms of governance principles such 
as transparency, accountability, participation and coherence (across Ministries).  
 
5.12.4 Institutional framework supporting North Sea planning 
Finally, if we look at the way in which the development of marine protected areas is embedded 
in the larger institutional setting, it is clear that there are several EU policy documents and 
Directives, as well as international agreements which indicate that this is the way ahead. The 
general opinion at the SDN/W-UR workshop was that it is clear that the policy framework is 
changing towards a more important role for nature conservation at sea. There was some 
concern however that it would take several years (and perhaps also several court cases) 
before it is exactly clear how the rules should be implemented in practice, and which activity is 
allowed where and under what conditions. Concern was also raised that there will be 
differences in implementation between different EU member states. More research would be 
needed to monitor the implementation of the various Directives and to see how they work out 
in practice for the fishermen and other stakeholders involved.  
In some ways the establishment of protected areas at sea can be seen as an extension of the 
National Ecological Network on land (Ecologische Hoofd Structuur; EHS). From a transition 
management perspective it may be interesting to look more closely at similarities and 
differences between involving stakeholders on land versus at sea.38 A lot of experience has 
                                                   
38This section discusses similarities and differences from a (co-)management and transition management 
perspective only. At the SDN/W-UR workshop, it was argued that from a biological/ecological 
perspective, there are more differences between nature protection on land versus at sea than usually 
assumed (as discussed above). Marine ecosystems are more dynamic than terrestrial (hence boundaries 
may continuously change), they are more interrelated with their environment (hence it is more difficult to 
separate the impact of one human intervention out from all other human interventions or natural 
changes). This raises the question whether the EU Wild Birds and Habitats Directives imply a nature 
protection approach that is essentially land-based (Niels Daan, pers. comm. 2006). From a management 
perspective, also, there are differences between terrestrial and marine nature protection, in that farmers 
who are restricted in their development can not so easily re-locate, whereas fishermen are more flexible 
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 been gained already for example with farmers and horticulturalist located inside or close to 
the Ecological Network, who needed to adapt their business management in order to comply 
with the regulations that apply locally. New networks and coalitions have emerged at the local 
level between farmers and other rural interest groups, such as environmental groups, 
professional nature conservation agencies, associations of rural dwellers en organisations of 
other rural entrepreneurs (leisure and tourism, shops etc.). Farmers’ self-organisation, in the 
form of environmental cooperatives, has often played an important role in creating these 
networks (Van der Ploeg et al 2002). In some cases these cooperatives have in fact been able 
to assume, one could say- “co-management” functions in the field of Dutch agro-environmental 
policy implementation (Van der Schans 2003).39 The point is that agro-environmental 
cooperatives have taken on the task of integrating nature management and landscape 
maintenance in operational farm management already several years ago, and for Biesheuvel 
quota management groups in fisheries this may be a road worth pursuing as well.  
However, adapting one’s business management to meet nature conservation interests is not 
just a matter of complying with more restrictive regulation only, on land we have seen the 
development of innovative types of rural entrepreneurs, who proactively look for business 
opportunities to make a living out of the new situation; e.g. farm tourism, local produce, 
nature education (Broekhuizen et al., 1997). The evidence presented in this chapter suggests 
that when fishermen are actively involved in nature conservation policy making it is also more 
likely that they proactively adapt their economic activities in order to make the best out of a 
new situation. At the Wadden Sea we see some coastal fishing initiatives moving in this 
direction. An example is the Working group Integrated Fisheries (Werkgroep Geintegreerde 
Visserij). This is a group of artisanal fishermen who start from the assumption that there 
should be a balance between landscape, cultural history, nature conservation and business. In 
order to reach this balance the fishermen implement the principles of –ecologically inspired- 
adaptive fisheries management (as discussed earlier). For example, they pool their fishing 
entitlements in order to be able to catch fish when it is there, but have the flexibility to change 
to other fish species when the target species is not there. This is a clear alternative to the 
specialised fisheries, which have developed in the mainstream fishing fleet, which are heavily 
dependent on one or two species and have no alternatives when stocks are low. In the 
integrated fishery, fish landings follow the seasonal pattern (shrimp in one month, smelt in 
another month, and shellfish in yet another month). In addition, the fish is being processed and 
sold locally by members of the group, in order to capture a higher share of the value added.  
Another example is fishing vessel TS 31 who has obtained the Waddengoud certificate (a 
certificate of regional origin). The criteria for this certificate have been formulated in 
collaboration with the Dutch Bird Protection Association. Fishing is carried out with a non-
intrusive catching technique (staand want, a type of gill net fishing technique). The aim is to 
establish a more direct link between fishing as a regional activity and the end consumer who 
values sustainable quality food production. To this end, the fish is being sold by the fisherman 
                                                                                                                                           
to look for alternative fishing areas. This makes establishing a protected area on land much more a 
problem of some individual farmers, whereas establishing a protected area at sea is much more the 
problem of all fishermen engaged in a fishery collectively. In relation to this, fishing happens on a 
common property resource, whereas farming happens on a private property resource. The right of a 
farmer to be compensated when development restrictions come to apply to his property, is generally 
stronger enshrined in law, as the right of a fisherman to be compensated when somewhere at sea some 
fishing possibilities are being limited.  
39Vel and Vanla, environmental cooperatives of dairy farmers in the Frisian Woodlands (Friese Wouden), 
are both good examples of farmer groups that have obtained extra flexibility in public regulations in 
exchange for taking on extra obligations voluntarily. This type of exchange is also the basis of co-
management in Dutch flatfisheries (Van der Schans 2003). In the case of Vel and Vanla flexibility in public 
regulation did not so much relate to EHS zoning, but to other aspects of Dutch agro-environmental 
regulation (van der Ploeg et al 2002). The principle is however the same.  
WOt-rapport 42 92 
 (or his wife) directly on the Amsterdam open air organic fish market (www.goedevissers.nl). 
The TS 31 is also used for training young people who are in a socially or psychologically 
disadvantaged position; very much in the same way as some land-based farmers have taken 
on social-health care provision activities at their farms. In addition, people can join the 
fisherman to roam the Wadden Sea; a form of recreation and education which we also see on 
land. The Government welcomes this type of diversification –a transition from fisheries based 
to ecosystem based economic development. Farmers and fishermen as well as policy makers 
involved could learn from each other how to deal with limitations in public rules and create 
more room for the transition towards ecosystem based multifunctional land- as well as sea-
use. 
 
 
5.13 Conclusion 
This chapter provides international evidence that fishermen involvement in nature conservation 
is possible and can indeed play a positive role. Fishermen involvement in nature conservation 
should therefore be pursued more systematically in order to bring about a transition towards 
sustainable fisheries. The chapter highlights several issues that need to be taken into account 
when fisheries co-management and nature conservation are to be integrated. Fishermen 
organisations should be involved more directly in the development and / or implementation of 
nature conservation policies. This does not mean that they should always participate directly in 
all stages of the policy making process, as the empowerment perspective on co-management 
suggest, it requires however that decision making should be transparent, proportionate, and 
accountable. In similar way, the interests of other stakeholders should be adequately 
addressed in decision making, either through direct participation or through increasing the 
transparency and accountability of the decision making process. Furthermore, local initiatives 
should be embedded in a wider institutional framework, which ensures that factors beyond the 
control of local management institutions are effectively taken into account, and also 
ecosystem based fisheries management is consistent with other policy objectives and vice 
versa.  
 
More research would be needed to look at similarities and differences of nature conservation 
on land and at sea, and the consequences this may have for policy instruments which have 
been developed, and are to be used, in the terrestrial and marine environment respectively. 
More research would be needed to monitor how EU directives are being translated into 
national regulation, and in what way stakeholders (including fishermen) are being involved. 
More research would be needed as to how the Dutch co-management system can be geared 
to integrate more pro-actively an ecosystem-based management approach. More research 
would be needed also to provide positive role models for Dutch fishermen how commercial 
fishing activity and nature conservation can be practically combined.  
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 6 Epilogue 
The aim of the project was to provide an international comparison of fisheries management 
with respect to nature conservation. The EU Birds and Habitats Directive protect species and 
habitats both on land and at sea. Both directives are currently implemented and 
implementation has proceeded to a much greater degree on land than at sea. We hope that 
some of the insights in this report may be of some use in the process of implementation. 
 
We sought to identify examples of viable and sustainable fisheries that were regulated in such 
a way that they caused no significant harm to the ecosystem. The objective was to learn 
lessons on fishery management in the context of nature conservation that might be applicable 
to the Netherlands. Although this report contains many pages, we feel that we have only just 
begun to scratch the surface of this important topic. We explored different aspects of the 
problem, but are unable to end this report with a grand and all-encompassing synthesis. 
However, we do feel a few closing comments are in place. 
 
The classic tools to govern fisheries are restrictive, imposing catch quota, and capacity and 
technical limits. These have largely failed in preserving fish stocks at optimal, or even viable, 
economical and ecological levels, and have been effectively frustrated by the "commons" 
aspect of the fisheries problem. Managing fisheries so that they do not harm nature with these 
classic tools is an even greater challenge, if not impossible. However, the classicial tools can 
work if they are applied consistently, as seemed to be the case in the Halibut fishery. 
 
More generally, there is a role for fisheries self-management but not as a stopgap for 
government-initiated regulation but rather as complementary to public regulation. Market 
based approaches can play a role, but they cannot be solely depended upon to reach 
conservation goals. A mixed approach may be optimal, where both public regulations as well 
as market incentives are combined in a practically intelligent way, and each adds its own 
distinctive qualities to the overall framework. Thus, self- or co-management may play a role 
especially when the overall framework of governance has evolved from a regime that is 
compliance oriented to a regime that tries to stimulate companies to proactively integrate 
societal concerns in the corporate strategy and organisation.  
 
Throughout this study we had many discussions on what properties and managerial measures 
may be typical for sustainable fisheries. Below, we provide a list of what came up during these 
discussions. This list is to a large extent hypothetical. We nonetheless decided to reproduce it 
here, because it may be of use in future studies: 
 
1. The target species is highly appreciated and highly priced. 
2. Product quality is reflected in the price. 
3. The economic benefits for individual fishermen or fishing companies are high. 
4. The fisheries are manageable and there are no major conflicts concerning catch or 
bycatch with other forms of fisheries, or these have been dealt with. 
5. The fisheries are accompanied by scientific research jointly financed by government and 
industry. 
6. There exists a (national) ownership feeling of the fish stocks by the fishermen. 
7. The fishing industry is mainly self regulating and internal control is high. 
8. Fishing gear is optimized, taking into account effects on target species, habitats and 
bycatches.  
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 9. There is a quota system whereby the quota are based on scientific research and agreed 
by managing authorities and fisheries representatives.  
10. When relevant, there are not only quotas for target species but also for vulnerable 
bycatch species, like sea mammals, turtles, birds, other (large) fish or (long living) 
benthos.  
11. Independent observers often accompany individual fishing vessels. 
12. Quotas may differ from Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the whole fleet to Individual Daily 
Takes (IDT) for individual fishermen, or combinations of these. 
13. When quotas either for target or bycatch are reached, the fishery is stopped immediately. 
14. The spawning stocks are protected or only very limited fished. 
15. Management is aimed at keeping the reproducing stock as high as possible. 
16. To avoid killing of small juveniles or reproducing adults, sometimes fisheries are only 
allowed on intermediate fish sizes (lobster). 
17. Closures or no takes both in space and time are an integral part of sustainable fisheries. 
18. By scientifically establishing the stocks before setting quota, and by observing strict 
management rules, overfishing in times of diminishing stocks is avoided. 
19. Measures to improve the stocks are often part of the total fisheries management plan. 
20. When rules or quotas are not observed, fines are extremely high and in repetitive cases 
may lead to exclusion from the fisheries. 
21. Basic criteria of good governance are being observed (governance is immune for 
corporatist interests) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WOt-rapport 42 96 
 References 
Agardy T., Bridgewater P., Crosby M.P., Day J., Dayton P.K., Kenchington R., Laffoley D., 
McConney P., Murray P.A., Parks J.E. & Peau L. 2003. Dangerous targets? Unresolved issues 
and ideological clashes around marine protected areas, Aquatic Conservation: Marine and 
Freshwater Ecosystems 13(4): 353-367 
Agro Eco Consultancy 2001a. MSC pre-assessment rapport Waddenvisserij. Handmatige 
Kokkelvisserij. Rapport Agro Eco. Agro Eco, Bennekom. 
Agro Eco Consultancy 2001b. MSC pre-assessment rapport Waddenvisserij. Mechanische 
Kokkelvisserij. Rapport Agro Eco. Agro Eco, Bennekom. 
Agro Eco Consultancy 2001c. MSC pre-assessment rapport Waddenvisserij. Mosselzaadvisserij. 
Rapport Agro Eco. Agro Eco, Bennekom. 
Ames R.T., Williams G.H. & Fitzgerald S.M. 2005. Using digital video monitoring systems in 
fisheries: application for monitoring compliance of seabird avoidance devices and seabird 
mortality in pacific halibut longline fisheries. US department of commerce. National Oceanis 
and Atmospheric Administration. http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/Publications/ AFSC-TM/NOAA-TM-
AFSC-152.pdf
Asmus R.M., Sprung M. & Asmus H. 2000. Nutrient fluxes in intertidal communities of a south 
European lagoon (Ria Formosa) – similarities and differences with a northern Wadden Sea bay 
(Sylt-Rømø Bay). Hydrobiologia 436: 217-235. 
Atkinson P.W., Clark N.A., Bell M.C., Dare P.J., Clark J.A. & Ireland P.L. 2003. Changes in 
commercially fished shellfish stocks and shorebird populations in the Wash, England. Biological 
Conservation 114: 127-141. 
Barrett R.T., Anker-Nilssen T., Gabrielsen G.W. & Chapdelaine G. 2002 (is nog 2001 in lopende 
tekst). Food consumption by seabirds in Norwegian waters. ICES J. Mar. Sci. 59: 43–57. 
Berkes F. (ed.) 1989. Common property resources, ecology and community-based sustainable 
development, Belhaven Press. 
Berkes F., Hughes T.P., Steneck R.S., Wilson J.A., Bellwood D.R., Crona B., Folke C., Gunderson 
L.H., Leslie H.M., Norberg J., Nyström M., Olsson P., Österblom H., Scheffer M. & Worm B. 
2006. Ecology - globalization, roving bandits, and marine resources. Science 311, 1557-
1558. 
Board of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment of the United Nations 2005. Living beyond our 
means: natural assets and human well-being. 
http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/index.aspx. 
Casia, M. 2000. Introduction to the establishment of a community based marine sanctuary, Coastal 
Resource Management Project, CRM Document 24 CRM/2000, Philippines Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources 2000. 
Christie P., White A. & Deguit E. 2002. Starting point or solution? Community-based marine 
protected areas in the Philippines, J. Environ. Manage. 66: 441-454. 
Christie P., McCay B.J., Miller M.L., Lowe C., White A.T., Stoffle R., Fluharty D.L., McManus T.L., 
Chuenpagdee R., Pomeroy C., Suman D.O., Blount B.G., Huppert D., Villahermosa Eisma R.-L., 
Oracion E., Lowry K. & Pollnac R.B. 2003. Towards developing a complete understanding: a 
social science research agenda for marine protected areas, Fisheries 28: 22-26. 
Coffey C. 1998. Implementing the Habitats Directive in marine and coastal areas. Proceedings of a 
seminar held at Morecambe Bay, England 22-24 June 1997. Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, Luxembourg: 34p. 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg11/nature/home.htm). 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 97
 Commission of the European Communities 2001. European Governance, a White Paper, COM 
(2001) 428 Final, Brussels 25-07-2001. 
Commission of the European Communities 2001. Green paper on the future of the common 
fisheries policy, COM (2001) 135 Final, 2001. 
Commission of the European Communities 2002a, Communication from the Commission, on the 
reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (“Roadmap”) COM (2002) 181 final Brussels, 28-05-
2002. 
Commission of the European Communities 2002, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European parliament, Towards a strategy to protect and conserve the marine 
environment, COM (2002) 539 final, Brussels, 02.10.2002. 
Commission of the European Communities 2005. Mededeling van de Commissie aan de Raad en 
het Europese Parlement: Evaluatie van bepaalde toegangsbeperkingen in het kader van het 
gemeenschappelijke visserijbeleid (Shetlandbox en scholbox), COM(2005) 422, 19 september 
2005. 
Daan N. & van der Mheen H.W. 2005. Outstanding environmental issues in relation to European 
fisheries. RIVO report C062/04. Netherlands Institute for Fisheries Research, IJmuiden. 
Dalton R. 2005. Conservation biology: Is this any way to save a species? Nature, 436: 14-16. 
Dawson S.M. 1991. Modifying gill nets to reduce entanglements of cetaceans. Mar. Mamm. Sci. 7: 
274-282. 
Den Heijer, W. M., and B. Keus. 2001. Bestaande vistuigen als mogelijk alternatief voor de 
boomkor. Rapport RIKZ 2001.037 Rijksinstituut voor Kust en Zee, 's Gravenhage:76 p. 
Department of Environment and Heritage of the Australian Government 2004. Assessment of the 
Queensland East Coast Otter Trawl Fishery. http://www.deh.gov.au/coasts/fisheries/qld/eco-
trawl/report.html. 
Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries, Queensland Government 2005. Fishweb 
http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/fishweb/12545.html#1. 
De Vos B., Stuip M., de Groot D. & Ypma O. 2006, Beschermde gebieden in de Noordzee, Een 
inventarisatie van stakeholders en hun belangen en conflicten, Wageningen Universiteit en 
Research Centrum / Landbouw Economisch Instituut, Den Haag. 
De Vos B. & Hoefnagel E. 2006 Ondernemerschap in de platvissector, Ondernemers-stijlen, 
duurzaamheid en toekomstvisie, LEI rapport 2.06.04, Den Haag. 
Dietz T., Ostrom E. & Stern P.C. 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302: 1907-
1912. 
Dubbink W. & van Vliet M. 1996. Market regulation versus co-management? Two perspectives on 
regulating fisheries compared, Marine Policy 20: 499-516. 
Eckersley R. 1992. Environmentalism and political theory, toward an ecocentric approach, 
University College London Press. 
Ens B.J., Smaal A.C., & de Vlas J. 2004. The effects of shellfish fishery on the ecosystems of the 
Dutch Wadden Sea and Oosterschelde. Final report on the second phase of the scientific 
evaluation of the Dutch shellfish fishery policy (EVA II). Alterra-rapport 1011; RIVO-rapport 
C056/04; RIKZ-rapport RKZ/2004.031. Alterra, Wageningen. 
European Commission. 2002. Towards a strategy to protect and conserve the marine 
environment. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 02.10.2002: 64 p. 
European Commission. 2003. Interpretation Manual of European Union Habitats. Version EUR 25. 
European Commission (DG Environment), Brussel: 127 p. 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/nature/hab-en.htm). 
European Commission 2005. Communication from the commission to the council, the European 
parliament and the European economic and social committee. Launching a debate on a 
WOt-rapport 42 98 
 community approach towards eco-labelling schemes for fisheries products. SEC(2005)840. 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
FAO 1995. Code of conduct for responsible fisheries. FAO, Rome. 
FAO 2002. Report of the Reykjavik Conference on responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem. 
FAO Fisheries Report 658, Rome. 
FAO 2003a. The ecosystem approach to fisheries, Issues, terminology, principles, institutional 
foundations, implementation and outlook, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 443, FAO, Rome. 
FAO 2003b. Fisheries management: the ecosystem approach to fisheries. FAO Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries, Number 4, Supplement 2, FAO, Rome. 
FAO 2003c. Report of the expert consultation on the development of international guidelines for 
ecolabelling of fish and fishery products from marine capture fisheries. FAO Fisheries Report 
726, FAO, Rome. 
FAO 2005a. Guidelines for the ecolabelling of fish and fishery products from marine capture 
fisheries. FAO, Rome. 
FAO 2005b. Technical consultation on international guidelines for the ecolabelling of fish and 
fishery products from marine capture fisheries. FAO Fisheries Report 760. FAO, Rome. 
Freire J., Bernardez C., Corgos A., Fernandez L., Gonzalez-Gurriaran E, Sanpedro M.P. & Verisimo 
P. 2002. Management strategies for sustainable invertebrate fisheries in coastal ecosystems 
of Galicia (NW Spain). Aqautic Ecology 36: 41-50. 
Frouws J. 1994. Mest en macht. Een politiek-sociologische studie naar belangenbehartiging en 
beleidsvorming inzake de mestproblematiek in Nederland vanaf 1970. Proefschrift LUW, 
Wageningen. 
Gamito S. 1997. Sustainable management of a coastal lagoon system (Ria Formosa, Portugal): an 
ecological model for extensive aquaculture. Int. J. of Salt Lake Res. 6: 145-173. 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority  2003. Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Zoning Plan. 
http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/corp_site/management/zoning/zoning_publications.html
Greenpeace 2004. Rescuing the North and Baltic Seas: marine reserves – a key tool. Greenpeace 
Report July 2004 
Gubbay S. & Knapman P.A. 1999. A review of the effects of fishing within UK marine sites. English 
Nature (UK Marine SACs Project), 134p. 
Habermas J. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.  
Hall S. ., Basford D.J. & Roberts M.R. 1990. The impact of hydraulic dredging for razor clams 
Ensis spp. on an infaunal community. Neth. J. Sea Research 27: 119-125. 
Hardin G. 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 13: 1243-1248. 
Hardin G. 1998. Extensions of "the tragedy of the commons". Science 280: 682-683. 
Hoefnagel E. 2002. Corporatist origin of the Dutch co-management system. In: IIFET Conference 
Proceedings Fisheries in the Global Economy New Zealand.  
Hutchings J.A. 2000. Collapse and recovery of marine fishes. Nature, 406, 882-885. 
ICES 2003. Report of the Working Group on Environmental Interactions of Mariculture. ICES report 
CM 2003/F:04. 
IDON 2005. Integraal Beheerplan Noordzee 2015. Ministeries van VenW, LNV, EZ en VROM, Den 
Haag. 
Imeson R.J., van den Bergh J.C.J.M. 2005. Policy failure and stakeholder dissatisfaction in complex 
ecosystem management: the case of the Dutch Wadden Sea shellfishery. Ecological 
Economics 56:  488-507. 
International Pacific Halibut Commission 1994. Pacific halibut bycatch in the groundfish fisheries: 
effects on and management Implications for the halibut Fishery. Scentific Report No. 78. 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/scientif.htm
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 99
 International Pacific Halibut Commission 1998. The Pacific halibut: biology, fishery and 
management. Technical Report No. 40. 
http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/technical.htm
International Pacific Halibut Commission, 2004. IPHC Report of assessment and Research Activities 
2004. http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom/pubs/rara/2004rara/2004rara.htm
Jackson J.B.C. 2001. What was natural in the coastal oceans? Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 98: 5411-5418. 
Jackson J.B.C., Kirby M.X., Berger W.H., Bjorndal K.A., Botsford L.W., Bourque B.J., Bradbury R.H. 
Cooke R., Erlandson J., Estes J.A., Hughes T.P., Kidwell S., Lange C.B., Lenihan H.S., Pandolfi 
J.M., Peterson C.H., Steneck R.S., Tegner M.J. & Warner R.R. 2001. Historical overfishing and 
the recent collapse of coastal ecosystems. Science 293: 629-638. 
Jefferson F.A. & Currey B.E. 1994. Global review of porpoise Cetacea; Phoecoenidae mortality in 
gill nets. Biological Conservation 76: 167-183. 
Jentoft S. 1989. Fisheries co-management, Delegating government responsibility to fishermen's 
organizations. Marine Policy April 1989: 137-154. 
Jentoft S. & Mikalsen K.H. 1994. Regulating fjord fisheries: Folk management or interest group 
politics? In: C.L. Dyer and J.R. McGoodwin (eds). Folk management in the world's fisheries: 
lessons for modern fisheries management, pp. 287-316. University Press of Colorado Press, 
Boulder CO. 
Jentoft S. McCay B. 1995. User participation in fisheries management, lessons drawn from 
international experiences. Marine Policy 19: 227-246 
Jentoft S. & Sandersen H.T. 1996. Cooperatives in fisheries management: the case of St. Vincet 
and the Grenadines. Society & Natural Resources 9: 295-305. 
Johannes R.E. 1978, Traditional marine conservation methods in Oceania and their demise. Ann. 
Rev. Ecol. Systematics 9: 349-364. 
Johannes R.E. 2002. The renaissance of community-based marine resource management in 
Oceania. Ann. Rev. Ecol. Systematics 33:  317-340. 
Kaiser M.J. & Spencer B.E. 1996. The effects of beam-trawl disturbance on infaunal communities in 
different habitats. J. Anim. Ecol. 65: 348-358. 
Kaiser, M. J. & Edwards-Jones G. 2006. The role of ecolabeling in fisheries management and 
conservation. Cons. Biol. 20: 392–398. 
Kaschner K. & Pauly D. 2004. Competition between marine mammals and fisheries: food for 
thought. Humane Society of the United States / Humane Society International (HSUS/HSI) 
report presented to 56 Ann. Meeting IWC (Sorrento, Italy). Available from: 
www.hsus.org/whales. 
Kooiman J., van Vliet M. & Jentoft S. 1999 (eds). Creative governance, opportunities for fisheries in 
Europe, Ashgate, Aldershot. 
Kooiman J. Jentoft S., Pullin R. & Bavinck M. (eds). 2005. Fish for life: interactive governance for 
fisheries. Amsterdam University Press.  
Landbouw-Economisch Instituut (LEI) 1996. Bijdrage aan de eindevaluatie van de uitvoering van de 
voorstellen van de stuurgroep Biesheuvel, september 1996, LEI-DLO, Afdeling Visserij, Den 
Haag. 
Lindeboom H.J. & de Groot S.J. (eds). 1998. The effects of different types of fisheries on the North 
Sea and Irish Sea ecosystems. RIVO-DLO report C003/98. 
Lindeboom H.J., Geurts van Kessel A.J.M. & Berkenbosch A. 2005. Gebieden met bijzondere 
ecologische waarden op het Nederlands Continentaal Plat. Rapport RIKZ/2005.008, Den Haag 
/ Alterra rapport 1109, Wageningen. 
Marcovaldi M.Â. 1993. A new initiative to protect green turtles at an important foraging ground in 
Ceará, Brazil. Marine Turtle Newsletter 63: 3-14. 
WOt-rapport 42 100 
 Marcovaldi M.Â. & dei Marcovaldi G.G. 1999. Marine turtles of Brazil: the history and structure of 
Projeto TAMAR-ffiAMA. Biol. Cons. 91:35-41. 
McCay B.J. 1980. A fishermen’s cooperative, limited: indigenous resource management in a 
complex society. Anthropological Quarterly 53: 29-38. 
McCay B.J. & Jentoft S. 1996. Allmende-Probleme, Unvertrautes Gelände: Gemeineigentum unter 
der socialwissenschaftlichen Lupe. In: A. Diekmann & C.C. Jaeger (eds). Sonderdruck 
Umweltsoziologie, Kölner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Socialpsychologie, Westdeutscher 
Verlag GmbH, Opladen. 
McLeod C.R., Yeo M., Brown A. E., Burn A. J., Hopkins J. J. & Way S. F. 2002. The Habitats 
Directive: selection of Special Areas of Conservation in the UK, 2nd edition. Part 1: 
Background to site selection. Joint Nature Conservation Committee, Peterborough. 
(www.jncc.gov.uk/SAC selection). 
Meijer W, Lodders-Elfferich P.C. & Hermans L.M.L.H.A. 2004. Ruimte voor de Wadden, Eindrapport 
Adviesgroep Waddenzeebeleid, ‘s Gravenhage. 
Michler T. 2003. Management of marine bio resources. A comparative study of three European 
coastal areas. Master thesis. Universitat Oldenburg.  
 http://www.eucc-d.de/infos/Michler_Management_of_Marine_Bio-Resources.pdf 
Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (LNV) 1993. Vissen naar evenwicht, 
regeringsbeslissing Structuurnota Zee- en kustvisserij, Den Haag. 
Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (LNV) 2004. Ruimte voor een zilte oogst. Naar 
een omslag in de Nederlandse schelpdiercultuur. Beleidsbesluit Schelpdiervisserij 2005-2020. 
Den Haag. 
Ministeries van VROM, LNV., VenW & EZ. 2004. Nota Ruimte. Ruimte voor ontwikkeling. PKB deel 3 
Regeringsbeslissing. SDU, Den Haag (http://www.vrom.nl).  
Myers R.A. & Worm B. 2003. Rapid world wide depletion of predatory fish communities. Nature 
423: 280. 
Noordhuis R. & Houwing E.J. 2003. Afname van de driehoeksmossel in het Markermeer. RIZA 
Rapport 2003. 016. 
Odus 2001. Uit de schulp, visie op duurzame ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse schelpdiervisserij, 
Stichting Odus, Yerseke juni 2001 
Osborne R.W., Koski K.L. & Tallmon R.E. 2001. Voluntary marine protected areas and adaptive 
management in the San Juan Islands, Pudget Sound Research, The Whale Museum, Friday 
Harbor. 
OSPAR 2003. Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
meeting of the OSPAR Commission, Bremen: 23-27 June 2003, OSPAR Recommendation 
2003/3 on a Network of Marine Protected Areas, Annex 9. 
Ostrom E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambrdige Unviversity Press, Cambridge. 
Patiri de Andrade V. 2002. Projectos Ecológicos e o desenvolvimiento local – estudo de caso do 
Projecto TAMAR. MBA Disertation, Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), Salvador, Brasil.  
Pauly D., Christensen V., Dalsgaard J., Froese R. & Torres Jr. F. 1998. Fishing down marine food 
webs. Science 279: 860-863. 
Pauly D., Christensen V. Coelho L. (eds). 1999. Proceedings of the EXPO'98 conference on ocean 
food webs and economic productivity. Lisbon, Portugal, 1-3 July 1998 ACP – EU Fisheries 
Research Report No. 5 Brussels, September 1999. 
Pauly D., Christensen V., Guénette S., Pitcher T.J., Sumaila U.R., Walters C.J., Watson R. & Zeller 
D. 2002. Towards sustainability in world fisheries. Nature 418: 689-695. 
Pauly D. & Maclean J.L. 2003. In a perfect ocean: the state of fisheries and ecosystems in the 
North Atlantic Ocean. Island Press, Washinton DC. 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 101
 Pierre-Nathoniel, Dawn 2003. Towards the strengthening of the association. The case of the 
Soufriere Management Area (SMMA) Saint Lucia, paper prepared for the second International 
Tropical Marine Ecosystems Management Symposium (ITMEMS II), 24 - 27 March 2003, 
Philippines, Saint Lucia Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2003 
Piersma T., Koolhaas A., Dekinga A., Beukema J.J., Dekker R. & Essink K. 2001. Long-term 
indirect effects of mechanical cockle-dredging on intertidal bivalve stocks in the Wadden Sea. 
J. Appl. Ecol. 38: 976-990. 
Pinkerton E. 1989. Cooperative management of local fisheries. New directions for improved 
management & community development, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver. 
Polunin N. 1999. Marine protected areas: adaptations for use in temperate conditions. 
Proceedings of the EXPO'98 Conference on Ocean Food Webs and Economic Productivity, 
Lisbon, Portugal, 1-3 July 1998 ACP – EU Fisheries Research Report No. 5 Brussels, 
September 1999. 
Pomeroy C. 2003. Co-management and marine reserves in fishery management. In: D.C. Wilson, J. 
Raakjaer Nielsen & P. Degnbol (eds). The fisheries co-management experience: 
accomplishments, challenges and prospects, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Fish and Fisheries 
Series 26: 213-227. 
Raymundo L.J. 2002. Community-based coastal resources management of Apo Island, Negros 
Oriental, Philippines: history and lessons leaned, annex 2. Report from UNEP/EAS/ICRAN 
workshop (26-27 Aug. 2002) Phuket, Thailand. 
Reilly S., Hedley S., Borgerg J., Hewitt R., Thiele D., Watkins J. & Naganobu M. 2004. Biomass and 
energy transfer to baleen whales in the South Atlantic sector of the Southern Ocean. Deep-Sea 
Research II 51: 1397-1409. 
Reykjavik declaration on responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem 2001. Conference on 
responsible fisheries in the marine ecosystem, 1 to 4 October 2001. FAO/Iceland/Norway, 
Reykjavik. 
Reijnders P.J.H., Braseur S.M.J.M., van Leeuwen P.W. & Smit C.J. 2005. Onderzoek naar 
vermindering van bijvangst van zeehonden in fuiken. Risicoanalyse voor de Oosterschelde en 
algemene maatregelen in Nederlandse kustwateren. Alterra rapport 1211, Wageningen. 
Roberts C.M., Bohnsack J.A., Gell F., Hawkins J.P. & Goodridge R. 2001. Effects of marine 
reserves on adjacent fisheries. Science 294: 1920–1923. 
Roberts C. 1999. Marine protected areas as strategic tools. Keynote speech, Protected areas as a 
strategic tool for ecosystem management, Proceedings of the EXPO'98 Conference on Ocean 
Food Webs and Economic Productivity, Lisbon, Portugal, 1-3 July 1998 ACP – EU Fisheries 
Research Report No. 5, Brussels, September 1999  
Roberts C.M. & Hawkins J.P. 2000. Fully-protected marine reserves: a guide, WWF Endangered 
Seas Campaign, Washington DC 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2004. Turning the tide: addressing the impact of 
fisheries on the marine environment. Twenty-fifth Report, presented to Parliament (UK) by 
Command of Her Majesty, December 2004. http://www.rcep.org.uk/fishreport.htm.  
Russ G.R., & Alcala A.C. 1999. Management histories of Sumilon and Apo Marine Reserves, 
Philippines, and their influence on national marine resource policy. Coral Reefs 18: 307-319. 
Sainsbury K.J. & Sumaila U.R. 2003. Incorporating ecosystem objectives into anagement of 
sustainable marine fisheries, including ‘best practice’ reference points and use of marine 
protected areas. In: M. Sinclair & G. Valdimarsson (eds). Responsible fisheries in the marine 
ecosystem, pp. 343-361. FAO, Rome. 
Sandersen H.T. & Koester S. 2000. Co-management of tropical zones: the case of Soufrière 
management area, St. Lucia, WI. Coastal Management 28: 87-97. 
Shoop C.R., Ruckdeschel C.A. & N.B. Thompson 1985. Sea turtles in the southeast United States: 
nesting activity as derived from aerial and ground surveys, 1982. Herpetologica 41: 252-259. 
WOt-rapport 42 102 
 Sociaal Economische Raad (SER) 2000. 50 Jaar Wet op de Bedrijfsorganisatie – verslag van de 
bijeenkomst Met raad en daad, 26 Mei 2000. 
Steins N.A. 1999. All hands on deck: an interactive perspective on complex common-pool resource 
management based on case studies in the coastal waters of the Isle of Wight (UK), 
Connemara, Ireland, and the Dutch Wadden Sea. PhD thesis, University of Wageningen. 
Stichting De Noordzee 2003 (SDN 2003). Natuurgebieden op zee. Brochure, Utrecht. 
Townsend R. & Wilson J.A. 1987. An economic view of the tragedy of the commons. In: B.J. McCay 
and J.M. Acheson (eds). The question of the commons. The University of Arizona Press, 
Tucson, Arizona. 
Trites A.W., Christensen V. & Pauly D. 1997. Competition between fisheries and marine mammals 
for prey and primary production in the Pacific Ocean. J. of Northwest Atlantic Fishery Science 
22: 173-187. 
United Nations (UN) 2006. Conference to address law for high sea fishing, 22-26 May, Press 
Release SEA/1852. 
Van Broekhuizen R. (ed.) 1997. Atlas van het vernieuwend platteland. Tweehonderd voorbeelden uit 
de praktijk. Misset, Doetinchem. 
Van der Ploeg J.D., Frouws J. & Renting H. 2002. Self-regulation as new response to over-
regulation. In: J.D. van der Ploeg, A. Long & J. Banks (eds). Living countrysides, pp 136-146. 
Elsevier, Doetinchem. 
Van der Schans J.W., Ypma, M., & Backus G.B.C. 2000, Staarten tellen of continu verbeteren? Naar 
een herstructurering van de Nederlandse varkenshouderij. Spil 169-170: 24-30. 
Van der Schans J.W. 2001, Governance of marine resource, Conceptual clarifications and two case 
studies, PhD dissertation, Eburon, Delft.  
Van der Schans J.W 2002. EU Governance approach. Presentatie ten behoeve van EU project 
‘Sharing responsibilities in fisheries management’. Workshop general context and case studies, 
24-26 October, Seville. 
Van der Schans J.W. 2003. Comparison self-governance Dutch fisheries and life stock industries 
Presentatie ten behoeve van EU project ‘Sharing responsibilities in fisheries management’. 
Workshop comparison and evaluation division of responsibilities, 18-22 June, The Hague. 
Van der Schans J.W., Karlsen G.R., Nielsen J.R. & Rommel D. 2003. Sharing responsibilities in 
fisheries management, analytical and methodological issues. Paper presented at the Mare 
conference ‘People and the Sea II’. 5 September 2003, Amsterdam 
Van der Schans J.W. 2004, Het Nederlandse zeevisserijbeleid: een kwestie van gedeelde 
verantwoordelijkheid. In: J. Verreth (ed.). Over Bevissing. Cahiers Stichting Bio-Wetenschappen 
& Maatschappij, Woerden. 
Van der Schans J.W. 2006. Interactive strategic management, Presentatie relatiedag agrocentrum 
voor duurzaam ondernemen, 12 September 2006, LEI, Den Haag 
Van Geffen, J., Hagendoorn A., Water J. & Boon A. 2002. Op weg naar evenwicht. Evaluatie van de 
Structuurnota Zee- en kustvisserij (1993) “Vissen naar evenwicht”. Expertisecentrum LNV, 
December 2002. 
van Gils J.A., Piersma T., Dekinga A., Spaans B. & Kraan C. 2006. Shellfish dredging pushes a 
flexible avian top predator out of a marine protected area. PLoS Biol 4(12): e376. DOI: 
10.1371/journal.pmed.0030376. 
Van Hoof L., Ellen Hoefnagel, Jan Willem van der Schans, Jesper Raakjær Nielsen, Anne-Sofie 
Christensen, Sten Sverdrup-Jensen, Alyne Delaney, Svein Jentoft, Knut Mikalsen, Geir R. 
Karlsen, Clotilde Bodiguel, Joseph Catanzano, Juan Luis Suarez de Vivero, Inmaculada 
Martínez Alba, Sonia Feria Domínguez, Dominique Rommel. 2006. Sharing responsibilities in 
fisheries management. LEI report 7.05.05, Den Haag. 
International comparison of fisheries management with respect to nature conservation 103
 Van Vliet L.M. 1992. Communicatieve besturing van het milieuhandelen van ondernemingen, 
mogelijkheden en beperkingen. Faculteit Bedrijfskunde, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 
Eburon, Delft. 
Van Wijk M.O., Smit M.H. & Taal C. 2003. Regionaal-economisch belang van de Waddenzeevisserij. 
Rapport 4.03.06 Landbouw Economisch Instituut, Den Haag. 
Verbeek M. & Christiansen S. The Azorean Exclusive Fisheries Zone. WWF & Seas At Risk. 
http://www.seas-at-risk.org/pdf/Factsheet_Azores final.pdf. 
Verhulst S., Oosterbeek K., Rutten A.L. & Ens B.J. 2004. Shellfish fishery severely reduces 
condition and survival of oystercatchers despite creation of large marine protected areas. 
Ecology & Society 9: 17. http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art17. 
Vincent Wildlife Trust 1988. The effects of otter guards on the fishing efficiency of eel fyke nets. 
London: 47p. 
Viswanathan, Kuperan K., Nielsen J.R., Degnbol P., Ahmed M., Hara M., Abdullah N.M.R. 2003. 
Fisheries co-management policy brief: findings from a worldwide study. WorldFish Center 
conribution No. 1696, WorldFish Center, Penang, Malaysia. 
White A.T., Eisma-Osorio R.-L. & Green S.J. 2005. Integrated coastal management and marine 
protected areas: complementarity in the Philippines. Ocean & Coastal Management 48: 948–
971. 
Wilson J.A., Acheson J.M., Metcalfe M. & Kleban P.1994. Chaos, complexity and community 
management of fisheries. Marine Policy 18: 291-305. 
WWF 2005. Ocean protection: are we on track? Leaflet based on PhD thesis of Louisa Woods, 
October 2005. 
 
 
http://www.xunta.es/galicia2004/en/07_08.htm,  
http://www.xunta.es/galicia2004/en/07_09.htm
http://www.apoisland.com/
http://www.starwaves.tv/corp/2005/viewroom_rs04.jsp
http://www.sabapark.org/ 
http://www.smma.org.lc/ 
http://www.kokkelvisserij.com/ 
http://www.noordzeeloket.nl/ 
http://www.schelpdieren.nl/ 
http://www.waddenzee.nl/ 
http://www.ospar.org/eng/html/ 
http://www.ngo.grida.no/wwfneap/Projects/MPA.htm 
http://cordis.europa.eu/inco/fp5/acprep_en.html 
http://www.lei.wur.nl/NL/onderzoek/Expertise/AgroCenter/ISM/ 
http://effectivempa.noaa.gov/welcome.html
http://seahorse.fisheries.ubc.ca/portugal-where.html. 
 
 
WOt-rapport 42 104 
 Acronyms 
CANARI: Caribbean Natural Resources Institute 
CAP: Corrective Action Plan used in Marine Stewardship Council certification 
CAR: Corrective Actions used in Marine Stewardship Council certification 
CCAMLR: Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
CFP: Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union 
DFL: Dutch Guilder (extinct monetary unit of the Netherlands) 
EC: European Communities (one of the three pillars of the European Union) 
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone; area of the sea where one country has the exclusive economic 
rights 
EHS: National Ecological Network (Ecologische Hoofd Structuur) 
EC: European Community 
EU: European Union 
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
GBR: Great Barrier Reef 
HFMC: Hoki Fishery Management Company Ltd 
HP: Horse Power (engine power) 
IBAMA: Brazilian Institute for the Environment 
IBN2015: Dutch management plan for the North Sea (Integraal Beheersplan Noordzee)  
ICES: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. ICES is the organisation that 
coordinates and promotes marine research in the North Atlantic.  
IDT: Individual Daily Takes 
ITQ: Individually Transferable Quota 
IUCN: The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. Since 
1990 known by the name of World Conservation Union. 
IUU fishery: Illegal Unregulated and Unreported fishing 
LEI: Landbouw-Economisch Instituut – Research institute for agricultural economics 
LNV: Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality of the Netherlands 
MNP: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Milieu- en NatuurPlanbureau) 
MPA: Marine Protected Area - any area with a protective regime for the natural environment. 
Often specifically linked to the OSPAR convention, but SAC’s and SPA’s can also be 
considered MPA’s. Different MPA’s may have different protective regimes. 
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 MSC: Marine Stewardship Council; an independent non-profit organisation that promotes 
responsible fishing practices 
MVO: organisation that promotes corporate social responsibility (CSR) to businesses, public 
authorities and NGOs (een zelfstandige organisatie die Maatschappelijk Verantwoord 
Ondernemen stimuleert en ondersteunt) 
NEFAC: North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
NGO: Non Governmental Organisation 
NIPAS: National Integrated Protected Areas System 
NMFS: National Marine Fisheries Service 
NRC: National Research Council 
OSPAR: Oslo Paris convention 1992. Convention for the protection of the marine environment 
of the north-east atlantic Contracting parties of the convention are 16 European countries.  
PFA: Pelagic Freezer-Trawler Association 
PO: Producers Organizations (of cockles or mussels for instance) 
RIKZ: National Institute for Coastal and Marine Management (Rijks Instituut voor Kust en Zee) 
SAC: Special Areas of Conservation under the European Union Habitats Directive 
SDN: Stichting de Noordzee 
SCS: Scientific Certification Systems 
SGS: International company for inspection, verification, testing and certification 
SMMA: Soufrière Marine Management Area 
SPA: Special Protection Areas under the European Union Wild Birds Directive 
SRDF: Soufrière Regional Development Foundation 
TAC: Total Allowable Catch  
TAMAR: Brazilian organisation for the protection of sea turtles 
UN: United Nations 
VEBEGA: Vereniging ter Bevordering van de Garnalenhandel – organisation to boost shrimp 
trading 
VMS: Vessel Monitoring System 
WWF: World Wide Fund for Nature 
WUR: Wageningen University and Research Centre 
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 Glossary 
Beam trawl fishery: Fishery technique where a net attached to a heavy metal beam is towed 
over the sea floor by a vessel to catch bottom living fish species and shrimp. The gear used 
for this type of fishery slightly digs into the sediment, leaving tracks and disturbing the upper 
sediment layer. 
 
Birds directive: European Union directive for the protection of areas that are important for 
wild birds  
 
Bivalve: molluscs such as mussels, oyster etc 
 
Bulk fishery: industrial fishery using fine mesh nets. In the North Sea it is mainly used for 
catching large quantities of sandeel which are removed from the nets by using powerful 
pumps. 
 
Bycatches: catch of non target species in fishery 
 
Demersal: living on the sea floor 
 
Epifauna: animals living on a certain substrate, for example bentic epifauna: animals living on 
the sea floor 
 
Fyke: a long bag shaped fishing net held open by large loops at the opening and small at the 
end of the fyke, usually placed on the sea floor, fish can swim in the net but can’t get out.  
 
Gadoid: species of the taxonomic group (family) that includes cod (Gadus morhua) 
 
Gill net: Long rectangular nets. Gillnets are placed in the water with corks and weights to 
allow them to hang in a vertical position. Fish swimming into the mesh are caught in the web 
by their gills or get entangled. 
 
Groundfish fisheries: fisheries on species that live on the sea floor such as shrimp and 
flatfish 
 
Habitats directive: European Union directive for the protection of ecologically important 
areas  
 
HP restriction: restriction in of engine power (horse power) in fishing vessels 
 
Infauna: animals living in the sediment 
 
Intertidal: shallows that emerge at low tide 
 
Invertebrates: animals without bones e.g. crabs, mussels worms etc. 
 
Long-line fishing: A long-line consists of a main line to which many branch lines (called 
snoods) are attached. Each snood has a baited hook at its end. Depending on the type of 
long-line, buoys and weights are attached to the long-line to ensure the long-line is at its 
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 required depth. Some of the long-lines set are over 100km long and they contain more than 
20,000 hooks.  
 
Macrobenthic community: small but with the bare eye visible animals living on the sea floor 
 
Maximum sustainable yield: for fishery management calculated long term fishery catch that 
can be taken without harming the fish stock 
 
Mesh size: size of the openings in a fishing net 
 
Natura2000 network: European Union network of nature protection areas, comprises of 
areas under the Habitats and Birds directives 
 
Otter trawl fishery:. As beam trawl fishery but the trawl net is kept open vertically by the 
headrope to which lots of floatsand sometimes kites are attached, and horizontally by otter 
boards, hence English otter trawl. The otter boards or doors are set at a particular angle, so 
that drag is minimised and spread of the net is maximised.  
 
Oyster spat: young oysters 
 
Pair trawling: a net is towed between two vessel; mostly used to catch pelagic species 
(midwater paired trawling) 
 
Pelagic: living in the water column 
 
Piscivorous: fish eating 
 
Primary production: organic production of plants and algae 
 
Pseudofaeces: non edible or redundant food particles embedded in mucus that are not 
digested but expelled e.g. by bivalves such as musssels 
 
Rajid populations: rays 
 
Salinas: saltpans in former salt marshes that have been converted to fish ponds 
 
Subtidal areas: areas that are also al low tide submerged 
 
Shellfish dredge: powerful suction dredging techniques to catch shellfish such as mussles, 
cockles, oyster 
 
Triploid: genetically changed to having a triple set of chromosomes in stead of double 
(diploid) 
 
Trophic level: position of an organism in the food web. Plants are the first level in the food 
web, predators dolphins, seabirds are the highest level. 
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 Species names 
English name Scientific name Dutch name 
Abalone Haliotis spec Zeeoor (soort schelpdier) 
Alaska salmon  Oncorhynchus spec. Zalm - verschillende soorten 
Alaskan Pollock  Theragra chalcogramma Koolvis 
Albatross a.o. Diomedea spec. Albatros 
Allis Shad Alosa alosa Elft 
Arctic Tern Sterna paradisaea Noordse stern 
Basking Shark Cetorhinus maximus Reuzenhaai 
Baxter’s Dogfish Etmopterus baxteri  Soort diepwaterhaai uit NZ 
Banana prawn Penaeus merguiensis Bananengarnaal 
Bivalves Class Bivalvia Tweekleppigen 
Black-browed Albatross Thalassarche melanophris Wenkbrauwalbatros 
Black Tern Chlidonias niger Zwarte stern 
Black-throated Diver Gavia arctica Parelduiker 
Brown Shrimp Crangon crangon Garnaal 
Bryozoans Phylum Bryozoa Mosdiertjes 
Buller’s Albatross Thalassarche bulleri Bullers Albatros 
Cephalopods Class Cephalopoda Inktivissen 
Cetaceans Order Cetacea Walvissen en Dolfijnen 
Chinook salmon Oncorhynchus tshawytscha Chinookzalm 
Chum salmon Oncorhynchus keta Chum Zalm 
Blond Clam Ruditapes rhomboides Soort Tapijtschelp 
Cockle Cerastoderma edule Kokkel 
Cod Gadus morhua Kabeljauw 
Coho salmon Oncorhynchus kisutch Zalm 
Common Tern Sterna hirundo Visdief 
Cordgrass Spartina spec. Slijkgras 
Creel Nephrops norvegicus Noorse Kreeft 
Crustaceans Subfylum Crustacea Kreeftachtigen 
Cuttlefish Order Sepiidae Zeekatten (Inktvissen) 
Eastern king prawn Melicertus plebejus Soort garnaal 
Echinoderms Phylum Echinodermata Stekelhuidigen (o.a. Zeesterren) 
Edible Oyster Ostrea edulis Platte Oester 
Eider Somateria mollissima Eidereend 
Endeavour prawn Metapenaus spec. Soort Garnaal 
European Storm-petrel Hydrobates pelagicus Stormvogeltje 
Gadoid Family Gadidae Kabeljauwachtigen 
Gastropod Class Gastropoda Slakken 
Great Northern Diver Gavia immer IJsduiker 
Green Sea Turtle Chelonia mydas Soepschildpad 
Grooved Carpet Shell Ruditapes decussatus Getraliede Tapijtschelp 
Haddock Melanogrammus aeglefinus Schelvis 
Hake Merluccius sp Heek 
Harbour porpoise Phocoena phocoena Bruinvis 
Hawksbill Turtle Eretmochelys imbricata Karetschildpad 
Herring Clupea harengus Haring 
Honeycomb Worm Sabellaria alveolata Honingraatworm 
Icelandic cyprine Arctica islandica Noordkromp (tweekleppige) 
Knot Calidris canutus Kanoetstrandloper 
Lampern Lampetra fluviatilis Rivierprik 
Leach’s Storm-peterl Oceanodroma leucorhoa Vaal stormvogeltje 
Leatherback Sea Turtle Demochelys coriacea Lederschildpad 
Ling Geypterus blacodes Vissoort uit Nieuw-Zeeland  
Little Tern Sterna albifrons Dwergstern 
Lugworm Arenicola marina Wadpier 
Loggerhead Sea Turtle Caretta caretta Onechte Karetschildpad 
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 Mackerel Scomber scombrus Makreel 
Mediterranean Mussel Mytilus galloprovincialis Diepwatermossel 
Moreton bay bugs Thenus orientalis Berenkreeft 
Mussel Mytilus edulis Mossel 
New Zealand Hoki  Macruronus novaezelandiae Blauwe grenadier (heekachtige) 
North Sea Herring Clupea harengus Haring 
Norway Lobster Nephrops norvegicus Noorse Kreeft 
Oyster Ostrea edulis Platte Oester 
Octopus Order Octopoda Octopus 
Olive Ridley Lepidochelys olivacea Warana 
Oystercatcher Haematopus ostralegus Scholekster 
Pacific cod Gadus macrocephalus Pacifische Kabeljauw 
Pacific halibut Hippoglossus stenolepis Heilbot 
Patagonian Toothfish Dissostichus eleginoides Tandvis 
Petrel Order Procellariiformes Stormvogels 
Pink salmon Oncorhynchus gorbuscha Roze Zalm 
Plaice Pleuronectes platessa Schol 
Pollock (Alaskan) Theragra chalcogramma Koolvis 
Portuguese Oyster Crassostrea angulata Portugese Oester 
Razor clam Ensis spec. Zwaardschede (tweekleppige) 
Rajid Family Rajidae Roggen 
Red Rock Lobster (Mexico) Panulirus Interruptus Langoest 
Red spot king prawn Melicertus longistylus Soort Garnaal 
Red-throated Diver Gavia stellata Roodkeelduiker 
Rockfish Morone saxatilis Gestreepte Zeebaars 
Saithe Pollachius virens Koolvis 
Sandwich Tern Sterna sandvicensis Grote stern 
Scallop  Family Pectinidae o.a. Sint-Jakobsschelp 
Sea lamprey Petromyzon marinus Zeeprik 
Sea urchin Strongylocentrotus pallidus Zee-egel 
Seabass Dicentrarchus labrax Zeebaars 
Seabream Family Sparidae Zeebrasemachtigen 
Sea cucumber Class Holothuroidea Zeekomkommer 
Seagrass Zostera spec. Zeegras 
Seahorses and pipefish Family Syngnathidae Zeepaardjes en Zeenaalden 
Seal Superfamily Pinnipedia Zeehond 
Seal shark Dalatias licha  Soort diep water haai 
Shovelnose dogfish Deania calcea  Soort diep water haai 
Shrimp  Crangon crangon Garnaal 
Silver warehou Seriolella punctata Soort uit familie v.d. Zwartvissen 
Slavonian Grebe Podiceps auritus Kuifduiker 
Sockeye salmon Oncorhynchus nerka Rode Zalm 
Sole Solea solea Schol 
South African Hake Merluccius paradoxus  Heek 
South Patagonian Toothfish Dissostichus eleginoides Patagonische IJsheek 
Squid Order Teuthida Pijlinktvis 
Sturgeon Acipenser sturio Steur 
Surf Clam Spisula solida Stevige Strandschelp 
Syngnathids Family Syngnathidae Zeepaardjes en Zeenaalden 
Tiger prawn  Penaeus monodon Tijgergarnaal 
Trochus Trochus spec. Knoopjesschelp 
Trough Shells Spisula spec. Strandschelp (tweekleppige) 
Twaite shad Alosa fallax Fint 
Yellow fin sole Limanda aspera Japanse Schar 
Western King Prawn Melicertus latisulcatus Soort Garnaal 
Western Australian Rock Lobster Panulirus cygnus Langoest 
Whelk Buccinum undatum Wulk (schelpdier) 
White-chinned Petrel Procellaria aequinoctialis Witkinstormvogel 
Whiting Merlangius merlangus Wijting 
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 Annex 1  Workshop on fishery management in nature 
areas 
Invitation and program 
Fishery management in nature areas – What is the most effective way to protect the 
ecosystem?  
 
Lessons from the real world 
 
Workshop. Thursday the 1st of December 2005, at the LEI in The Hague 
 
Almost the entire Wadden Sea and Oosterschelde, and important parts of the Westerschelde 
are designated as special protection areas and special areas of conservation under the 
European Bird and Habitat Directives. Soon, the European Water Framework Directive will take 
effect. This leads to many questions. How will these Directives be implemented? What does 
this mean for the many fisheries that currently exist in these areas? Does fishery always 
conflict with nature conservation, or do fisheries exist that do not significantly harm nature? In 
which way should the fishery be managed? How can we organize the fishery that sustainables 
fisheries are allowed to continue, while not damaging the ecosystem? Or should we decide for 
a geographic separation between fishery and nature conservation? 
 
Similar discussions will soon commence for the North Sea. Nature areas on the open sea may 
be realized before long now that the “Integraal Beheerplan Noordzee 2015” has designated 4 
protected areas on the North Sea. This leads to the question which fisheries are possible and 
acceptable in the protected areas. Which types of management can guarantee that the impact 
of the fisheries on the ecosystems of the protected areas will be minimal? At the very least, 
the fishery in the protected areas should not deplete the fished stocks, should have a minimal 
impact on the bottom and the benthic fauna and should not affect the productivity and the 
structure of the ecosystem. 
  
Do fisheries exist elsewhere in the world that are managed in such a way that nature is 
sufficiently protected and can these fisheries serve as an example for Dutch policy makers? 
Do such cases always involve fisheries governed by the state, or is there also a role for self 
regulation by the fishermen (co-management)? What is the role of other parties (in the chain of 
production, non-governmental organizations) in the protection of the natural values? Is it the 
case that fisheries that qualify for the MSC certificate (Marine Stewardship Council) 
automatically meet the criteria of the Bird and Habitats Directive that the fishery should not 
cause significant harm to the natural values for which the area was designated under these 
directives. How does the management of the MSC fisheries function in practice? What are the 
advanteges and the disadvantages of the different types of management? And on what points 
can the public and the private sector learn from each other and mutually strengthen each 
other? 
  
On thursay the 1st of December 2005, Alterra, LEI, “Stichting De Noordzee” and 
“Waddenvereniging” organize a workshop on this topic. The workshop gives further impetus to 
a discussion in the Netherlands which types of management can contribute to sustainable 
fisheries in protected areas. 
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 The morning program consists of five plenary presentations. In the afternoon, working groups 
will discuss specific themes and examples. With this invitation we ask you to reserve Thursday 
the 1st of December in your agenda. 
 
The workshop is aimed at: 
• scientists (fishery biologists and ecologists) 
• persons with an active role in the management of a particular fishery 
 
Morning Program 
Bruno Ens (Alterra) & Esther Luiten (SDN) – Introduction and goal of the workshop 
Jan Willem van der Schans – Which forms of fishery management are the most effective with 
regard to nature conservation: stimuli from the government or stimuli from the market? 
Ger Jan Piet (RIVO) – Ecosystem approaches in the Communal Fisheries Policy of the EU 
Cor Smit – What are the implications of the Euprean Nature Directives and OSPAR for fishery 
management? 
Kees Lankester – How are ecosystem effects monitored of fisheries certified under the MSC 
and what are the opporunties to certify SSDD (small-scale data-deficient) fisheries? 
Bruno Ens – What is known of the ecosystem impact of the fisheries certified under the MSC 
criteria? 
 
Afternoon Program 
Discussion in groups on selected fisheries and questions. The draft report on the international 
comparison of fishery management produced for the Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau will serve as 
the basis for our discussion. 
• Does the MSC certificate offer sufficient protection against damage of the 
ecosystem by the fishery, i.e. do MSC certified fisheries automatically meet the 
demands of the Birds and Habitats Directives? Is it perhaps even true that the 
Marine Stewardship Council offers more protection against damage to the 
ecosystem from fishery than the European directives? The discussion could focus 
on selected examples: 
a. Mussel fishery in the Wadden Sea 
b. Shrimp fishery in the Wadden Sea and North Sea 
c. Beam trawl fishery on flatfish in the North Sea 
• Are there fisheries that are not certified by the MSC, yet are regulated in such a 
way that they offer sufficient protection of the natural values in an area? The 
discussion could focus on the examples in the draft report for the MNP: 
a. Ria Formosa in Portugal 
b. Ria’s in Galicië in Spain 
c. Otter trawl fishery on the Great Barrier Reef in Australia 
d. Halibut fishery in the norther Pacific and the Bering Strait 
e. Fishery on lugworms in the Wadden Sea 
f. Former fishery on sea turtles in Brazil 
• What are the possiblities to oganize small-scale and data-deficient fisheries in 
such a way that they do not cause significant harm to nature? The discussion 
could focus on: 
a. Fishery on Bass and Mullet in the Wadden Sea 
b. Small scale integrated fishery in the Wadden Sea 
c. Hand cockle fishery in the Wadden Sea 
 
Discussion groups report back and final discussion on the conclusions 
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Main conclusions of the workshop 
 
Topic 1: Does the MSC offer sufficient protection against damage of the ecosystem 
by the fishery? (Bruno Ens & Frank Petersen) 
 
The participants did not agree on a clear yes or a clear no to the question. 
 
The discussion focused on the added value and the possibilities of the MSC for the Dutch 
fisheries. 
In the past, the mussel fishery has initiated a process of certification, but this process was not 
finished. The time may not have been ripe, but present conditions seem more favourable for 
the MSC certificate. 
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 At present, the mussel fishery must make each year an impact assessment for the European 
Directives. For the MSC certificate a full impact assessment is only required every five years. 
Some remarks on MSC: 
• MSC is a way to solve the discussion on what constitutes a sustainable fishery 
• With the MSC fishermen can show what they actually do to improve the 
sustainability of their fishery 
• The market asks for certification 
• The existence of the MSC certificate attests to the failure of the Common Fishery 
Policy of the European Union 
 
The Dutch government does not take an active policy with regard to ecological labels and 
certificates. Government provides the framework and business must take the initiative. In 
some special cases the government contributes to certication (mullet fishery in the Wadden 
Sea). Other governments may be more inclined to contribute to certication. The international 
examples of fisheries with the MSC certificate include only one case where certification was 
obtained without government support. 
 
The EU is also developing a policy on certification. At present it is not clear what this policy 
will look like. It seems logical to take the FAO document as a starting point, instead of coming 
up with completely new policies. 
 
The MSC does address welfare issues via stakeholders and fishery management. 
 
 
Topic 2: Do there exist fisheries not certified by the MSC that are managed in such a 
way that nature is sufficiently protected and what can we learn from these fisheries? 
(Han Lindeboom and Hein Sas) 
 
The cases studies suggest that in other countries fishery is more often managed from an 
ecosystem perspective. The important question concerns the underlying motivation and the 
decision making process leading to this type of management. To learn more on these issues, 
the following questions need to be addressed: 
• Are we sufficiently informed about the case studies? Answering this question requires 
a more thorough investigation into the case studies 
• What are the goals and the results of the case studies and do these include results 
that should be copied by the Netherlands? 
 
A major problem of many fisheries is the lack of selectivity, leading to a lot of bycatch. As a 
result the impact on nature is often high and it is difficult to reconcile such unselective 
fisheries with nature protection. 
 
A problem for the fishermen is that fish stocks can be quite variable. How should fishermen 
cope with this natural variability?” 
• Spreading of risk by fishing on different target species. Specialization on only one 
species increases the risk of overfishing. 
• Small scale fisheries can be temporarily closed when stocks are low. This is not 
possible in large fisheries where a lot of capital has been injected, due to the financial 
risks. 
 
Especially with regard to the management of small-scale fisheries we may learn from other 
countries. However, the current licensing system may make it difficult to implement some of 
the foreign solutions in the Netherlands. Changing to a different way of fishing may be difficult 
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 due to the quota system, permits, financial consequences and the mentality of all parties 
involved. 
  
Sustainability requires leadership and a governing body. Those involved should profit from 
organizing a sustainable fishery.  
 
 
Topic 3: Should smallscale fisheries always be given a chance to fish in nature 
areas? (Esther Luijten and Siebold van Breukelen) 
 
The scale of a fishery is not the issue. What matters is the impact of the fishery on the 
ecosystem. Data are needed to gauge this impact and to a large extent, these data can be 
collected by the fishermen themselves (catches, bycatches, expenses etc.). Anticipating more 
restrictive regulations, the mullet fishery in the Wadden Sea has embarked on a process of 
certification (Waddengoud). Four of the five fishermen participate in this certification process. 
The collection of data, like the size of captured fish and the size of the stock, is discussed. 
 
Fishermen should explain to society how they exploit the fish stocks and what impact they 
have on the ecosystem. The annual income of a fisherman is a good indicator of the 
sustainability of a fishery. Topdown regulation results in the fishermen being less inclined to 
provide information. Initiatives from the sector, like the application to obtain the MSC 
certificate, are more positive, resulting in a greater willingness of the fishermen to provide 
data. 
 
Smallscale fishermen are more flexible and can more easily adapt their fishing methods, 
because they suffer less from high capital burdens. However, adaptation or change to another 
type of fishery is difficult, because fisheries are regulated species by species. Monitoring of 
smallscale fisheries may also be difficult. 
 
One way or the other (smallscale) fishery should be limited to guarantee that the number of 
permits does not increast too much. The fishery sector should come up with a proposal. If the 
government regulates a fishery well, certification would not be necessary. 
 
 
Final discussion 
 
If not all fishermen participate in the MSC certification this may lead to problems with the 
antitrust authority. MSC certification depends on the voluntary participation by the fishermen. If 
some fishermen do not want to cooperate, it is difficult to obtain certification. 
 
The Dutch government endorses certificates, like the MSC. Transparency and an explanation 
by the fishermen of their activities to society and stakeholders is very valuable. 
 
Implementation of the Habitats and Birds Directive at sea and the formulation of the 
conservation goals is taking shape in relative isolation. Yet, implementation (in 2007) will be 
strict and swift. 
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